Infrastructure (Sustainability Assessment)

INPRO basic principle (BP) for sustainability assessment in the area infrastructure - A country shall be able to adopt, maintain or enlarge an NES for the supply of energy and related products without making an excessive investment in national infrastructure.

Introduction

Scope

Issues other than technical requirements for NES are important to potential users of nuclear energy. Many of the factors that will either facilitate or obstruct the ongoing deployment of nuclear power over the next fifty years and beyond relate to infrastructure — national, regional and international.
Within the INPRO methodology, the term infrastructure can be defined as a collection of necessary capabilities of national institutions to achieve the long term sustainability of a nuclear power programme in a given country. These capabilities are essential for successful deployment and operation (or expansion) of an NES, and require legal (e.g. nuclear law) and institutional (e.g. regulatory bodies), industrial and economic (e.g. support to the owner/operator of a nuclear power plant) and sociopolitical measures (e.g. public acceptance and human resources).
The definition of an NES includes, in addition to the reactor, all nuclear fuel cycle facilities (i.e. components) at both the front end of the fuel cycle (e.g. mining/milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication) and the back end (e.g. reprocessing, storage and disposal of waste) and associated infrastructure. Consequently, infrastructure is a part of the NES to be assessed; however, within the INPRO methodology, a reactor and related nuclear fuel cycle facilities are not considered to be a part of a national infrastructure, albeit that they influence the size of the necessary infrastructure required in a given country, region and globally.

Objective

It is generally recognized that to operate nuclear facilities, particularly a nuclear power plant (NPP), safely and securely, a sophisticated infrastructure is required. Countries that already operate NPPs will, in general, already have an appropriate infrastructure in place, but this is unlikely to be the case for a country that has not yet acquired its first NPP.
The manual can be used to look at infrastructure requirements in a country considering whether to acquire its first NPP, planning for the expansion of an existing nuclear power programme, and/or for replacing currently operating plants when they reach the end of their useful life, or when planning for other components of an NES, for example, for fuel manufacturing.
The manual is not intended to provide specific guidance on creating the necessary infrastructure, but focuses on assessing the status of the infrastructure, whether already existing or being planned. For a country embarking on a nuclear power programme, specific guidance on creating an adequate infrastructure is provided in the IAEA publications entitled Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power [4] and Evaluation of the Status of National Nuclear Infrastructure Development [5], and by the related IAEA peer review service Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR) [6] offered to Member States by the IAEA.
An assessment using the INPRO methodology should lead either to the confirmation that an established (or planned) infrastructure is adequate for the nuclear power programme planned (or in operation) or to the definition of actions that need to be taken to achieve an adequate infrastructure.
Planning for a first NPP, or for the enlargement of an existing NES, and planning for addressing the associated infrastructural issues are closely linked and one necessitates the other. On the other hand, establishing or upgrading the necessary infrastructure takes time and effort and so actions to this end are unlikely to be started until energy system planning has clearly identified nuclear power as an option for (additional) energy supply that should be seriously considered. Thus, in this publication, the discussion of infrastructure requirements also involves on occasion a discussion of energy system planning, since, at least at the early stages of planning, infrastructure planning and energy system planning are interwoven and interdependent activities. For example, energy system planning, when considered in isolation from infrastructure, may indicate that an NPP should enter into operation within a relatively short time frame. But ensuring the infrastructure (existing or planned) is adequate to acquire and safely operate especially the first NPP may require a significantly longer time. So, the energy system planning process cannot be completed without considering the related infrastructure planning process

Structure

In Section 2, the main information that is needed for an INPRO assessment in the area of infrastructure is specified. In Section 3, background information concerning the basic principle of INPRO, user requirements and criteria in the INPRO methodology area of infrastructure is set out and a process for evaluating the criteria is presented. From the discussion in the preceding section, it is clear that a number of factors or topics need to be considered in the area of infrastructure. These factors are grouped together and discussed in Section 3 of the manual, under the following general headings, each of which represents a user requirement (UR) in the area of infrastructure:

• Legal and institutional considerations (UR1);
• Industrial and economic considerations (UR2);
• Political support and public acceptance (UR3);
• Human resources (UR4);
• Minimization of infrastructure (UR5);
• Regional and international arrangements (UR6).

The basic principle, user requirements and the corresponding criteria in the INPRO methodology area of infrastructure are set out in Table 1.

Table 1. Overview of basic principle, user requirements and criteria in the INPRO methodology area of infrastructure

INPRO basic principle for sustainability assessment in the area of infrastructure: A country shall be able to adopt, maintain or enlarge an NES for the supply of energy and related products without making an excessive investment in national infrastructure.
INPRO user requirements	Criteria	Indicator (IN) and Acceptance Limit (AL)
UR1: Legal and institutional infrastructure: An adequate legal framework should be established to cover issues of nuclear liability, safety and radiation protection, environmental protection, control of operation, waste management and decommissioning, security and non-proliferation	CR1.1: Legal aspects	IN1.1: Status of legal framework
		AL1.1: Legal framework has been established in accordance with international standards
	CR1.2:	IN1.2: Status of State organizations with responsibilities for safety and radiation protection, environmental protection, control of operation, waste management and decommissioning, emergency preparedness and response, security and non-proliferation
		AL1.2: State organizations have been established, in accordance with international standards
UR2 : Industrial and economic infrastructure: The industrial and economic infrastructure of a country with an NESc should be adequate to support the project throughout the complete lifetime of the nuclear power programme, including planning, construction, operation, decommissioning and related waste management activities	CR2.1: Funding of infrastructure	IN2.1: Funding needed for the infrastructure of a nuclear power programme
		AL2.1: Sufficiently available to cover the nuclear power programme
	CR2.2: Size of nuclear facility	IN2.2: Size of nuclear installation
		AL2.2: Matches local needs
	CR2.3: Siting	IN2.3: Process of siting a nuclear facility
		AL2.3: Siting process has taken safety, security and environmental requirements into account in accordance with international standards
	CR2.4: Support infrastructure	IN2.4: Availability of infrastructure to support owner/operator
		AL2.4: Internally or externally available
	CR2.5: Added value	IN2.5: Added value of a nuclear power programme to society
		AL2.5: Added value > infrastructure investment by government necessary to support nuclear power programme
UR3: Political support and public acceptance: Adequate measures should be taken to achieve and maintain publice acceptance of an NES being planned or in operation to enable a government policy commitment to support the deployment and operation of the system	CR3.1: Public information	IN3.1: Information provided to public
		AL3.1: Sufficient according to national requirements, taking into account international practice
	CR3.2: Public participation	IN3.2: Participation of public in decision making process on a nuclear power programme
		AL3.2: Sufficient according to national requirements, taking into account international practice
	CR3.3: Survey of public acceptance	IN3.3: Public acceptance of nuclear power
		AL3.3: Sufficient to expect that the political risk of policy support for nuclear power is acceptable
	CR3.4: Policy support	IN3.4:.Government policy regarding nuclear power
		AL3.4: Policy is supportive of nuclear power
	CR3.5: Political environment and investor risk	IN3.5: Long term political commitment to a nuclear power programme
		AL3.5: Commitment sufficient to enable a return of investment
UR4: Human resources: The necessary human resources should be available to enable all responsible parties involved in a nuclear power programme to achieve safe, secure and economical operation of the NES during its lifetime	CR4.1: Human resources	IN4.1: Availability of adequate human resources to establish and operate an NES
		AL4.1: Sufficient according to international experience
UR5: Minimization of infrastructureg: The NES should be designed to minimize the necessary infrastructure for a nuclear power programme	CR5.1: Personnel	IN5.1: Human resources needed for operation, maintenance and repair and decommissioning
		AL5.1: Amount of human resources is reduced in comparison to an existing facility
	CR5.2: Prefabrication of components	IN5.2: Extent of prefabrication of components
		AL5.2: Extent is increased in comparison to an existing facility
UR6: Regional and international arrangements: Regional and international arrangements should provide options that enable a country with an NES to minimize the infrastructure for a nuclear power programme	CR6.1: Options to reduce institutional infrastructure	IN6.1: Have regional and/or international arrangements to reduce the institutional infrastructure been considered?
		AL6.1: Yes
	CR6.2: Options to reduce industrial infrastructure	IN6.2: Have regional and/or international arrangements to reduce the industrial infrastructure been considered?
		AL6.2: Yes
	CR6.3: Options to reduce social political infrastructure	IN6.3: Have regional and/or international arrangements to reduce the social political infrastructure been considered?
		AL6.3: Yes
	CR6.4: Options to reduce human resources	IN6.4: Have regional and/or international arrangements to reduce human resources been considered?
		AL6.4: Yes

Necessary input for INPRO sustainability assessment in the area of infrastructure

This section first discusses the importance of performing energy system planning to define the role of nuclear power in an energy mix to satisfy the predicted growth of energy demand in a country. Subsequently, the main information needed for an assessment using the INPRO methodology in the area of infrastructure and its potential source is defined.

