Infrastructure (Sustainability Assessment)
INPRO basic principle (BP) for sustainability assessment in the area infrastructure - A country shall be able to adopt, maintain or enlarge an NES for the supply of energy and related products without making an excessive investment in national infrastructure.
Contents
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Necessary input for INPRO sustainability assessment in the area of infrastructure
- 2.1 Energy system planning and planning for a nuclear power programme
- 2.2 Necessary information to perform an assessment in the INPRO methodology area of infrastructure
- 2.2.1 Legal and institutional infrastructure (UR1)
- 2.2.2 Industrial and economic infrastructure (UR2)
- 2.2.3 Political support and public acceptance (UR3)
- 2.2.4 Human resources (UR4)
- 2.2.5 Minimization of infrastructure (UR5)
- 2.2.6 Regional and international arrangements (UR6)
- 2.2.7 Assessment of innovative designs
- 2.2.8 INIR as a source of input for a NESA in the area of infrastructure
- 3 Basic principle, user requirements and criteria in the INPRO methodology infrastructure area
- 3.1 Basic principle
- 3.2 User requirement UR1: legal and institutional infrastructure
- 3.2.1 Legal framework
- 3.2.1.1 Hierarchy of legislation
- 3.2.1.2 Objective of nuclear legislation
- 3.2.1.3 Role of conventions
- 3.2.1.4 Legal aspects of nuclear safety and liability
- 3.2.1.5 Legal aspects of non-proliferation
- 3.2.1.6 Legal aspects of nuclear security
- 3.2.1.7 Legal aspects of import and export control
- 3.2.1.8 Legal aspects of the transport of radioactive material
- 3.2.1.9 Legal aspects of radioactive waste management
- 3.2.1.10 Legal aspects of environmental protection
- 3.2.2 Institutional infrastructure
- 3.2.3 Criterion CR1.1: Legal aspects
- 3.2.4 Criterion CR1.2: Institutions
- 3.2.1 Legal framework
- 3.3 User requirement UR2: economic and industrial infrastructure
Introduction
Scope
Issues other than technical requirements for NES are important to potential users of nuclear energy. Many of
the factors that will either facilitate or obstruct the ongoing deployment of nuclear power over the next fifty years
and beyond relate to infrastructure — national, regional and international.
Within the INPRO methodology, the term infrastructure can be defined as a collection of necessary
capabilities of national institutions to achieve the long term sustainability of a nuclear power programme in a
given country. These capabilities are essential for successful deployment and operation (or expansion) of an NES,
and require legal (e.g. nuclear law) and institutional (e.g. regulatory bodies), industrial and economic (e.g. support
to the owner/operator of a nuclear power plant) and sociopolitical measures (e.g. public acceptance and human
resources).
The definition of an NES includes, in addition to the reactor, all nuclear fuel cycle facilities (i.e. components)
at both the front end of the fuel cycle (e.g. mining/milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication) and the back
end (e.g. reprocessing, storage and disposal of waste) and associated infrastructure. Consequently, infrastructure
is a part of the NES to be assessed; however, within the INPRO methodology, a reactor and related nuclear fuel cycle facilities are not considered to be a part of a national infrastructure, albeit that they influence the size of the
necessary infrastructure required in a given country, region and globally.
Objective
It is generally recognized that to operate nuclear facilities, particularly a nuclear power plant (NPP), safely
and securely, a sophisticated infrastructure is required. Countries that already operate NPPs will, in general, already
have an appropriate infrastructure in place, but this is unlikely to be the case for a country that has not yet acquired
its first NPP.
The manual can be used to look at infrastructure requirements in a country considering whether to acquire
its first NPP, planning for the expansion of an existing nuclear power programme, and/or for replacing currently
operating plants when they reach the end of their useful life, or when planning for other components of an NES, for
example, for fuel manufacturing.
The manual is not intended to provide specific guidance on creating the necessary infrastructure, but focuses
on assessing the status of the infrastructure, whether already existing or being planned. For a country embarking
on a nuclear power programme, specific guidance on creating an adequate infrastructure is provided in the IAEA
publications entitled Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power [4] and
Evaluation of the Status of National Nuclear Infrastructure Development [5], and by the related IAEA peer review
service Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR) [6] offered to Member States by the IAEA.
An assessment using the INPRO methodology should lead either to the confirmation that an established (or
planned) infrastructure is adequate for the nuclear power programme planned (or in operation) or to the definition
of actions that need to be taken to achieve an adequate infrastructure.
Planning for a first NPP, or for the enlargement of an existing NES, and planning for addressing the associated
infrastructural issues are closely linked and one necessitates the other. On the other hand, establishing or upgrading
the necessary infrastructure takes time and effort and so actions to this end are unlikely to be started until energy
system planning has clearly identified nuclear power as an option for (additional) energy supply that should be
seriously considered. Thus, in this publication, the discussion of infrastructure requirements also involves on
occasion a discussion of energy system planning, since, at least at the early stages of planning, infrastructure
planning and energy system planning are interwoven and interdependent activities. For example, energy system
planning, when considered in isolation from infrastructure, may indicate that an NPP should enter into operation
within a relatively short time frame. But ensuring the infrastructure (existing or planned) is adequate to acquire
and safely operate especially the first NPP may require a significantly longer time. So, the energy system planning
process cannot be completed without considering the related infrastructure planning process
Structure
In Section 2, the main information that is needed for an INPRO assessment in the area of infrastructure is specified. In Section 3, background information concerning the basic principle of INPRO, user requirements and criteria in the INPRO methodology area of infrastructure is set out and a process for evaluating the criteria is presented. From the discussion in the preceding section, it is clear that a number of factors or topics need to be considered in the area of infrastructure. These factors are grouped together and discussed in Section 3 of the manual, under the following general headings, each of which represents a user requirement (UR) in the area of infrastructure:
- Legal and institutional considerations (UR1);
- Industrial and economic considerations (UR2);
- Political support and public acceptance (UR3);
- Human resources (UR4);
- Minimization of infrastructure (UR5);
- Regional and international arrangements (UR6).
