INPRO Assessment of the Planned Nuclear Energy System of Belarus

Introduction

General information on Belarus

Belarus is located in the eastern part of Europe. In the west it borders Poland, in the northwest Lithuania, in the north Latvia, in the north-east and east Russia, in the South Ukraine. The territory of Belarus is crossed by several European transport corridors providing the shortest communication routes from the central and eastern regions of the Russian Federation to western European countries, and between the Baltic and the Black seas.
The territory of Belarus is 207 600 square kilometers. The longest distance, 650 km, is from west to east, and 560 km from north to south. By the size of its territory, Belarus occupies the thirteenth place among the European countries and the sixth among the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries (following Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan).
The topography of Belarus features predominantly low hilly land with an average altitude of 160 m above sea level, while the highest point is only 345 m above sea level. The flatland nature of its surface creates favourable conditions for the expansion of human settlements, agricultural development of the territory, construction of industries, transport and service lines, and development of tourism and recreational services.
Agricultural land occupies 45% of the territory, including 30% of tillage. There are 0.9 hectares of cultivated land, including 0.6 hectares of tillage, per capita in Belarus.
Forests account for 36% of the country's territory. There are 0.7 hectares of woods and 111 m³ of timber per capita here, which is almost twice as high as the average European level. The trees growing in Belarus mostly belong to valuable species. Pine occupies 52.9%, fir 10.5%, oak and other hard-leaved species 3.8%, birch 18.1%, aspen 2.3%, alder 9.6% of the forest covered area. However, the species composition of the woods is far from optimal. Considering the fertility of the forest soils, the area under hard-leaved species could be expanded two-fold. The forest potential in Belarus is rather high; the annual increment of timber reserves is 25 million cubic meters, while the actual timber production is 10–11 million cubic meters per year. The area with mature woods is steadily growing. The forest, apart from being a source of timber, performs numerous ecological functions (such as water protection, water regulation, soil protection, assimilation functions), and also sanitation, recreation and health-building functions. Belarusian forests play an important biospheric role and make a considerable contribution to the ecological stabilization of central and eastern Europe.

Natural resources

About 30 kinds of mineral raw material can be found in Belarus (more than 4000 deposits and fields). The most significant are potassium salts; their reserves occupy one of the leading places in Europe. The reserves of rock-salt are also notable. The prospected industrial reserves of these minerals in the Mozyr, Davydov and Starobin deposits exceed 22 billion tons.
The country is rich in rock products, such as granites, dolomites and dolomite limestone, marl, chalk, fusible and refractory clay, loam, sand and gravel. There is raw material for the production of natural paints (e.g. marsh iron ore, ochre, glauconite).
The availability of high quality water resources stimulates the construction of sanatorium and resort complexes and the development of companies trading and exporting mineral curative and table water. In recent years, more than 63 springs have been discovered with a potential supply of 155 572 m³ per day. Belarus possesses sufficiently strong raw material reserves for the production of construction material. However, there is a deficit of high-grade glass-making sand and clay.
Peat fields are widely spread in Belarus, although — due to intensive exploitation — the peat fields as production sources have largely been exhausted. The total geological reserves are estimated at 4.4 billion tons. Sapropels are an important natural raw fertilizer; their estimated reserves are three billion cubic meters. A comprehensive utilization of peat and sapropel resources is important.
The reserves of oil are not large and oil is extracted in small quantities. Deposits of brown coal have been found in Belarus. However, its low caloric value and high ash content preclude its utilization in energy production in the near future. Briquetted brown coal (possibly, with peat) can be used only as household fuel or as raw material for producing wax and plant growth stimulants.
The Belarusian territory is promising in terms of ferrous and non-ferrous metal. Geological exploration in search for amber, titanium and rare-earth metal deposits is under way.
The existing mineral resources fully provide for the future needs of potassium and rock salt, lime and cement, refractory and ceramic clays, construction sand, gravel and facing stone.
It must be noted that the mining resources in Belarus are still insufficiently investigated. The new economic situation and the emergence of sophisticated technologies call for a revaluation of the deposits and reserves of mineral resources in the Republic, and a more efficient utilization of all components of the resources mined.