Energy system planning and planning for a nuclear power programme

Energy system planning is highly important for the success of a nuclear power programme, especially if it is the first nuclear project in a country, e.g. the installation of the first NPP. Energy system planning is discussed in Section 2 of the economics manual [11] of the INPRO methodology.
Energy system planning should:

• Define a technically feasible and economically optimized plan for the expansion of the energy supply;
• Examine the role of nuclear power in the energy supply plan of the country.

However, energy system planning does not form a part of an assessment using the INPRO methodology per se. In general, the INPRO methodology assumes that an NES has been specified to contribute to meeting a defined (future) energy demand. The INPRO methodology is then used to determine whether the INPRO methodology requirements are met, in which case the NES represents a sustainable source of energy.
In case of an intended installation of a (first or additional) NPP, the final outcome of the energy system planning phase should be the specification of the contribution, as a function of time, that nuclear technology will make to the energy supply in a country (or region, or globally). The specified role for nuclear power should be technically and economically feasible. Thus, the results of an energy system planning study should be available to the INPRO assessor.
Countries can obtain assistance for their energy system planning from the IAEA.

Necessary information to perform an assessment in the INPRO methodology area of infrastructure

In this section, for each user requirement, UR1 to UR6, the main input data needed for an assessment and their potential source are discussed.
In the NES assessment (NESA) support package (see Section 4.3 of the overview publication of the INPRO manual), examples of input data available on the internet for an INPRO assessment are provided.

Legal and institutional infrastructure (UR1)

The INPRO assessor needs to have access to information on national legal and institutional measures, such as the legal framework (in place or planned) related to nuclear power, and on the capabilities of regulatory and other organizations with responsibilities for nuclear safety, radiation protection, environmental protection, emergency preparedness and response, non-proliferation and nuclear security.
The source of this information should be the responsible national government organizations such as the regulatory bodies, the ministry of energy and the ministry of the environment. If the country has recently used a relevant IAEA service that reviews, on the request of Member States, national legal and institutional infrastructure, the INPRO assessor should use the results of these IAEA services as a source of input. Examples of relevant IAEA services are: the Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS), the Emergency Preparedness Review Service (EPREV), Radioactive Waste Services, International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ), the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS), the IAEA State System for Accountancy and Control Advisory Service (ISSAS) and the IAEA Legislative Assistance Programme. The IAEA service INIR as a source of input is discussed separately in more detail in Section 2.2.8.

Industrial and economic infrastructure (UR2)

Participation of national industry in the nuclear power programme

The results of a study — jointly produced by the government, the owner/operator of the NES and the national industry — setting out the existing capabilities (and necessary upgrading) of the national industry to support a (planned) nuclear power programme and a State policy for the participation of national industry should be available to the INPRO assessor. In addition, the results of a cost–benefit analysis should be available, comparing the necessary investment in industrial infrastructure with the expected benefits of a nuclear power programme to national industry. The source of this information should be the responsible national government organizations such as the ministry of energy, and industry involved in the nuclear programme.

Transportation of heavy equipment

The government is usually responsible for assuring adequate means of transportation (roads, ports, bridges, etc.) of bulky nuclear components such as the reactor pressure vessel to the site of an NPP. The source of this information should be the ministry of transportation.

Benefit of a nuclear power programme to society

The results of a study should be available to the INPRO assessor that defines the (expected) benefit of the (envisaged) nuclear power programme to society in the country. The source of this information should be the responsible national government organizations such as the ministry of energy.

Financial and technical constraints

Information on financial limitations and technical constraints for the implementation of a nuclear power programme should be available as input to the INPRO assessor.
A main technical constraint may be the size of the national grid, to which an NPP will be connected. The grid size has to be compatible with the size of the NPP to be constructed. Further, the grid should represent a reliable source of power for safety sensitive equipment while the plant is shut down, e.g. for maintenance. This information should be available from the (planned) owner/operator of the NES based on an energy system expansion study. PESS provides tools and assistance in performing such an energy system expansion study on request.
In this publication, the funding of national infrastructure is taken into account. Confirmation of the necessary government budget for the part of infrastructure to be covered by the State, such as educational institutions and transport related measures (appropriate roads, bridges and ports), should be available to the INPRO assessor from responsible government organizations such as the ministry for transport and for education.
Based on the plan of participation of national industry in the nuclear power programme, the necessary funds for the foreseen upgrading of the national industry should be assured. Confirmation of the availability of these funds should be received from the national industry.

Siting of nuclear facilities

The siting process of nuclear facilities should be conducted taking international standards on safety, security and environment into account. The INPRO assessor should have access to relevant information on the siting process. The source of the information should be a responsible government organization, such as the regulator, the ministry of energy or the ministry of the environment. If the country has recently used the IAEA Site and External Events Design Review Service (SEED), the INPRO assessor should use the results of this service as input for the assessment.

Political support and public acceptance (UR3)

Information to the public and public participation

The INPRO assessor should have access to information about the policies of the State (ministries and regulators), of the owner/operator of nuclear facilities and of industrial companies and associations involved in a nuclear power programme regarding the provision of information to the public and mechanisms for public input into the decision making process. The information should be available from the responsible government organization, e.g. the ministry of energy, the owner/operator of nuclear facilities, and national industry.

Survey of public opinion

Finally, a survey of the opinion of decision makers and the public regarding nuclear power should have been performed by the owner/operator and the government in the country with an existing (or planned) NES, to provide input for the INPRO assessment of public acceptance of a nuclear power programme.

Political environment and investor risk

To determine the political risk of an investment in a nuclear power programme, the INPRO assessor needs information about the political situation, including the legal system dealing with interveners to nuclear projects in the country. The information should be provided by the ministry of justice.

Human resources (UR4)

Educational system

Government entities, such as regulators, the owner/operator of the NES and national industry, need adequate human resources to run a successful nuclear power programme. The INPRO assessor needs information on the (planned) national educational system and the training system of the owner/operator to provide skilled trades, technicians and professional engineers/scientists in all disciplines relevant to nuclear power. This information is to be provided by the responsible government organization such as the ministry of education and by the owner/ operator.

Attractiveness of nuclear power sector

To assure the availability of qualified personnel in the nuclear power sector, the attractiveness of this sector in the country has to be confirmed. Attractiveness is based on salaries and other factors such as working conditions. The information should be provided primarily by the owner/operator of nuclear facilities.

Minimization of infrastructure (UR5)

The INPRO assessor needs information from the designer about measures to reduce the necessary national infrastructure in the new design, in comparison to an existing nuclear facility. Reductions of necessary infrastructure could have been achieved by reducing the necessary human resources to operate, maintain and repair the new nuclear facility, and by using prefabrication of components during construction of a nuclear facility.