The basic principle, user requirements and the corresponding criteria in the INPRO methodology area of infrastructure are set out in Table 1.
| INPRO basic principle for sustainability assessment in the area of infrastructure: A country shall be able to adopt, maintain or enlarge an NES for the supply of energy and related products without making an excessive investment in national infrastructure. | ||
| INPRO user requirements | Criteria | Indicator (IN) and Acceptance Limit (AL) |
|---|---|---|
| UR1: Legal and institutional
infrastructure: |
CR1.1: Legal aspects | IN1.1: Status of legal framework |
| AL1.1: Legal framework has been established in accordance with international standards | ||
| CR1.2: | IN1.2: Status of State organizations with responsibilities for safety and
radiation protection, environmental protection, control of operation, waste management and decommissioning, emergency preparedness and response, security and non-proliferation | |
| AL1.2: State organizations have been established, in accordance with
international standards | ||
UR2 : Industrial and economic
infrastructure: The industrial and economic infrastructure of a country with an NESc should be adequate to support the project throughout the complete lifetime of the nuclear power programme, including planning, construction, operation, decommissioning and related waste management activities |
CR2.1:
Funding of infrastructure |
IN2.1: Funding needed for the infrastructure of a nuclear power
programme |
| AL2.1: Sufficiently available to cover the nuclear power programme | ||
| CR2.2: Size of
nuclear facility |
IN2.2: Size of nuclear installation | |
| AL2.2: Matches local needs | ||
| CR2.3: Siting | IN2.3: Process of siting a nuclear facility | |
| AL2.3: Siting process has taken safety, security and environmental
requirements into account in accordance with international standards | ||
| CR2.4:
Support infrastructure |
IN2.4: Availability of infrastructure to support owner/operator | |
| AL2.4: Internally or externally available | ||
| CR2.5:
Added value |
IN2.5: Added value of a nuclear power programme to society | |
| AL2.5: Added value > infrastructure investment by government
necessary to support nuclear power programme | ||
| UR3: Political support and public
acceptance: Adequate measures should be taken to achieve and maintain publice acceptance of an NES being planned or in operation to enable a government policy commitment to support the deployment and operation of the system |
CR3.1: Public
information |
IN3.1: Information provided to public |
| AL3.1: Sufficient according to national requirements, taking into
account international practice | ||
| CR3.2: Public
participation |
IN3.2: Participation of public in decision making process on a nuclear
power programme | |
| AL3.2: Sufficient according to national requirements, taking into
account international practice | ||
| CR3.3: Survey of
public acceptance |
IN3.3: Public acceptance of nuclear power | |
| AL3.3: Sufficient to expect that the political risk of policy support for
nuclear power is acceptable | ||
| CR3.4: Policy
support |
IN3.4:.Government policy regarding nuclear power | |
| AL3.4: Policy is supportive of nuclear power | ||
| CR3.5: Political
environment and investor risk |
IN3.5: Long term political commitment to a nuclear power programme | |
| AL3.5: Commitment sufficient to enable a return of investment | ||
| UR4: Human resources:
The necessary human resources should be available to enable all responsible parties involved in a nuclear power programme to achieve safe, secure and economical operation of the NES during its lifetime |
CR4.1: Human
resources |
IN4.1: Availability of adequate human resources to establish and
operate an NES |
| AL4.1: Sufficient according to international experience | ||
| UR5: Minimization of infrastructureg:
The NES should be designed to minimize the necessary infrastructure for a nuclear power programme |
CR5.1: Personnel | IN5.1: Human resources needed for operation, maintenance and repair
and decommissioning |
| AL5.1: Amount of human resources is reduced in comparison to an
existing facility | ||
| CR5.2:
Prefabrication of components |
IN5.2: Extent of prefabrication of components | |
| AL5.2: Extent is increased in comparison to an existing facility | ||
| UR6: Regional and international
arrangements: Regional and international arrangements should provide options that enable a country with an NES to minimize the infrastructure for a nuclear power programme |
CR6.1: Options to
reduce institutional infrastructure |
IN6.1: Have regional and/or international arrangements to reduce the
institutional infrastructure been considered? |
| AL6.1: Yes | ||
| CR6.2: Options to
reduce industrial infrastructure |
IN6.2: Have regional and/or international arrangements to reduce the
industrial infrastructure been considered? | |
| AL6.2: Yes | ||
| CR6.3: Options
to reduce social political infrastructure |
IN6.3: Have regional and/or international arrangements to reduce the
social political infrastructure been considered? | |
| AL6.3: Yes | ||
| CR6.4: Options
to reduce human resources |
IN6.4: Have regional and/or international arrangements to reduce
human resources been considered? | |
| AL6.4: Yes | ||
Necessary input for INPRO sustainability assessment in the area of infrastructure
This section first discusses the importance of performing energy system planning to define the role of nuclear power in an energy mix to satisfy the predicted growth of energy demand in a country. Subsequently, the main information needed for an assessment using the INPRO methodology in the area of infrastructure and its potential source is defined.
Energy system planning and planning for a nuclear power programme
Energy system planning is highly important for the success of a nuclear power programme, especially if it is
the first nuclear project in a country, e.g. the installation of the first NPP. Energy system planning is discussed in
Section 2 of the economics manual [11] of the INPRO methodology.
Energy system planning should:
- Define a technically feasible and economically optimized plan for the expansion of the energy supply;
- Examine the role of nuclear power in the energy supply plan of the country.
However, energy system planning does not form a part of an assessment using the INPRO methodology per
se. In general, the INPRO methodology assumes that an NES has been specified to contribute to meeting a defined
(future) energy demand. The INPRO methodology is then used to determine whether the INPRO methodology
requirements are met, in which case the NES represents a sustainable source of energy.
In case of an intended installation of a (first or additional) NPP, the final outcome of the energy system
planning phase should be the specification of the contribution, as a function of time, that nuclear technology will
make to the energy supply in a country (or region, or globally). The specified role for nuclear power should be
technically and economically feasible. Thus, the results of an energy system planning study should be available to
the INPRO assessor.
Countries can obtain assistance for their energy system planning from the IAEA.
Necessary information to perform an assessment in the INPRO methodology area of infrastructure
In this section, for each user requirement, UR1 to UR6, the main input data needed for an assessment and
their potential source are discussed.
In the NES assessment (NESA) support package (see Section 4.3 of the overview publication of the INPRO
manual), examples of input data available on the internet for an INPRO assessment are provided.