Climate

The climate of Belarus is moderately continental with mild and humid winter, warm summer and wet autumn. The mean temperature in January is from – 4 °C in the south-west to – 8 °C in the north-east of the country; that of July is + 17 to + 19 °C. The annual precipitation is 550–650 mm in lowland areas and 650–750 mm in flatland and elevated areas. The average vegetation period is 184–208 days. The climatic conditions in Belarus are favourable for growing staple grain crops, vegetables, fruit trees and bushes which are common for moderate climate zones of east Europe, especially for cultivating potatoes, flax, annual grass and fodder root crops.
There are more than 20 000 rivers and streams in Belarus with the total length of 91 000 km, and about 11 000 lakes, including 470 lakes with the area exceeding 0.5 km2 each. Naroch is the largest lake in Belarus (79.2 km², the deepest point about 25 m). More than half of the water resources belong to the Black Sea basin, the rest belongs to the Baltic Sea basin. The Pripyat, Dnieper, Nieman, Berezina and Zapadnaya Dvina rivers, and also the Dnieper-Bug canal are important for river navigation.
More than 145 artificial lakes have been created in Belarus. The most important is the Viliya Reservoir (75 km² ) that gives birth to the Viliya–Minsk system of canals along which water from the Viliya river is directed to Minsk, the Republic's capital.
The renewable resources of surface and underground fresh water in the country are sufficient for meeting the present and future needs: the river water resources constitute 57.9 km³/a. The total volume of water accumulated in lakes is estimated at 6–7 km³, the volume of artificial reservoirs is 3.1 km³. The average water intake for the household and industrial purposes does not exceed 5–7% of annually renewable water reserves.

Territorial division

Belarus consists of six oblasts which include 118 administrative districts and the city of Minsk. There are 104 towns and 108 settlements with the status of a town.
Regional differentiation is not high in Belarus, although the oblasts differ in their level of socioeconomic development and the structure of their economy. The main socioeconomic, natural geography and ecological features include:

• A higher level of industrial development in the eastern regions and, therefore, a high level of production and consumption of energy and material;
• The presence of major chemical and petrochemical complexes in Vitebsk, Grodno, Gomel, Minsk and Mogilev oblasts, which are a severe burden on the environment;
• A high concentration of industrial production in the capital and major cities;
• Differences between oblasts in the level of agricultural production connected with soil, climatic, ecological and other local characteristic features, and with differences in the location of main branches of agricultural specialization;
• Main concentration of social infrastructure complexes in Minsk, oblast centres and other towns. The city of Minsk is situated in the central part of Belarus and is the national capital and the centre of the oblast and district with the same name. Minsk is granted a special status. It is the largest political, economic, scientific and cultural centre of the Republic. The population is 1 885 100. The territory is 255.8 km². Administratively, it is divided into nine districts and has one city council with jurisdiction over some villages and urbanized settlement. With about 300 industrial enterprises, Minsk has the largest industrial production in Belarus — more than 22% of the country’s industrial output. The city of Minsk exceeds the other regions in the output of machine engineering, electric energy, non-ferrous metallurgy, medical and printing industries. The prevalence of machine engineering industries — producing more than half the city’s industrial products — is a characteristic feature of the capital. There are such major enterprises as BelavtoMAZ, Minsk Tractor Works, Minsk Engine Works, and Atlant. Electric energy, and the food industry also has a high share. The industrial complex of the city possesses a high export potential: at a number of companies up to 80% of output is exported.

Population

The size of the resident population of Belarus amounted to 9 465 200 people as of the beginning of 2012. Over 24% of the urban population resides in the Belarusian capital.
Belarus is a comparatively densely populated country. Average population density is 46 persons per sq km. The territory of Belarus is inhabited rather uniformly, most densely in central regions. The sex/age structure of the population is as follows: males account for 45.7% and females for 54.3%. Dynamics of size of population in Belarus during 1990–2011 are given in Table 1.

Table 1. Dynamics of size of population in Belarus

	1990	2000	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Number of resident population, thousands.	10190	9990	9800	9751	9714	9690	9514	9500	9481

Belarus is a polyethnic and polyconfessional State in which over 130 nationalities (comprising just under 20% of the total population) reside with Belarusians (81.2%).