Regional and international arrangements (UR6)

There are several international arrangements available for a country with a nuclear power programme that can reduce the effort necessary to build and maintain an adequate infrastructure, such as harmonization of the licensing process, sharing of support services, application of harmonized safety standards and the use of worldwide universities for nuclear education. The INPRO assessor needs information on whether such arrangements have been considered in the planning of a nuclear power programme. The source of this information should be the responsible government organizations, such as the regulator or the ministry of education, and the owner/operator of the NES.

Assessment of innovative designs

A special situation is when an innovative nuclear design in an early stage of development is to be assessed with regard to infrastructure. In such a case, new design features compared to existing (reference) designs might primarily be of interest in an INPRO assessment; in particular, the influence of these features on the amount and kind of infrastructure needed could be evaluated. This situation is most probably more relevant for an INPRO assessor in a technology holder (developer) country and less interesting for an INPRO assessor in a technology user country, as the latter will rely more on proven technology.

INIR as a source of input for a NESA in the area of infrastructure

If a country embarking on a nuclear power programme to build its first NPP is also applying — in parallel to the INPRO methodology in a NESA — the Milestone Approach [4, 5] and the corresponding INIR service from the IAEA, the INPRO assessor is recommended to contact and cooperate with the responsible national organization for the Milestone approach and INIR (usually called the NEPIO, Nuclear Energy Programme Implementing Organization [12]) to receive the necessary input for an assessment in the INPRO methodology area of infrastructure for user requirements UR1–UR4 and to harmonize the results of both activities.
Table 2 presents the issues to be covered in the Milestone approach and reviewed by the INIR process [4–6] that can provide input to the assessment of requirements of the INPRO methodology in the area of infrastructure.

Table 2. Issues defined in the milestone approach and reviewed in the INIR process and related inpro methodology requirements.

User requirement (UR) in INPRO methodology	Issue (I) in INIR process
UR1: Legal and institutional infrastructure	I-1: National position I-2: Nuclear safety I-3: Management I-5: Legislative framework I-6: Safeguards I-7: Regulatory framework I-8: Radiation protection I-13: Environmental protection I-14: Emergency planning I-15: Security and physical protection I-17: Radioactive waste
UR2: Industrial and economic infrastructure	I-1: National position I-3: Management I-4: Funding and financing I-9: Electrical grid I-12: Site and supporting facilities I-16: Nuclear fuel cycle I-18: Industrial involvement I-19: Procurement
UR3: Political support and public acceptance	I-1: National position I-3: Management I-11: Stakeholder involvement
UR4: Human resources	I-1: National position I-3: Management I-10: Human resource development

For INPRO methodology user requirements UR5 and UR6 in the area of infrastructure, there is no direct relationship with the 19 issues of the Milestone approach process. The relationship of a NESA and the INIR process is evaluated in more detail in the overview publication of the updated INPRO manual.

Basic principle, user requirements and criteria in the INPRO methodology infrastructure area

The term ‘infrastructure’ within the INPRO methodology includes primarily legal and institutional measures, such as the establishment of a national legal framework, i.e. the conventions, laws and regulations needed for a nuclear power programme, and the corresponding organizations, e.g. the regulatory body, to fulfil the functions defined within the legal framework. An adequate national infrastructure has to be established and maintained by the national institutions of the country, meaning the government, the operators of nuclear facilities and national industry involved in a national nuclear power programme, to assure its long term sustainability.
In the area of infrastructure, one basic principle and six user requirements have been defined. For each user requirement, several criteria have been developed, most of which have additional evaluation parameters to assist with the assessment.

Basic principle

Infrastructure basic principle: A country shall be able to adopt, maintain or enlarge an NES for the supply of energy and related products without making an excessive investment in national infrastructure.
The main goal, expressed in this basic principle, is to ensure that the necessary investment in nuclear related national infrastructure is not an obstacle for the start, maintenance or expansion of a nuclear power programme.
The term ‘investment’ here is meant to cover not only direct financial investments in capital equipment but also other indirect costs, such as costs for the development of human resources, transfer of technology and know-how. The term ‘excessive’ is understood to mean economically unattractive and/or to represent an undue burden on society.
To achieve the goal of the basic principle, INPRO has developed six user requirements (UR1–UR6) directed primarily at the national institutions involved in a nuclear power programme, such as regulatory bodies, operators and nuclear industry, but also at designers of nuclear facilities.
User requirements UR1–UR4 ask national institutions involved in a nuclear power programme to achieve and maintain an adequate infrastructure, i.e. to enable a safe, secure and economical operation of an NES in the long term.
User requirement UR5 asks the designer of nuclear facilities to minimize the necessary infrastructure for a new nuclear facility by reducing the human resources needed for operation, maintenance and repair work, and to use prefabricated of components.
Additionally, user requirement UR6 asks the government and the owner/operator to consider international or regional arrangements instead of national solutions, as a means to optimize the investment in national infrastructure. One of the long term goals of the development of regional and international arrangements for nuclear related infrastructure is to reduce the necessary national investment to a level comparable to the investment in the infrastructure required for non-nuclear energy systems.

User requirement UR1: legal and institutional infrastructure

User requirement UR1: An adequate legal framework should be established to cover the issues of nuclear liability, safety and radiation protection, environmental protection, control of operation, waste management and decommissioning, security and non-proliferation.
The Fundamental Safety Principles [13] state that regulating nuclear and radiation safety and security is the responsibility of the State and that an effective legal framework must be established and maintained. The role of the INPRO assessor is to determine whether the (existing or planned) legal framework is adequate to achieve the long term sustainability of a nuclear power programme.
The establishment of a nuclear power programme entails legal requirements at both the national and international level. These requirements give rise to the need to establish and maintain a legal framework that provides the basis for establishing safety requirements for the control and oversight of operations and of security arrangements, including non-proliferation and environmental aspects. As noted, responsibility for the development and maintenance of the legal framework rests with national governments. If a country is embarking on a nuclear power programme, i.e. is planning to install its first NPP, the nuclear legal framework must be in place well in advance of the installation.
The legal framework comprises two aspects: legal requirements set out in nuclear related legislation, referred to as nuclear law, and the related institutional infrastructure including regulatory authorities that must give effect to the law and ensure that the legal requirements are met.
In this publication, the legal framework primarily related to nuclear safety is discussed. The sustainability assessment of an NES in the area of nuclear safety, other than assessing the legal framework, is dealt with in a separate publication of the updated INPRO manual.
The assessment of an NES in the area of proliferation resistance, including a detailed evaluation of the legal aspects of this area, is described in a separate publication of the INPRO manual. Nevertheless, in this publication, legal aspects of proliferation resistance are mentioned for completeness, primarily with the intention of assuring these aspects have been addressed in the separate assessments of proliferation resistance.

Legal framework

There are two key IAEA publications on nuclear law [14, 15]. The following information is based on these two IAEA publications. The history, evolution and outlook of nuclear law is discussed in Ref. [16]. The 2003 edition of the Handbook on Nuclear Law [14] defines nuclear law as:

“the body of special legal norms created to regulate the conduct of legal or natural persons engaged in

activities related to fissionable materials, ionizing radiation and exposure to natural sources of radiation... The primary objective of nuclear law is to provide a legal framework for conducting activities related to nuclear energy and ionizing radiation in a manner which adequately protects individuals, property and the

environment.”

Nuclear law has specific characteristics, such as the safety principle, the security principle and the responsibility principle, that distinguish it from other aspects of national law.