Legal and institutional infrastructure (UR1)
The INPRO assessor needs to have access to information on national legal and institutional measures, such as
the legal framework (in place or planned) related to nuclear power, and on the capabilities of regulatory and other
organizations with responsibilities for nuclear safety, radiation protection, environmental protection, emergency
preparedness and response, non-proliferation and nuclear security.
The source of this information should be the responsible national government organizations such as the
regulatory bodies, the ministry of energy and the ministry of the environment. If the country has recently used a
relevant IAEA service that reviews, on the request of Member States, national legal and institutional infrastructure,
the INPRO assessor should use the results of these IAEA services as a source of input. Examples of relevant
IAEA services are: the Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS), the Emergency Preparedness Review
Service (EPREV), Radioactive Waste Services, International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ), the
International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS), the IAEA State System for Accountancy and Control
Advisory Service (ISSAS) and the IAEA Legislative Assistance Programme. The IAEA service INIR as a source of
input is discussed separately in more detail in Section 2.2.8.
Industrial and economic infrastructure (UR2)
Participation of national industry in the nuclear power programme
The results of a study — jointly produced by the government, the owner/operator of the NES and the national industry — setting out the existing capabilities (and necessary upgrading) of the national industry to support a (planned) nuclear power programme and a State policy for the participation of national industry should be available to the INPRO assessor. In addition, the results of a cost–benefit analysis should be available, comparing the necessary investment in industrial infrastructure with the expected benefits of a nuclear power programme to national industry. The source of this information should be the responsible national government organizations such as the ministry of energy, and industry involved in the nuclear programme.
Transportation of heavy equipment
The government is usually responsible for assuring adequate means of transportation (roads, ports, bridges, etc.) of bulky nuclear components such as the reactor pressure vessel to the site of an NPP. The source of this information should be the ministry of transportation.
Benefit of a nuclear power programme to society
The results of a study should be available to the INPRO assessor that defines the (expected) benefit of the (envisaged) nuclear power programme to society in the country. The source of this information should be the responsible national government organizations such as the ministry of energy.
Financial and technical constraints
Information on financial limitations and technical constraints for the implementation of a nuclear power
programme should be available as input to the INPRO assessor.
A main technical constraint may be the size of the national grid, to which an NPP will be connected. The grid
size has to be compatible with the size of the NPP to be constructed. Further, the grid should represent a reliable
source of power for safety sensitive equipment while the plant is shut down, e.g. for maintenance. This information
should be available from the (planned) owner/operator of the NES based on an energy system expansion study.
PESS provides tools and assistance in performing such an energy system expansion study on request.
In this publication, the funding of national infrastructure is taken into account. Confirmation of the necessary
government budget for the part of infrastructure to be covered by the State, such as educational institutions and
transport related measures (appropriate roads, bridges and ports), should be available to the INPRO assessor from
responsible government organizations such as the ministry for transport and for education.
Based on the plan of participation of national industry in the nuclear power programme, the necessary funds
for the foreseen upgrading of the national industry should be assured. Confirmation of the availability of these
funds should be received from the national industry.
Siting of nuclear facilities
The siting process of nuclear facilities should be conducted taking international standards on safety, security and environment into account. The INPRO assessor should have access to relevant information on the siting process. The source of the information should be a responsible government organization, such as the regulator, the ministry of energy or the ministry of the environment. If the country has recently used the IAEA Site and External Events Design Review Service (SEED), the INPRO assessor should use the results of this service as input for the assessment.
Political support and public acceptance (UR3)
Information to the public and public participation
The INPRO assessor should have access to information about the policies of the State (ministries and regulators), of the owner/operator of nuclear facilities and of industrial companies and associations involved in a nuclear power programme regarding the provision of information to the public and mechanisms for public input into the decision making process. The information should be available from the responsible government organization, e.g. the ministry of energy, the owner/operator of nuclear facilities, and national industry.
Survey of public opinion
Finally, a survey of the opinion of decision makers and the public regarding nuclear power should have been performed by the owner/operator and the government in the country with an existing (or planned) NES, to provide input for the INPRO assessment of public acceptance of a nuclear power programme.
Political environment and investor risk
To determine the political risk of an investment in a nuclear power programme, the INPRO assessor needs information about the political situation, including the legal system dealing with interveners to nuclear projects in the country. The information should be provided by the ministry of justice.
Human resources (UR4)
Educational system
Government entities, such as regulators, the owner/operator of the NES and national industry, need adequate human resources to run a successful nuclear power programme. The INPRO assessor needs information on the (planned) national educational system and the training system of the owner/operator to provide skilled trades, technicians and professional engineers/scientists in all disciplines relevant to nuclear power. This information is to be provided by the responsible government organization such as the ministry of education and by the owner/ operator.
Attractiveness of nuclear power sector
To assure the availability of qualified personnel in the nuclear power sector, the attractiveness of this sector in the country has to be confirmed. Attractiveness is based on salaries and other factors such as working conditions. The information should be provided primarily by the owner/operator of nuclear facilities.
Minimization of infrastructure (UR5)
The INPRO assessor needs information from the designer about measures to reduce the necessary national infrastructure in the new design, in comparison to an existing nuclear facility. Reductions of necessary infrastructure could have been achieved by reducing the necessary human resources to operate, maintain and repair the new nuclear facility, and by using prefabrication of components during construction of a nuclear facility.
Regional and international arrangements (UR6)
There are several international arrangements available for a country with a nuclear power programme that can reduce the effort necessary to build and maintain an adequate infrastructure, such as harmonization of the licensing process, sharing of support services, application of harmonized safety standards and the use of worldwide universities for nuclear education. The INPRO assessor needs information on whether such arrangements have been considered in the planning of a nuclear power programme. The source of this information should be the responsible government organizations, such as the regulator or the ministry of education, and the owner/operator of the NES.
Assessment of innovative designs
A special situation is when an innovative nuclear design in an early stage of development is to be assessed with regard to infrastructure. In such a case, new design features compared to existing (reference) designs might primarily be of interest in an INPRO assessment; in particular, the influence of these features on the amount and kind of infrastructure needed could be evaluated. This situation is most probably more relevant for an INPRO assessor in a technology holder (developer) country and less interesting for an INPRO assessor in a technology user country, as the latter will rely more on proven technology.