Hierarchy of legislation

Legislation is generally organized in a hierarchy of three levels: (1) constitutional instruments, (2) statutory elements enacted by a parliament or legislature, and (3) regulations promulgated by expert governmental bodies, and supplemented by so-called guidelines, i.e. non-mandatory recommendations on how to fulfil regulations. Nuclear law is part of level 2. It should primarily define requirements with the objective of ensuring public and occupational safety, environmental protection, security and non-proliferation that are binding on all persons and organizations. Nuclear law should also specify the liability regime. Regulations, a part of level 3, and guidelines are binding primarily on specific persons or organizations, e.g. the owner/operator who is licensed to operate a nuclear facility. It is recommended (see Refs [14, 15]) that regulations and especially guidelines should not be set out within nuclear law, but should be prepared by the responsible authorities, e.g. the safety authority, radiation protection authority, security body, environmental authority, to facilitate the timely updating of regulations and guidelines. (Where different authorities are involved, it is important that their activities be coordinated.)

Objective of nuclear legislation

As discussed in the IAEA Guidebook on the Introduction of Nuclear Power [17] and required in the IAEA Safety Standard Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety [18], nuclear legislation should seek to:

• Set out objectives for protecting individuals, society and the environment from radiation hazards;
• Vest a regulatory body that is independent from public and private corporations, and institutions promoting nuclear energy and operating nuclear facilities, with legislative powers for regulating and ensuring the safe and secure use of nuclear energy;
• Define principles and conditions that enable the regulatory authority to authorize the carrying out of nuclear activities, such as construction, operation and decommissioning of nuclear facilities;
• Establish principles and rules consistent with international conventions on third party liability;
• Ensure the security and physical protection of nuclear and other radioactive material and facilities;
• Create a system for the accounting and control of nuclear material.

According to the IAEA Handbook on Nuclear Law [15], the objectives of nuclear law could be presented in a preamble to the law as follows:

• To permit the uses and applications of nuclear energy which are beneficial and peaceful;
• To ensure that people and the environment are adequately protected against any harmful effects that may arise from ionizing radiation and that radiation sources are kept in a safe and secure manner;
• To set up a body to regulate peaceful uses of ionizing radiation by performing the functions and holding the responsibilities detailed in nuclear law;
• To ensure that the State meets any obligations it has undertaken by signing any relevant international

instruments.

Role of conventions

National nuclear legislation (nuclear law) should take into account regional and international treaties and conventions. To subscribe to such treaties and conventions, three steps are distinguished: signing of the convention by individual States, ratification of the convention by the State’s legislative assembly/parliament and the entering into force of the convention. Individual States need to establish legal arrangements for implementing the obligations that they have assumed when signing and ratifying international instruments such as conventions (see section 1.5.9 of Ref. [14]).
In the following subsections, the legal aspects, i.e. primarily the relevant international conventions of nuclear safety and liability, non-proliferation, nuclear security, import and export control, transport of radioactive material, waste management and environmental protection are briefly discussed.

Legal aspects of nuclear safety and liability

Within the nuclear law, the safety of nuclear installations is an important issue. The corresponding legislation should focus on the general nuclear safety objective and the technical safety objectives [13].
Important safety related international conventions to be reflected in nuclear law include: The Convention on Nuclear Safety [19], The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the safety of Radioactive Waste Management [20], the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident [21] and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency [22]. Nuclear law should reflect international best practice, as described in the IAEA Safety Standards (such as Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety Standards [23]). The concept of safety management and safety and security culture should be included either in the law or in regulations.
Nuclear law must cover the safe management of all sources and types of ionizing radiation in a country. The objective of radiation protection is to ensure that individuals, society and the environment are adequately protected against radiological hazards. Radiation protection requires that during normal operations, radiation exposures should be kept below prescribed limits and should be optimized using the ALARA principle.
It is particularly important that provisions in nuclear law addressing nuclear and radiological emergency preparedness and response be carefully drafted to be consistent with other laws and arrangements for addressing other emergency situations in line with the all-hazards approach. The IAEA Safety Standard GS-R-2 [24] can be used as a basis for emergency preparedness and response provisions.
Prime responsibility for nuclear safety rests with the owner/operator of a nuclear facility. From this principle, the nuclear liability regime has been derived (see Chapter 11 of Refs [14, 15]). The basic idea behind the term liability is that a person or entity responsible for causing harm should compensate the victim. States recognized at an early stage that the possibility of transboundary damage required an international nuclear liability regime. The nuclear liability regime is based on two basic conventions: The Paris Convention (adopted in 1960 under the auspices of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD NEA) came into force in 1968 [25]) and the Vienna Convention (adopted in 1963 under the auspices of the IAEA, came into force in 1977 [26]). The Paris Convention provides a third party liability regime and is open to OECD states. It was amended in 1963 by the Brussels Supplementary Convention (further compensation by public funds). The Vienna Convention established a worldwide system and was supplemented in 1997 by the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage [27]. In 1988 the Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention [28] was established.
In all nuclear liability regimes (with the exception of Austria and the United States of America), the concept of strict liability is applied, i.e. the owner/operator of a nuclear installation is held liable regardless of fault. Further, the simple existence of causation of damage is the basis of the operator’s liability. Additional principles of nuclear liability are the limitation of liability in amount and time, (recognizing that civil law is not designed to cope with catastrophes and that in the event of such a catastrophe, the State will inevitably step in and pay additional compensation) and the concentrations of procedures within a single court (to create legal certainty).

Legal aspects of non-proliferation

The most significant international treaty in the area of non-proliferation is the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT, [30]). To ensure compliance with the basic commitments (not to transfer or to acquire nuclear weapons) of the NPT, all non-nuclear-weapon States accept safeguards for the purpose of verification of the fulfilment of their obligations (Chapter 12 of Refs [14, 15]) based on a comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocols.
The foundation of the safeguards system lies in the IAEA Statute, which is binding on both the IAEA Secretariat and IAEA Member States. Safeguards comprise three main functions: accountancy, containment and surveillance, and inspection.
Supplementary to the NPT, several regional non-proliferation agreements exist, such as the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Rarotonga Treaty), the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (the Bangkok Treaty) and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (the Pelindaba treaty).
A State system for accounting and control of nuclear material (SSAC) is an important part of the non-proliferation regime. Further details on this regime can be found in the proliferation resistance manual of the INPRO methodology.

Legal aspects of nuclear security

The main international conventions in this area are, firstly, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material [31] and its 2005 amendment [32] and, secondly, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism [33]. Additional international legal instruments relevant for this area are: United Nations Security Council resolution 1373 [34] on threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts; United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 [35] on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; The Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources [36] and the companion publication Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources [37]; The Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention) [38]; and The Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf [39].
Further details on this regime can be found in Chapter 14 of Refs [14, 15] and in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series publications [40–48].

Legal aspects of import and export control

As stated in Chapter 13 of the IAEA Handbook on Nuclear Law [15], export and import controls are relevant to safety, nuclear security and safeguards measures in a State and enable it to maintain its sovereign control over activities taking place within its own territory. Export controls help to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices. They are required under relevant multilateral and regional nuclear non-proliferation instruments, most prominently the NPT [30], and the reporting of certain exports and imports to the IAEA is required under safeguards agreements negotiated in connection with such instruments. From a nuclear security perspective, both export and import controls are relevant to preventing and detecting illicit trafficking, and can help to prevent the acquisition of nuclear and other radioactive materials by persons or entities that could seek to use them for malicious purposes. Export and import controls also contribute to safety by helping States to ensure that exported or imported items are only acquired by persons or entities with the capability of using them in an acceptable manner and only for authorized purposes.

Legal aspects of the transport of radioactive material

As stated in Chapter 9 of the IAEA Handbook on Nuclear Law [15], the IAEA regularly publishes detailed Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (the transport regulations) [49] addressing all categories of radioactive material. Also, in May 2005 the IAEA Board of Governors approved a new policy for reviewing and revising the transport regulations. According to this policy, the IAEA Secretariat will continue to review the transport regulations at intervals consistent with the schedules of the United Nations Sub-Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods and of the relevant international modal organizations in order to remain in step with the review cycles of the other relevant international bodies.