INIR as a source of input for a NESA in the area of infrastructure
If a country embarking on a nuclear power programme to build its first NPP is also applying — in parallel
to the INPRO methodology in a NESA — the Milestone Approach [4, 5] and the corresponding INIR service
from the IAEA, the INPRO assessor is recommended to contact and cooperate with the responsible national
organization for the Milestone approach and INIR (usually called the NEPIO, Nuclear Energy Programme
Implementing Organization [12]) to receive the necessary input for an assessment in the INPRO methodology area
of infrastructure for user requirements UR1–UR4 and to harmonize the results of both activities.
Table 2 presents the issues to be covered in the Milestone approach and reviewed by the INIR process [4–6]
that can provide input to the assessment of requirements of the INPRO methodology in the area of infrastructure.
| User requirement (UR) in INPRO methodology | Issue (I) in INIR process |
|---|---|
| UR1: Legal and institutional infrastructure |
I-1: National position |
| UR2: Industrial and economic infrastructure |
I-1: National position |
| UR3: Political support and public acceptance |
I-1: National position |
| UR4: Human resources |
I-1: National position |
For INPRO methodology user requirements UR5 and UR6 in the area of infrastructure, there is no direct relationship with the 19 issues of the Milestone approach process. The relationship of a NESA and the INIR process is evaluated in more detail in the overview publication of the updated INPRO manual.
Basic principle, user requirements and criteria in the INPRO methodology infrastructure area
The term ‘infrastructure’ within the INPRO methodology includes primarily legal and institutional measures,
such as the establishment of a national legal framework, i.e. the conventions, laws and regulations needed for a
nuclear power programme, and the corresponding organizations, e.g. the regulatory body, to fulfil the functions
defined within the legal framework. An adequate national infrastructure has to be established and maintained by
the national institutions of the country, meaning the government, the operators of nuclear facilities and national
industry involved in a national nuclear power programme, to assure its long term sustainability.
In the area of infrastructure, one basic principle and six user requirements have been defined. For each user
requirement, several criteria have been developed, most of which have additional evaluation parameters to assist
with the assessment.
Basic principle
Infrastructure basic principle: A country shall be able to adopt, maintain or enlarge an NES for the supply of
energy and related products without making an excessive investment in national infrastructure.
The main goal, expressed in this basic principle, is to ensure that the necessary investment in nuclear related
national infrastructure is not an obstacle for the start, maintenance or expansion of a nuclear power programme.
The term ‘investment’ here is meant to cover not only direct financial investments in capital equipment
but also other indirect costs, such as costs for the development of human resources, transfer of technology and
know-how. The term ‘excessive’ is understood to mean economically unattractive and/or to represent an undue
burden on society.
To achieve the goal of the basic principle, INPRO has developed six user requirements (UR1–UR6) directed
primarily at the national institutions involved in a nuclear power programme, such as regulatory bodies, operators
and nuclear industry, but also at designers of nuclear facilities.
User requirements UR1–UR4 ask national institutions involved in a nuclear power programme to achieve and
maintain an adequate infrastructure, i.e. to enable a safe, secure and economical operation of an NES in the long
term.
User requirement UR5 asks the designer of nuclear facilities to minimize the necessary infrastructure for a
new nuclear facility by reducing the human resources needed for operation, maintenance and repair work, and to
use prefabricated of components.
Additionally, user requirement UR6 asks the government and the owner/operator to consider international
or regional arrangements instead of national solutions, as a means to optimize the investment in national
infrastructure. One of the long term goals of the development of regional and international arrangements for nuclear
related infrastructure is to reduce the necessary national investment to a level comparable to the investment in the
infrastructure required for non-nuclear energy systems.
User requirement UR1: legal and institutional infrastructure
User requirement UR1: An adequate legal framework should be established to cover the issues of nuclear
liability, safety and radiation protection, environmental protection, control of operation, waste management and
decommissioning, security and non-proliferation.
The Fundamental Safety Principles [13] state that regulating nuclear and radiation safety and security is the
responsibility of the State and that an effective legal framework must be established and maintained. The role of the
INPRO assessor is to determine whether the (existing or planned) legal framework is adequate to achieve the long
term sustainability of a nuclear power programme.
The establishment of a nuclear power programme entails legal requirements at both the national and
international level. These requirements give rise to the need to establish and maintain a legal framework that
provides the basis for establishing safety requirements for the control and oversight of operations and of security
arrangements, including non-proliferation and environmental aspects. As noted, responsibility for the development
and maintenance of the legal framework rests with national governments. If a country is embarking on a nuclear
power programme, i.e. is planning to install its first NPP, the nuclear legal framework must be in place well in
advance of the installation.
The legal framework comprises two aspects: legal requirements set out in nuclear related legislation, referred
to as nuclear law, and the related institutional infrastructure including regulatory authorities that must give effect to
the law and ensure that the legal requirements are met.
In this publication, the legal framework primarily related to nuclear safety is discussed. The sustainability
assessment of an NES in the area of nuclear safety, other than assessing the legal framework, is dealt with in a
separate publication of the updated INPRO manual.
The assessment of an NES in the area of proliferation resistance, including a detailed evaluation of the legal
aspects of this area, is described in a separate publication of the INPRO manual. Nevertheless, in this publication,
legal aspects of proliferation resistance are mentioned for completeness, primarily with the intention of assuring
these aspects have been addressed in the separate assessments of proliferation resistance.
Legal framework
There are two key IAEA publications on nuclear law [14, 15]. The following information is based on these two IAEA publications. The history, evolution and outlook of nuclear law is discussed in Ref. [16]. The 2003 edition of the Handbook on Nuclear Law [14] defines nuclear law as:
“the body of special legal norms created to regulate the conduct of legal or natural persons engaged in
activities related to fissionable materials, ionizing radiation and exposure to natural sources of radiation... The primary objective of nuclear law is to provide a legal framework for conducting activities related to nuclear energy and ionizing radiation in a manner which adequately protects individuals, property and the
environment.”
Nuclear law has specific characteristics, such as the safety principle, the security principle and the responsibility principle, that distinguish it from other aspects of national law.
Hierarchy of legislation
Legislation is generally organized in a hierarchy of three levels: (1) constitutional instruments, (2) statutory elements enacted by a parliament or legislature, and (3) regulations promulgated by expert governmental bodies, and supplemented by so-called guidelines, i.e. non-mandatory recommendations on how to fulfil regulations. Nuclear law is part of level 2. It should primarily define requirements with the objective of ensuring public and occupational safety, environmental protection, security and non-proliferation that are binding on all persons and organizations. Nuclear law should also specify the liability regime. Regulations, a part of level 3, and guidelines are binding primarily on specific persons or organizations, e.g. the owner/operator who is licensed to operate a nuclear facility. It is recommended (see Refs [14, 15]) that regulations and especially guidelines should not be set out within nuclear law, but should be prepared by the responsible authorities, e.g. the safety authority, radiation protection authority, security body, environmental authority, to facilitate the timely updating of regulations and guidelines. (Where different authorities are involved, it is important that their activities be coordinated.)
Objective of nuclear legislation
As discussed in the IAEA Guidebook on the Introduction of Nuclear Power [17] and required in the IAEA Safety Standard Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety [18], nuclear legislation should seek to:
- Set out objectives for protecting individuals, society and the environment from radiation hazards;
- Vest a regulatory body that is independent from public and private corporations, and institutions promoting nuclear energy and operating nuclear facilities, with legislative powers for regulating and ensuring the safe and secure use of nuclear energy;
- Define principles and conditions that enable the regulatory authority to authorize the carrying out of nuclear activities, such as construction, operation and decommissioning of nuclear facilities;
- Establish principles and rules consistent with international conventions on third party liability;
- Ensure the security and physical protection of nuclear and other radioactive material and facilities;
- Create a system for the accounting and control of nuclear material.
According to the IAEA Handbook on Nuclear Law [15], the objectives of nuclear law could be presented in a preamble to the law as follows:
- To permit the uses and applications of nuclear energy which are beneficial and peaceful;
- To ensure that people and the environment are adequately protected against any harmful effects that may arise from ionizing radiation and that radiation sources are kept in a safe and secure manner;
- To set up a body to regulate peaceful uses of ionizing radiation by performing the functions and holding the responsibilities detailed in nuclear law;
- To ensure that the State meets any obligations it has undertaken by signing any relevant international
instruments.
Role of conventions
National nuclear legislation (nuclear law) should take into account regional and international treaties and
conventions. To subscribe to such treaties and conventions, three steps are distinguished: signing of the convention
by individual States, ratification of the convention by the State’s legislative assembly/parliament and the entering
into force of the convention. Individual States need to establish legal arrangements for implementing the obligations
that they have assumed when signing and ratifying international instruments such as conventions (see section 1.5.9
of Ref. [14]).
In the following subsections, the legal aspects, i.e. primarily the relevant international conventions of nuclear
safety and liability, non-proliferation, nuclear security, import and export control, transport of radioactive material,
waste management and environmental protection are briefly discussed.
Legal aspects of nuclear safety and liability
Within the nuclear law, the safety of nuclear installations is an important issue. The corresponding legislation
should focus on the general nuclear safety objective and the technical safety objectives [13].
Important safety related international conventions to be reflected in nuclear law include: The Convention
on Nuclear Safety [19], The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the safety of
Radioactive Waste Management [20], the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident [21] and the
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency [22]. Nuclear law should
reflect international best practice, as described in the IAEA Safety Standards (such as Radiation Protection and
Safety of Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety Standards [23]). The concept of safety management and
safety and security culture should be included either in the law or in regulations.
Nuclear law must cover the safe management of all sources and types of ionizing radiation in a country. The
objective of radiation protection is to ensure that individuals, society and the environment are adequately protected
against radiological hazards. Radiation protection requires that during normal operations, radiation exposures
should be kept below prescribed limits and should be optimized using the ALARA principle.
It is particularly important that provisions in nuclear law addressing nuclear and radiological emergency
preparedness and response be carefully drafted to be consistent with other laws and arrangements for addressing
other emergency situations in line with the all-hazards approach. The IAEA Safety Standard GS-R-2 [24] can be
used as a basis for emergency preparedness and response provisions.
Prime responsibility for nuclear safety rests with the owner/operator of a nuclear facility. From this principle,
the nuclear liability regime has been derived (see Chapter 11 of Refs [14, 15]). The basic idea behind the term
liability is that a person or entity responsible for causing harm should compensate the victim. States recognized at
an early stage that the possibility of transboundary damage required an international nuclear liability regime.
The nuclear liability regime is based on two basic conventions: The Paris Convention (adopted in 1960
under the auspices of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD NEA) came into force in 1968 [25]) and the
Vienna Convention (adopted in 1963 under the auspices of the IAEA, came into force in 1977 [26]). The Paris
Convention provides a third party liability regime and is open to OECD states. It was amended in 1963 by the
Brussels Supplementary Convention (further compensation by public funds). The Vienna Convention established
a worldwide system and was supplemented in 1997 by the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for
Nuclear Damage [27]. In 1988 the Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the
Paris Convention [28] was established.
In all nuclear liability regimes (with the exception of Austria and the United States of America), the concept
of strict liability is applied, i.e. the owner/operator of a nuclear installation is held liable regardless of fault. Further,
the simple existence of causation of damage is the basis of the operator’s liability. Additional principles of nuclear
liability are the limitation of liability in amount and time, (recognizing that civil law is not designed to cope
with catastrophes and that in the event of such a catastrophe, the State will inevitably step in and pay additional
compensation) and the concentrations of procedures within a single court (to create legal certainty).
Legal aspects of non-proliferation
The most significant international treaty in the area of non-proliferation is the Treaty on the Non Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT, [30]). To ensure compliance with the basic commitments (not to transfer or to acquire
nuclear weapons) of the NPT, all non-nuclear-weapon States accept safeguards for the purpose of verification of
the fulfilment of their obligations (Chapter 12 of Refs [14, 15]) based on a comprehensive safeguards agreement
and additional protocols.
The foundation of the safeguards system lies in the IAEA Statute, which is binding on both the IAEA
Secretariat and IAEA Member States. Safeguards comprise three main functions: accountancy, containment and
surveillance, and inspection.