Legal aspects of radioactive waste management

As stated in Chapter 10 of the Handbook on Nuclear Law [14], notwithstanding differences in national development policies on the treatment of radioactive waste and spent fuel, States utilizing nuclear energy have been able to reach a consensus on the basic principles that should be applied in the field of radioactive waste and spent fuel management. This consensus is reflected in the 1997 Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (the Joint Convention) [20].

Legal aspects of environmental protection

There is a convention regarding environmental issues in transnational situations, the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (the Espoo convention) [50], adopted in 1991 by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) in the Finnish city of Espoo. Environmental threats do not respect national borders. Governments have realized that to avert this danger they must notify and consult each other on all major projects under consideration (including nuclear power) that might have adverse environmental impact across borders. The Convention entered into force in 1997. There is also an additional protocol to this Convention, the Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA), that was adopted in 2003. The SEA Protocol augments the Espoo Convention by ensuring that individual Parties integrate environmental assessment into their plans and programmes at the earliest stages. The SEA Protocol entered into force on 11 July 2010. This convention and its protocol are also applicable to the (planned) installation of an NPP.

Institutional infrastructure

The term institutional infrastructure in the INPRO methodology covers all regulatory authorities that need to be established and maintained by a country for a long term sustainable nuclear power programme, with regard to nuclear safety, environment, security, non-proliferation, export and import control, transport of radioactive material and radioactive waste management. In addition, for the development of adequate human resources, an infrastructure for education and training is needed.

Safety and environmental institutions

The institutional infrastructure in regard to nuclear safety consists primarily of a regulatory body empowered by nuclear law (see Chapter 2 of Refs [14, 15]). Preferably, this regulatory body should be a single institution covering all regulatory aspects of nuclear safety, including regulation of the management of radioactive waste and spent fuel. In some countries, however, there are two authorities, the nuclear safety authority and the radiation protection authority, and there are examples where some specific aspects of nuclear safety, such as the safe transport of radioactive material, is the responsibility of a different governmental organization, e.g. the ministry of transportation, and import and export control is the responsibility of the ministry for economy. Additionally, most States will have an environmental authority that may impose additional requirements on nuclear facilities, such as the fulfilment of the Espoo convention mentioned above. In such cases of divided responsibility, the responsibilities and functions of each organization must be clearly defined and their activities must be coordinated and harmonized.
For countries embarking on a nuclear power programme, the IAEA has developed Specific Safety Guide No. SSG-16, Establishing the Safety Infrastructure for a Nuclear Power Programme [51]. This publication defines the necessary actions to be taken during the development of a nuclear programme to achieve an adequate nuclear safety infrastructure, and references the applicable IAEA safety requirements.

Security institutions

Within a national security regime, several State organizations in a country are required to work together, each with well-defined responsibilities. In addition to the security department of the owner/operator of a nuclear facility, organizations with responsibilities for specific aspects of nuclear security include local authorities in the area of the facility (e.g. local police), and State organizations (e.g. the military, intelligence agencies, national police). A competent State authority must be in place to ensure the establishment and maintenance of the security of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, as well as a national security regime that, inter alia, will ensure the fulfilment of the commitments resulting from adherence to applicable international nuclear security conventions. Further details on this issue can be found in the respective chapter 14 of Refs [14, 15] and in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series publications [40–48].

Non-proliferation institutions

While safety and security are national responsibilities, non-proliferation is both a national and an international responsibility. The responsible international authority is the IAEA. Having said that, States must ensure that there is a national safeguards authority to ensure that the State is fulfilling its obligations under the NPT [30], as set out in the comprehensive safeguards agreement [52] and additional protocols [53] between the State and the IAEA (see Chapter 12 of Refs [14, 15]). One of the most important responsibilities of a national safeguards authority is to establish and maintain the SSAC. Further details on this issue can be found in the proliferation resistance manual of the INPRO methodology.

Institutions for disposal of radioactive waste and spent fuel

In most countries with a nuclear power programme, there is a government organization — separate from the owner/operator of nuclear facilities — that is responsible for the management and disposal of radioactive waste and spent fuel. To enable safe disposal, this organization would be in charge of defining the end state (and all intermediate steps) of all nuclear wastes produced in the national NES. This issue is further discussed in the waste management publication of the INPRO manual and in Chapter 10 of Refs [14, 15].

Institutions for education and training

To operate and regulate a successful nuclear power programme requires a qualified workforce. For a nuclear power programme, engineers, technicians and skilled trades/craftsmen are primarily needed. A variety of educational institutions have a role to play in building and maintaining a skilled workforce, including universities (e.g. with nuclear engineering courses) and technical schools with access to specialized training facilities (e.g. for training nuclear operators, qualifying welders and non-destructive testing experts). Training centres could also be run by the operator of the nuclear facility. This topic is discussed further, in Section 3.5, when addressing user requirement UR4 (human resources).

Criterion CR1.1: Legal aspects

ᅠIndicator IN1.1: Status of legal framework.ᅠ

Acceptance limit AL1.1: Legal framework has been established, in accordance with international standards. This criterion deals with the establishment of an adequate nuclear legal framework consisting of a nuclear law and corresponding regulations (rules) and associated guidelines. The necessary content of such a legal framework has been discussed briefly above. A comprehensive description of the legislative process to create an adequate nuclear law and its content, requirements and history can be found in Refs [14, 15]). Using this reference, a set of evaluation parameters has been identified by the INPRO methodology, as a sublevel of criterion CR1.1. ᅠEvaluation parameter EP1.1.1: Scope of nuclear lawᅠ Nuclear law should cover the following areas: Establishment of the regulatory body with its responsibilities, such as authorization/licensing, inspection and enforcement; Radiation protection; Safety of nuclear installations; Emergency preparedness and response; Radioactive material and radiation sources; Transport of radioactive material; Management of radioactive waste and spent fuel; Mining and milling, if such activities take place in the given country; Nuclear liability and coverage; Export and import controls for nuclear material; Safeguards for nuclear material which assure non-proliferation; Nuclear security; Environmental protection, if not covered elsewhere in the laws of the State. Acceptability of EP1.1.1 (condition for a positive judgement): Evidence is available to the INPRO assessor that all areas listed above are covered by the national nuclear law. ᅠEvaluation parameter EP1.1.2: Adequacy of nuclear lawᅠ To assess whether an established nuclear law is adequate in accordance with international standards, the following questions (taken from the Handbook on Nuclear Law, Section 1.5.2 of Ref. [14]) could be used by an INPRO assessor with a background in nuclear law: “(a) Does the current legislation make it clear that public health, safety, security and the environment are overriding considerations in the use of nuclear techniques and material? (b) Are there major gaps or overlaps in the legal structure regarding the treatment of nuclear related activities or material, both those currently being conducted or used and those that can reasonably be expected? (c) Have the most important terms used in the legislation been given clear and consistent definitions in the statutory documents? Does the use of different terms and definitions, or a failure to define certain terms, produce confusion about how nuclear related activities are to be regulated? (d) Are the institutional responsibilities for regulating nuclear related activities clear and consistent, permitting efficient regulation without delays and bureaucratic conflicts?... (f) Does the present system fully comply with the State’s international legal obligations and reflect international best practice, as described in safety standards…promulgated by the IAEA or other relevant multinational bodies?” Acceptability of EP1.1.2 (conditions for a positive judgement): Evidence is available to the INPRO assessor that the questions above have been answered satisfactorily, i.e. an affirmative answer (YES) for questions (a), (c) (first part), (d) and (f); and a negative answer (NO) to the questions (b) and (c) (second part). Alternatively, an INPRO assessor could use the results of an IAEA service from the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) called the IAEA Legislative Assistance Programme to confirm the adequacy of the existing (or planned) national nuclear law. ᅠEvaluation parameter EP1.1.3: International legal arrangementsᅠ Individual States need to establish national legal arrangements for implementing the obligations that they have assumed when signing and ratifying international instruments such as conventions. The IAEA Handbook on Nuclear Law (in section 1.5.10 of Ref. [14] and in chapter 1 of Ref. [15]) discusses general approaches, i.e. transformation and incorporation, that can be followed when adopting the standards and guidelines of international organizations or of other States in a national legal framework. INPRO recommends that States sign, ratify and put into force established regional and international conventions and treaties to the extent possible, including at least the following international instruments, amended or enlarged: Convention on Nuclear Safety [19]; International Nuclear Liability convention [25, 26]; Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident [21]; Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency [22]; Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management [20]; Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (and associated safeguards agreements and protocols) [30]; Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material [31]; Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources [36]; International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism [33]; The Espoo convention [50]. Acceptability of EP1.1.3 (condition for a positive judgement): Evidence is available to the INPRO assessor that all the above defined international legislation has been signed and ratified, and incorporated into national nuclear law, i.e. legal arrangements for implementing the obligations that the State has assumed when signing and ratifying these international instruments have been established. ᅠEvaluation parameter EP1.1.4: Completeness and adequacy of regulations and guidelinesᅠ As part of the legal framework, the third level (see Section 3.2.1.1) of the legal requirements, consisting of regulations and associated guidelines, has to be established. INPRO methodology recommends that the national regulatory body should take into account established international safety standards when creating this additional level in the area of nuclear safety (e.g. Refs [13, 23]). For the area of nuclear security, similar international guideline publications are available [40–48]. Acceptability of EP1.1.4 (condition for a positive judgement): Evidence is available to the INPRO assessor that national regulations and guidelines are consistent with and take into account international standards. A country embarking on a nuclear power programme can follow the approach presented in Refs [51, 54] that provide guidance on the establishment of a framework for safety in accordance with the IAEA safety standards. To the final assessment of criterion CR1.1: Legal aspects: The acceptance limit AL1.1 (Legal framework has been established, in accordance with international standards) of criterion CR1.1 is met when the evaluation of each of the four EPs (EP1.1.1–EP1.1.4) provides a positive judgement. When assessing compliance with criterion CR1.1, INPRO recommends that the INPRO assessor obtains assistance from relevant departments of competent international organizations such as the IAEA.