Supplementary to the NPT, several regional non-proliferation agreements exist, such as the Treaty for the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific
Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Rarotonga Treaty), the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (the
Bangkok Treaty) and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (the Pelindaba treaty).
A State system for accounting and control of nuclear material (SSAC) is an important part of the
non-proliferation regime. Further details on this regime can be found in the proliferation resistance manual of the
INPRO methodology.
Legal aspects of nuclear security
The main international conventions in this area are, firstly, the Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material [31] and its 2005 amendment [32] and, secondly, the International Convention for the Suppression
of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism [33]. Additional international legal instruments relevant for this area are: United
Nations Security Council resolution 1373 [34] on threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts;
United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 [35] on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; The
Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources [36] and the companion publication Guidance
on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources [37]; The Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention) [38]; and The Protocol of 2005 to the
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental
Shelf [39].
Further details on this regime can be found in Chapter 14 of Refs [14, 15] and in the IAEA Nuclear Security
Series publications [40–48].
Legal aspects of import and export control
As stated in Chapter 13 of the IAEA Handbook on Nuclear Law [15], export and import controls are relevant to safety, nuclear security and safeguards measures in a State and enable it to maintain its sovereign control over activities taking place within its own territory. Export controls help to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices. They are required under relevant multilateral and regional nuclear non-proliferation instruments, most prominently the NPT [30], and the reporting of certain exports and imports to the IAEA is required under safeguards agreements negotiated in connection with such instruments. From a nuclear security perspective, both export and import controls are relevant to preventing and detecting illicit trafficking, and can help to prevent the acquisition of nuclear and other radioactive materials by persons or entities that could seek to use them for malicious purposes. Export and import controls also contribute to safety by helping States to ensure that exported or imported items are only acquired by persons or entities with the capability of using them in an acceptable manner and only for authorized purposes.
Legal aspects of the transport of radioactive material
As stated in Chapter 9 of the IAEA Handbook on Nuclear Law [15], the IAEA regularly publishes detailed Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (the transport regulations) [49] addressing all categories of radioactive material. Also, in May 2005 the IAEA Board of Governors approved a new policy for reviewing and revising the transport regulations. According to this policy, the IAEA Secretariat will continue to review the transport regulations at intervals consistent with the schedules of the United Nations Sub-Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods and of the relevant international modal organizations in order to remain in step with the review cycles of the other relevant international bodies.
Legal aspects of radioactive waste management
As stated in Chapter 10 of the Handbook on Nuclear Law [14], notwithstanding differences in national development policies on the treatment of radioactive waste and spent fuel, States utilizing nuclear energy have been able to reach a consensus on the basic principles that should be applied in the field of radioactive waste and spent fuel management. This consensus is reflected in the 1997 Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (the Joint Convention) [20].
Legal aspects of environmental protection
There is a convention regarding environmental issues in transnational situations, the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (the Espoo convention) [50], adopted in 1991 by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) in the Finnish city of Espoo. Environmental threats do not respect national borders. Governments have realized that to avert this danger they must notify and consult each other on all major projects under consideration (including nuclear power) that might have adverse environmental impact across borders. The Convention entered into force in 1997. There is also an additional protocol to this Convention, the Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA), that was adopted in 2003. The SEA Protocol augments the Espoo Convention by ensuring that individual Parties integrate environmental assessment into their plans and programmes at the earliest stages. The SEA Protocol entered into force on 11 July 2010. This convention and its protocol are also applicable to the (planned) installation of an NPP.
Institutional infrastructure
The term institutional infrastructure in the INPRO methodology covers all regulatory authorities that need to be established and maintained by a country for a long term sustainable nuclear power programme, with regard to nuclear safety, environment, security, non-proliferation, export and import control, transport of radioactive material and radioactive waste management. In addition, for the development of adequate human resources, an infrastructure for education and training is needed.
Safety and environmental institutions
The institutional infrastructure in regard to nuclear safety consists primarily of a regulatory body empowered
by nuclear law (see Chapter 2 of Refs [14, 15]). Preferably, this regulatory body should be a single institution
covering all regulatory aspects of nuclear safety, including regulation of the management of radioactive waste and
spent fuel. In some countries, however, there are two authorities, the nuclear safety authority and the radiation
protection authority, and there are examples where some specific aspects of nuclear safety, such as the safe
transport of radioactive material, is the responsibility of a different governmental organization, e.g. the ministry of
transportation, and import and export control is the responsibility of the ministry for economy. Additionally, most
States will have an environmental authority that may impose additional requirements on nuclear facilities, such as
the fulfilment of the Espoo convention mentioned above. In such cases of divided responsibility, the responsibilities
and functions of each organization must be clearly defined and their activities must be coordinated and harmonized.
For countries embarking on a nuclear power programme, the IAEA has developed Specific Safety Guide
No. SSG-16, Establishing the Safety Infrastructure for a Nuclear Power Programme [51]. This publication defines
the necessary actions to be taken during the development of a nuclear programme to achieve an adequate nuclear
safety infrastructure, and references the applicable IAEA safety requirements.
Security institutions
Within a national security regime, several State organizations in a country are required to work together, each with well-defined responsibilities. In addition to the security department of the owner/operator of a nuclear facility, organizations with responsibilities for specific aspects of nuclear security include local authorities in the area of the facility (e.g. local police), and State organizations (e.g. the military, intelligence agencies, national police). A competent State authority must be in place to ensure the establishment and maintenance of the security of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, as well as a national security regime that, inter alia, will ensure the fulfilment of the commitments resulting from adherence to applicable international nuclear security conventions. Further details on this issue can be found in the respective chapter 14 of Refs [14, 15] and in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series publications [40–48].
Non-proliferation institutions
While safety and security are national responsibilities, non-proliferation is both a national and an international responsibility. The responsible international authority is the IAEA. Having said that, States must ensure that there is a national safeguards authority to ensure that the State is fulfilling its obligations under the NPT [30], as set out in the comprehensive safeguards agreement [52] and additional protocols [53] between the State and the IAEA (see Chapter 12 of Refs [14, 15]). One of the most important responsibilities of a national safeguards authority is to establish and maintain the SSAC. Further details on this issue can be found in the proliferation resistance manual of the INPRO methodology.