Criterion CR1.2: Institutions

ᅠIndicator IN1.2: Status of State organizations with responsibilities for safety and radiation protection, environmental protection, control of operation, waste management and decommissioning, emergency preparedness and response, security and non-proliferation.ᅠ

Acceptance limit AL1.2: State organizations have been established, in accordance with international standards. The second criterion CR1.2 of UR1 deals with the institutional aspects of the legal framework related to regulatory bodies (the other institutions in the responsibility of the government (e.g., for education/training) are discussed in UR4). To carry out its responsibility effectively, efficiently and independently, the regulatory body needs to be provided with adequate personnel, financial resources, office quarters, information technology and support services. In deciding on the structure of the regulatory body, the country’s cultural attitudes and traditions, the nature of its national legal infrastructure and the established governmental organizations with their procedures have to be taken into account; as well as technical, financial and human resources available within the State and/or accessible regionally or internationally. To assess important attributes of the regulatory body, several evaluation parameters (EP1.2.1 to EP1.2.7) have been chosen and are discussed below. ᅠEvaluation parameter EP1.2.1: Independence of the regulatory bodyᅠ An important attribute of a regulatory body is that it shall be independent from interference in its regulatory functions by operators of nuclear facilities or institutions with a role in promoting nuclear energy (Ref. [55] and Principle 2 of the Safety Fundamentals [13]). In situations where the regulatory body is relying on advisory bodies (or technical support organizations, TSO) for fulfilling some of its functions, these institutions should also be independent. The basis for such independence should be set out in the nuclear law (see Chapter 2.4 of Ref. [15]). In addition to financial independence, effective independence depends on factors such as technical and managerial competence, adequacy of human resources, effective leadership, the process used for appointing the head of the regulatory body, and enforcement and reporting mechanisms, including the reporting of safety related incidents in nuclear facilities. Recognized means of achieving such effective regulatory independence (Chapter 2 of Ref. [15]) include: Institutional separation of regulatory and non-regulatory functions; fixed terms for regulatory officials; constraints on the removal of regulatory officials on political grounds; separate budgetary and employment authority for the regulatory body; reporting to an official or organization without conflicting responsibilities; and unrestricted access to the press and the public. Acceptability of EP1.2.1 (condition for a positive judgement): Evidence is available to the INPRO assessor of the adequacy of the human resources of the regulatory body and of its competence and capability to achieve and maintain positions independent of the owners/operators of nuclear facilities, and that it is free from undue pressure from interested parties — commercial or political. ᅠEvaluation parameter EP1.2.2: General functions of the regulatory bodyᅠ The main activities or functions of the regulator body are summarized below (see Section 3.2 of Ref. [5] and Section 2.3 of Refs [14, 15]): Establishment of regulatory standards, codes and criteria, and guidelines for the design, construction, operation and decommissioning of nuclear facilities, including the safe and secure management of radioactive wastes generated; Review and evaluation of licensing documents, such as the nuclear security and contingency plans, safety analysis and environmental reports of nuclear facilities and on-site emergency arrangements; Authorization of the construction, operation and decommissioning of a nuclear facility and the conduct of activities by a licensee, by e.g. issuing licenses, registration; Performance of inspections, reviews, audits and enforcement activities to ensure compliance with established rules and regulations; Provision of information about safety and security aspects of facilities and activities to the public, the media and interested parties; Coordination with other regulatory bodies. In appendix I of Ref. [56], 14 characteristics of a fully functional and effective regulatory body are defined that could be used to evaluate the adequacy of a regulatory body. To assess evaluation parameter EP1.2.3, INPRO methodology recommends using the support of relevant departments of qualified organizations such as the IAEA. Acceptability of EP1.2.2 (condition for a positive judgement): This evaluation parameter can be considered fulfilled if there is evidence available to the INPRO assessor of the adequate performance of these functions by all regulatory bodies involved in a nuclear power programme. ᅠEvaluation parameter EP1.2.3: Review of safety regimeᅠ The evaluation parameter calls for an effective and efficient safety regime. Thus, evidence is required that a review of the national safety regime has been carried out by a competent organization and that the results of the review are positive. To evaluate evaluation parameter EP1.2.3, INPRO methodology recommends using the support of relevant departments of qualified organizations such as the IAEA. For example, the IAEA offers, on the request of a government, an IRRS to evaluate a country’s existing or planned regulatory arrangements regarding nuclear and radiation safety. The IRRS mission is designed to strengthen and enhance the effectiveness of the national regulatory infrastructure of States for nuclear, radiation, radioactive waste and transport safety and security of radioactive sources, while recognizing the ultimate responsibility of each State to ensure safety in the above areas. This expressed purpose of the IRRS is to be accomplished through consideration of both regulatory technical and policy issues, with comparisons against IAEA safety standards and where appropriate, good practices elsewhere. Acceptability of EP1.2.3 (condition for a positive judgement): Evidence is available to the INPRO assessor that a review of the nuclear safety regime has been carried out by a competent institution with positive results. ᅠEvaluation parameter EP1.2.4: Review of emergency preparednessᅠ Nuclear and radiological emergency preparedness can be considered to be a component of a nuclear safety regime but, because of its importance and because in some States nuclear and radiological emergency preparedness is a subset of emergency preparedness in general, here nuclear and radiological emergency preparedness is considered separately. Number 9 of the Fundamental Safety Principles [13] states that arrangements must be established for preparedness and response for nuclear or radiological emergencies. The practical goal of emergency preparedness, as defined in the IAEA Safety Standard on Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency [24], is to ensure that arrangements are in place for a timely, managed, controlled, coordinated and effective response at the scene, and at the local, regional, national and international level, to any nuclear or radiological emergency. The practical goals of emergency response are [24]: To regain control of the situation; To prevent or mitigate consequences at the scene; To prevent the occurrence of deterministic health effects in workers and the public; To render first aid and to manage the treatment of radiation injuries; To prevent, to the extent practicable, the occurrence of stochastic health effects in the population; To prevent, to the extent practicable, the occurrence of non-radiological effects on individuals and among the population; To protect, to the extent practicable, property and the environment; To prepare, to the extent practicable, for the resumption of normal social and economic activity. The government must ensure that adequate arrangements are put in place to prepare for and to respond to a nuclear or radiological emergency at the operating