Institutions for disposal of radioactive waste and spent fuel
In most countries with a nuclear power programme, there is a government organization — separate from the owner/operator of nuclear facilities — that is responsible for the management and disposal of radioactive waste and spent fuel. To enable safe disposal, this organization would be in charge of defining the end state (and all intermediate steps) of all nuclear wastes produced in the national NES. This issue is further discussed in the waste management publication of the INPRO manual and in Chapter 10 of Refs [14, 15].
Institutions for education and training
To operate and regulate a successful nuclear power programme requires a qualified workforce. For a nuclear power programme, engineers, technicians and skilled trades/craftsmen are primarily needed. A variety of educational institutions have a role to play in building and maintaining a skilled workforce, including universities (e.g. with nuclear engineering courses) and technical schools with access to specialized training facilities (e.g. for training nuclear operators, qualifying welders and non-destructive testing experts). Training centres could also be run by the operator of the nuclear facility. This topic is discussed further, in Section 3.5, when addressing user requirement UR4 (human resources).
Criterion CR1.1: Legal aspects
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ᅠIndicator IN1.1: Status of legal framework.ᅠ
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This criterion deals with the establishment of an adequate nuclear legal framework consisting of a nuclear law and corresponding regulations (rules) and associated guidelines. The necessary content of such a legal framework has been discussed briefly above. A comprehensive description of the legislative process to create an adequate nuclear law and its content, requirements and history can be found in Refs [14, 15]). Using this reference, a set of evaluation parameters has been identified by the INPRO methodology, as a sublevel of criterion CR1.1.
To the final assessment of criterion CR1.1: Legal aspects: |
Criterion CR1.2: Institutions
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ᅠIndicator IN1.2: Status of State organizations with responsibilities for safety and radiation protection, environmental protection, control of operation, waste management and decommissioning, emergency preparedness and response, security and non-proliferation.ᅠ
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The second criterion CR1.2 of UR1 deals with the institutional aspects of the legal framework related to
regulatory bodies (the other institutions in the responsibility of the government (e.g., for education/training) are
discussed in UR4). To carry out its responsibility effectively, efficiently and independently, the regulatory body
needs to be provided with adequate personnel, financial resources, office quarters, information technology and
support services. In deciding on the structure of the regulatory body, the country’s cultural attitudes and traditions,
the nature of its national legal infrastructure and the established governmental organizations with their procedures
have to be taken into account; as well as technical, financial and human resources available within the State and/or
accessible regionally or internationally.
To final assessment of criterion CR1.2: Institutions: |
User requirement UR2: economic and industrial infrastructure
User requirement UR2: The industrial and economic infrastructure of a country with an NES should be
adequate to support the project throughout the complete lifetime of the nuclear power programme, including
planning, construction, operation, decommissioning and related waste management activities.
This user requirement refers to the necessary industrial and economic infrastructure to be available or
established within a country that is intending to install, maintain or enlarge a nuclear power programme. While user
requirement UR2 is focused on the role of national industry in supporting the owner/operator of nuclear facilities,
it needs to be recognized that State infrastructure, for example, in the area of transportation, is encompassed by this
requirement.
A key reference for industrial infrastructure is the IAEA publication Developing Industrial Infrastructure to
Support a Programme of Nuclear Power [62].
The role of the INPRO assessor is to check whether the established or planned industrial and economic
infrastructure is adequate.
Support of infrastructure by national industry and government
Industrial support infrastructure
In the ideal case, a complete domestic industrial infrastructure would enable a given country to perform all
activities during the lifetime of a nuclear power programme, such as the planning, design, component manufacture,
construction and installation, maintenance and repair, and decommissioning of nuclear facilities and the management
of related radioactive wastes. The corresponding industrial capabilities required to perform these activities are very
broad. They include the availability of skilled and qualified human resources; the supply of materials, semifinished
products, standard and specialized equipment; and the availability of means for transporting goods and supplies.
The supply of materials includes the supply of products such as cement and steel. Semifinished products include
items such as piping, tubing, plates, etc. Standard equipment includes parts such as cables and electrical equipment
such as motors, etc. Special equipment includes nuclear components and also equipment for machining large
components, bending and forming, boring, forging, welding and surface treatment. The manufacturing of special
nuclear components (e.g. pressure vessels, steam generators, main coolant pumps) is challenging and their supply
should be optimized by evaluating international supply options. Special equipment may be needed for shipments
made by road, railway, air and ship and to lift heavy and bulky components.
It is highly unlikely that any country will have a complete domestic capability — at least some components
or materials will have to be imported. For a country acquiring its first NPP, many components will be imported
and the scope for domestic supply will be limited. For subsequent units, the scope of domestic supply would be
expected to increase as the country acquires capability.
A country embarking on a nuclear power programme should include in its planning phase, as part of a
feasibility study, a survey of existing national industrial capabilities (see, for example, section 5.8.3 of Ref. [17]).
Such a survey would identify the needs and opportunities for upgrading the national industry, which are typically
relevant in three areas: manufacturing, engineering and quality management (quality assurance and quality control).
Based on the results of the survey, a plan for the development of national participation should be established.
This plan would seek to define an optimized level of participation as a function of the status of the nuclear power
programme, taking into consideration national policy objectives and the capabilities and development potential
of domestic industry. Government and the owner/operator of the nuclear facility can play an important role in
enhancing the domestic industrial infrastructure, by supporting industry with a combination of political, technical
and organizational measures, for example, by providing financial support for upgrading capabilities or by adopting
a policy that favours local suppliers.
An optimum level of domestic participation in a nuclear power programme will evolve with time. For example,
assuming that several units are to be constructed, it could progress as follows (see section 10.2.3 of Refs [7, 63]):
- Domestic labour and some construction materials obtained from national suppliers are used for non-specialized purposes on-site, especially civil engineering works.
- Domestic contractors assume responsibility, full or partial, for the civil engineering work, possibly including some design work.
- Domestically manufactured components from existing factories are used for non-critical parts of the balance of plant.
- Domestic manufacturers extend their production capabilities to manufacture components that meet nuclear standards, possibly under licensing arrangements with foreign suppliers.