organization, local, regional and national levels and, where appropriate, at the international level. On-site emergency arrangements for preparedness to respond to an emergency at a facility under the responsibility of an operating organization are to be dealt through the regulatory process. This includes review and approval of the on-site emergency arrangements of the operating organization by the regulatory body as part of the licensing process. The scope and extent of emergency arrangements will depend on the results of the hazard assessment27 to be carried out in line with Ref. [24]. An IAEA publication within the Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) Series, on a Method for Developing Arrangements for Response to a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency [57], presents a practical, step by step method for developing arrangements for preparedness to respond to a nuclear or radiological emergency at operating organization, local and national level in line with Ref. [24]. Another publication within the EPR Series, Considerations in Emergency Preparedness and Response for a State Embarking on a Nuclear Power Programme [58], is intended to assist those States that are embarking on a nuclear power programme to develop prior to commissioning their first NPP an adequate level for emergency preparedness to respond to a nuclear or radiological emergency. Actions to Protect the Public in an Emergency due to Severe Conditions at a Light Water Reactor [59] is another publication within the EPR Series that provides those responsible for making and for acting on decisions in the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency with guidance on the actions necessary to protect the public involving actual or projected severe damage to the fuel in the reactor core or spent fuel pool at a light water reactor (LWR) or spent fuel pool. Upon their request, the IAEA can assist Member States in conducting an independent assessment of the arrangements and capabilities for preparedness and response for nuclear and/or radiological emergencies through the EPREV (Emergency Preparedness Review) appraisal service. The EPREV service offers various types of missions to Member States covering all aspects from the appraisal of the emergency preparedness arrangements at a specific installation to a full appraisal of all arrangements in a requesting Member State, including on-site, off-site and national arrangements. Acceptability of EP1.2.4 (condition for a positive judgement): A review of the emergency preparedness arrangements has been carried out either by a competent independent national authority, such as the regulator, or government auditor or by competent international organizations, such as the IAEA, with results that assure the adequacy of the level of preparedness. Results of such a review and the subsequent follow-up actions taken should be available to the INPRO assessor. ᅠEvaluation parameter EP1.2.5: Review of nuclear security regimeᅠ The evaluation of parameter EP1.2.5 calls for an effective and efficient nuclear security regime. Thus, evidence is required that a review of the nuclear security regime has been carried out by a competent organization and that the results of the review are positive. Such a review may have been carried out by domestic organizations such as the government’s national audit office. The IAEA could also be requested to provide assistance in performing such a review. To assist States in the identification of the best means by which to strengthen their nuclear security regime, the IAEA has initiated INSServ. INSServ missions requested by a State aim at assisting the State to identify, in a holistic manner, the scope of concerns to be addressed by the nuclear security regime, including the security of nuclear material and facilities, of radioactive sources, and detection and response to illicit trafficking (for assistance, the IAEA should be contacted). Upon request, the IAEA can also assist Member States in strengthening and enhancing the effectiveness of the nuclear security of materials and facilities through IPPAS missions. The IPPAS mission could be conducted on a State-wide basis or could be facility specific. During an IPPAS mission, the State’s regulatory system for the protection of nuclear facilities is reviewed as well as the resulting physical facility protection systems. Advice is offered, based on international guidelines [47] and internationally recognized best practices to assist the State as it protects nuclear material and facilities. Acceptability of EP1.2.5 (condition for a positive judgement): Evidence is available to the INPRO assessor that the review of the nuclear security regime by a competent organization has confirmed the adequacy of the regime. ᅠEvaluation parameter EP1.2.6: Review of safeguards regimeᅠ INPRO methodology has defined a detailed assessment process for the safeguards regime of a country (in the proliferation resistance manual of the INPRO methodology). Here, the evaluation parameter EP1.2.6 is defined, primarily to assure that an adequate assessment of the safeguards regime is to be performed as part of the holistic assessment of an NES. The IAEA offers a service to Member States called ISSACS. The ISSACS mission provides requesting national authorities with recommendations and suggestions for improvements to their State systems for accountancy and control (SSACs) of nuclear material. The missions evaluate the regulatory, legislative, administrative and technical components of the SSAC at both the State and facility level, and assess how the SSAC meets the obligations contained in the State’s safeguards agreement and additional protocol as applicable. Acceptability of EP1.2.6 (condition for a positive judgement): Evidence is available to the INPRO assessor that a review of the non-proliferation regime by a competent organization has confirmed the adequacy of the regime. ᅠEvaluation parameter EP1.2.7: Management systemᅠ A management system should be established in all institutions related to a nuclear power programme to ensure that defined quality goals and objectives are met and implemented for all processes important to safety, security, proliferation resistance and environment. To establish and maintain such a programme, the IAEA guidance on management systems in Refs [60, 61] can be used. Acceptability of EP1.2.7 (condition for a positive judgement): Evidence is available to the INPRO assessor that a quality assurance policy has been defined and implemented in all institutions related to a nuclear power programme. To final assessment of criterion CR1.2: Institutions: The acceptance limit AL1.2 (State organizations with responsibilities for safety and radiation protection, environmental protection, control of operation, waste management and decommissioning, security and non-proliferation have been established, in accordance with international standards) of CR1.2 is met only when the assessment of all evaluation parameters (EP1.2.1 to EP1.2.7) discussed above produced a positive judgement.

User requirement UR2: economic and industrial infrastructure

User requirement UR2: The industrial and economic infrastructure of a country with an NES should be adequate to support the project throughout the complete lifetime of the nuclear power programme, including planning, construction, operation, decommissioning and related waste management activities.
This user requirement refers to the necessary industrial and economic infrastructure to be available or established within a country that is intending to install, maintain or enlarge a nuclear power programme. While user requirement UR2 is focused on the role of national industry in supporting the owner/operator of nuclear facilities, it needs to be recognized that State infrastructure, for example, in the area of transportation, is encompassed by this requirement.
A key reference for industrial infrastructure is the IAEA publication Developing Industrial Infrastructure to Support a Programme of Nuclear Power [62].
The role of the INPRO assessor is to check whether the established or planned industrial and economic infrastructure is adequate.

Support of infrastructure by national industry and government

Industrial support infrastructure

In the ideal case, a complete domestic industrial infrastructure would enable a given country to perform all activities during the lifetime of a nuclear power programme, such as the planning, design, component manufacture, construction and installation, maintenance and repair, and decommissioning of nuclear facilities and the management of related radioactive wastes. The corresponding industrial capabilities required to perform these activities are very broad. They include the availability of skilled and qualified human resources; the supply of materials, semifinished products, standard and specialized equipment; and the availability of means for transporting goods and supplies. The supply of materials includes the supply of products such as cement and steel. Semifinished products include items such as piping, tubing, plates, etc. Standard equipment includes parts such as cables and electrical equipment such as motors, etc. Special equipment includes nuclear components and also equipment for machining large components, bending and forming, boring, forging, welding and surface treatment. The manufacturing of special nuclear components (e.g. pressure vessels, steam generators, main coolant pumps) is challenging and their supply should be optimized by evaluating international supply options. Special equipment may be needed for shipments made by road, railway, air and ship and to lift heavy and bulky components.
It is highly unlikely that any country will have a complete domestic capability — at least some components or materials will have to be imported. For a country acquiring its first NPP, many components will be imported and the scope for domestic supply will be limited. For subsequent units, the scope of domestic supply would be expected to increase as the country acquires capability.
A country embarking on a nuclear power programme should include in its planning phase, as part of a feasibility study, a survey of existing national industrial capabilities (see, for example, section 5.8.3 of Ref. [17]). Such a survey would identify the needs and opportunities for upgrading the national industry, which are typically relevant in three areas: manufacturing, engineering and quality management (quality assurance and quality control).
Based on the results of the survey, a plan for the development of national participation should be established. This plan would seek to define an optimized level of participation as a function of the status of the nuclear power programme, taking into consideration national policy objectives and the capabilities and development potential of domestic industry. Government and the owner/operator of the nuclear facility can play an important role in enhancing the domestic industrial infrastructure, by supporting industry with a combination of political, technical and organizational measures, for example, by providing financial support for upgrading capabilities or by adopting a policy that favours local suppliers.
An optimum level of domestic participation in a nuclear power programme will evolve with time. For example, assuming that several units are to be constructed, it could progress as follows (see section 10.2.3 of Refs [7, 63]):

• Domestic labour and some construction materials obtained from national suppliers are used for non-specialized purposes on-site, especially civil engineering works.
• Domestic contractors assume responsibility, full or partial, for the civil engineering work, possibly including some design work.
• Domestically manufactured components from existing factories are used for non-critical parts of the balance of plant.
• Domestic manufacturers extend their production capabilities to manufacture components that meet nuclear standards, possibly under licensing arrangements with foreign suppliers.
• Domestic manufacturing facilities are set-up to manufacture specialized heavy and other nuclear components, possibly under licensing arrangements with foreign suppliers.

Investment in and the extent to which national capabilities are developed needs to take into account the scope of the planned nuclear programme. A successful implementation of such a progressive national participation in a nuclear power programme has taken place in the Republic of Korea [63, 64].

Governmental support infrastructure

The government has a role in providing buildings (office space) and equipment for institutions needed for a nuclear programme, such as the regulatory bodies, laboratories for research and testing, and facilities for education and training. In the area of transportation, the availability of adequate roads, bridges, ports and airports is also the responsibility of the government, to enable the transport of nuclear components, some of them of large volume and weight (e.g. reactor pressure vessel).

Economic infrastructure

In this publication of the INPRO manual, economic aspects related to the national infrastructure29 needed to start up, maintain or expand a nuclear power programme are discussed. Economic infrastructure is understood as the capabilities of government and national industry to raise the capital needed for their investments into nuclear related infrastructure.

Infrastructure investments by the government

As discussed earlier (UR1), one of the prime responsibilities of government within a nuclear power programme is to establish and maintain a regulatory body responsible for safety and radiation protection (including emergency preparedness), security, non-proliferation and environment.
As stated above, a government would be expected to foster, together with industry, educational centres for the development and training of human resources, e.g. nuclear engineering courses, possibly including nuclear R&D facilities. Further, government investment may be required to upgrade the national infrastructure needed for transporting nuclear components, such as ports, roads and bridges, owing to the size of some components of nuclear facilities such as the reactor pressure vessel.
These necessary investments in infrastructure may require substantial financing resources from the government and may involve adjustments to the country’s national budget. The costs of establishing and maintaining the requisite institutions and activities may not be completely covered by taxes included in the tariff for energy products (e.g. electricity) and could become partly external costs, which would, in the long run, be balanced by spin-off benefits, including the benefit to society that results from the availability of an affordable and reliable supply of energy. This topic is discussed further when considering criterion CR2.5.

Infrastructure investments by national industry

If national industry is to participate in a nuclear power programme, as discussed above, it will need to invest, for example, to acquire new machinery, to train its staff in new technical processes, to add quality assurance and control procedures, and to expand its human resources. Substantial investments may be required even when technology is transferred, for example under a licensing agreement. (The staffing costs of the utility are internalized, i.e. included in the price of electricity or other energy products, e.g. heat.) Such investments by industry may represent a significant financing challenge and some government support may be required. While spin-off benefits such as the capability of manufacturing to higher quality standards may be significant, industry would seek an adequate financial return on its investment from the sale of products to the nuclear power programme. Thus, the industrial investment costs would be reflected in the costs to the owner/operator of the products and would, in the end, be reflected in the cost of power produced by the NPP, which is an indicator in the INPRO methodology area of economics (see the economics publication of the INPRO manual [11]). Note that the national plan for the participation of domestic industry needs to consider the investment needed for a given level of participation to determine if the investment is justified by the planned nuclear power programme, i.e. taking into account the number of plants to be acquired and the schedule for their introduction.

National electricity grid

For technical reasons (grid stability, the flexibility needed for matching supply to daily, weekly and annual load cycles), the size of a new NPP must be compatible with the grid to which it is to be connected [65]. The technical requirement that an NPP that is to be added to a grid represent no more than about 10% of the peak demand serviced by the grid would only be satisfied if there were significantly greater demand for power than that which can be delivered by the new NPP. Thus, the technical requirement for unit size and the economic requirement that there is a market for the product are mutually compatible.

Types of contract for acquiring a nuclear facility

The type of contract for the supply of an NPP or any other component of the nuclear fuel cycle (Section 11.4 of Ref. [17]) chosen by an owner/operator, which could be strongly influenced by government policy, has a strong impact on the requirements for national industrial infrastructure.
Basically, three main types of contract approach have been used in the past for all nuclear power projects:
Turnkey: A single contractor or a consortium of contractors takes over the responsibility for the complete project, including all parts and all phases, such as design, engineering, project management, construction, erection and supply of installations, testing and commissioning. The contractor, or the main contractor in the requirements, e.g. power output, efficiency, etc., at an agreed price.

• Split package: The overall responsibility is divided among a small number of contractors, each in charge of a large section of the work. An architect-engineer has to be involved to coordinate the project.
• Multiple packages: The owner/operator, possibly supported by an architect-engineer, assumes the overall responsibility for the project, which involves a large number of contracts with individual contractors.

The latter two approaches require a strong domestic capability in project management. Even so, for a first NPP, an architect-engineer experienced with NPP projects should be retained. For a country with little experience with the management of large projects, the turnkey approach is recommended.
Recent contracting models for nuclear power projects are:

• The BOT approach: In a BOT approach (see for example Section 8.8.1 of [7] and Section 6.3 of [66]) a consortium of foreign investors establishes a joint venture company (JVC) with a local utility and the JVC sells the electricity (or any other energy product, e.g. heat) to the local utility. The JVC builds the power plant with foreign engineering expertise and operates the plant until all costs have been recovered by means of the electricity tariff, after which ownership of the plant is transferred to the country in which it has been built. During the period of operation by the JVC, domestic staff are trained so that when ownership is transferred there is a domestic management and operating team in place that can assume responsibility for the continued operation of the plant.
• The BOO approach: In this approach the ownership of the plant is retained by the JVC (see example of a BOO contract in Ref. [67]).

An important consideration in the BOO/BOT approaches is the question of providing the JVC with adequate assurances that it will be able to sell its product at an attractive price and so be able to recover its investment. The issues of investment risk and return on investment are discussed in the economics publication of the INPRO manual [11]. Another issue is limiting the liability of the JVC in the event of an accident. It would be expected that a JVC would be prepared to participate in a BOO/BOT project only in a State that has signed and ratified one of the international conventions dealing with nuclear liability (see Section 3.2.1).
The turnkey contract and especially the BOO/BOT approach can be used also as an option to reduce the necessary front end investment in national infrastructure, at least at the beginning of a nuclear power programme (see user requirement UR6).
INPRO has defined five criteria CR2.1–CR2.5 for user requirement UR2, set out in UR2|Table 1.