- Domestic manufacturing facilities are set-up to manufacture specialized heavy and other nuclear components, possibly under licensing arrangements with foreign suppliers.
Investment in and the extent to which national capabilities are developed needs to take into account the scope of the planned nuclear programme. A successful implementation of such a progressive national participation in a nuclear power programme has taken place in the Republic of Korea [63, 64].
Governmental support infrastructure
The government has a role in providing buildings (office space) and equipment for institutions needed for a nuclear programme, such as the regulatory bodies, laboratories for research and testing, and facilities for education and training. In the area of transportation, the availability of adequate roads, bridges, ports and airports is also the responsibility of the government, to enable the transport of nuclear components, some of them of large volume and weight (e.g. reactor pressure vessel).
Economic infrastructure
In this publication of the INPRO manual, economic aspects related to the national infrastructure29 needed to start up, maintain or expand a nuclear power programme are discussed. Economic infrastructure is understood as the capabilities of government and national industry to raise the capital needed for their investments into nuclear related infrastructure.
Infrastructure investments by the government
As discussed earlier (UR1), one of the prime responsibilities of government within a nuclear power
programme is to establish and maintain a regulatory body responsible for safety and radiation protection (including
emergency preparedness), security, non-proliferation and environment.
As stated above, a government would be expected to foster, together with industry, educational centres for
the development and training of human resources, e.g. nuclear engineering courses, possibly including nuclear
R&D facilities. Further, government investment may be required to upgrade the national infrastructure needed
for transporting nuclear components, such as ports, roads and bridges, owing to the size of some components of
nuclear facilities such as the reactor pressure vessel.
These necessary investments in infrastructure may require substantial financing resources from the
government and may involve adjustments to the country’s national budget. The costs of establishing and
maintaining the requisite institutions and activities may not be completely covered by taxes included in the tariff
for energy products (e.g. electricity) and could become partly external costs, which would, in the long run, be
balanced by spin-off benefits, including the benefit to society that results from the availability of an affordable and
reliable supply of energy. This topic is discussed further when considering criterion CR2.5.
Infrastructure investments by national industry
If national industry is to participate in a nuclear power programme, as discussed above, it will need to invest, for example, to acquire new machinery, to train its staff in new technical processes, to add quality assurance and control procedures, and to expand its human resources. Substantial investments may be required even when technology is transferred, for example under a licensing agreement. (The staffing costs of the utility are internalized, i.e. included in the price of electricity or other energy products, e.g. heat.) Such investments by industry may represent a significant financing challenge and some government support may be required. While spin-off benefits such as the capability of manufacturing to higher quality standards may be significant, industry would seek an adequate financial return on its investment from the sale of products to the nuclear power programme. Thus, the industrial investment costs would be reflected in the costs to the owner/operator of the products and would, in the end, be reflected in the cost of power produced by the NPP, which is an indicator in the INPRO methodology area of economics (see the economics publication of the INPRO manual [11]). Note that the national plan for the participation of domestic industry needs to consider the investment needed for a given level of participation to determine if the investment is justified by the planned nuclear power programme, i.e. taking into account the number of plants to be acquired and the schedule for their introduction.
National electricity grid
For technical reasons (grid stability, the flexibility needed for matching supply to daily, weekly and annual load cycles), the size of a new NPP must be compatible with the grid to which it is to be connected [65]. The technical requirement that an NPP that is to be added to a grid represent no more than about 10% of the peak demand serviced by the grid would only be satisfied if there were significantly greater demand for power than that which can be delivered by the new NPP. Thus, the technical requirement for unit size and the economic requirement that there is a market for the product are mutually compatible.
Types of contract for acquiring a nuclear facility
The type of contract for the supply of an NPP or any other component of the nuclear fuel cycle (Section 11.4
of Ref. [17]) chosen by an owner/operator, which could be strongly influenced by government policy, has a strong
impact on the requirements for national industrial infrastructure.
Basically, three main types of contract approach have been used in the past for all nuclear power projects:
Turnkey: A single contractor or a consortium of contractors takes over the responsibility for the complete
project, including all parts and all phases, such as design, engineering, project management, construction,
erection and supply of installations, testing and commissioning. The contractor, or the main contractor in the
requirements, e.g. power output, efficiency, etc., at an agreed price.
- Split package: The overall responsibility is divided among a small number of contractors, each in charge of a large section of the work. An architect-engineer has to be involved to coordinate the project.
- Multiple packages: The owner/operator, possibly supported by an architect-engineer, assumes the overall responsibility for the project, which involves a large number of contracts with individual contractors.
The latter two approaches require a strong domestic capability in project management. Even so, for a first
NPP, an architect-engineer experienced with NPP projects should be retained. For a country with little experience
with the management of large projects, the turnkey approach is recommended.
Recent contracting models for nuclear power projects are:
- The BOT approach: In a BOT approach (see for example Section 8.8.1 of [7] and Section 6.3 of [66]) a consortium of foreign investors establishes a joint venture company (JVC) with a local utility and the JVC sells the electricity (or any other energy product, e.g. heat) to the local utility. The JVC builds the power plant with foreign engineering expertise and operates the plant until all costs have been recovered by means of the electricity tariff, after which ownership of the plant is transferred to the country in which it has been built. During the period of operation by the JVC, domestic staff are trained so that when ownership is transferred there is a domestic management and operating team in place that can assume responsibility for the continued operation of the plant.
- The BOO approach: In this approach the ownership of the plant is retained by the JVC (see example of a BOO contract in Ref. [67]).
An important consideration in the BOO/BOT approaches is the question of providing the JVC with adequate
assurances that it will be able to sell its product at an attractive price and so be able to recover its investment.
The issues of investment risk and return on investment are discussed in the economics publication of the INPRO
manual [11]. Another issue is limiting the liability of the JVC in the event of an accident. It would be expected that
a JVC would be prepared to participate in a BOO/BOT project only in a State that has signed and ratified one of the
international conventions dealing with nuclear liability (see Section 3.2.1).
The turnkey contract and especially the BOO/BOT approach can be used also as an option to reduce the
necessary front end investment in national infrastructure, at least at the beginning of a nuclear power programme
(see user requirement UR6).
INPRO has defined five criteria CR2.1–CR2.5 for user requirement UR2, set out in Table 1.