State institution

The President of Belarus is the head of State, guarantor of the Constitution and civil rights. The President takes measures to maintain the sovereignty of the Republic, its national security and territorial integrity, and provides political and economic stability, succession and cooperation of State bodies, and is a mediator between them.
In accordance with the Constitution, the President issues edicts and decrees that have binding force on the whole territory of Belarus. In cases stipulated by the Constitution, the President issues decrees with the force of law. Directly or through special bodies he provides for the execution of decrees and edicts.
The Parliament, i.e. the National Assembly, is the representative and legislative body of the Republic. The Parliament consists of two chambers, the Chamber of Representatives and the Council of the Republic. The Constitution defines the composition and the procedure of forming the chambers. The Chamber of Representatives consists of 110 deputies elected on the basis of universal, free, equal and direct suffrage, by secret ballot. The Council of the Republic is the chamber of territorial representation. In each region and in the city of Minsk, eight members of the Council of the Republic are elected at sittings of deputies by secret ballot. A further eight members are appointed by the President. Each Chamber elects its own Chairman and vice-chairmen who run the sittings and manage the internal regulations.
In conformance with the Constitution, the Chamber of Representatives is entitled to hear the reports of the Prime Minister on the Government's programmes of activities, give a vote of no confidence to the Government, and consider the issue of confidence to the Government upon the request of the Prime Minister. The Chamber of Representatives appoints elections of the President and accepts the dismissal of the President.
The Council of the Republic may cancel the decisions of local councils of deputies which run contrary to the national legislation, and takes decisions on dissolution of a local council in cases of systematic or gross violations of the legislation and in other cases stipulated by the law.
The Constitution establishes the right of the Council of the Republic to consider the decrees of the President on introducing the State of emergency, martial law, total or partial mobilization, and must take an appropriate decision within three days after their submission.
The Parliament takes a decision on the President's dismissal.
The term of office of the Parliament is four years and may be extended only in event of war. Local government and self-government is exercised through local councils of deputies, executive and management bodies, bodies of territorial public self-management, local referenda and meetings.
The local councils of deputies are representative bodies of State power in the respective territorial administrative units and the main bodies of self-management.
The Constitution establishes the exclusive competence of local councils of deputies for approval of programmes of economic and social development, local budgets and report on their execution, imposition of local taxes and duties in conformance with the law, determination, in conformance with the law, of the procedure of managing communal property, and the conduct of local referenda.
The local councils of deputies are elected by citizens of the respective territorial administrative units for four years.
In conformance with the Fundamental Law, heads of the local executive and management bodies are appointed and dismissed by the President or in the order established by him, and approved by the respective local councils of deputies.
The Constitution of Belarus establishes a binding force of the decisions of local councils of deputies, and of executive and management bodies on their respective territory, taken within their frame of competence, which is one of the guarantees of their efficient work.

Economy

The Belarusian economy has experienced steady and sizable growth since 1996. Following an estimated decline of close to 40% during 1992–95, gross domestic product (GDP) growth resumed in 1996. During 1996–2004, the GDP grew by 77.4%, at 6.6% on average per annum. Rates of GDP growth in 2005–2010 fluctuated between 7.0% and 10.2% (except in 2009, Table 2) according to the data of the National Statistics Committee of Belarus.

Table 2. Belarus: basic macroeconomic indicators, 1995-2010

	1995	2000	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
GDP, bln. BRB	121403	9134	65067	79267	97165	129791	137442	162964
GDP, % in relation to previous year, const. prices	89.6	105.8	109.4	110.0	107.0	110.2	100.2	107.6
GDP structure,%:
Industry	27.6		28.4	27.6				26.8
Agriculture	15.1		7.9	7.5				7.5
7.5 Construction	5.4		6.9	7.9				11
Transport & communication	12.2		9.5	9.2				9.5
Trade & catering	7.6		9.4	10.3				11.1
Net Taxes	9.7		14	14.2				12.8
Other	22.4		23.9	23.3				21.3

Economic growth in Belarus has been rather broad-based. It has been driven primarily by improvements in labour productivity and increases in both energy efficiency and capacity utilization. Fiscal and external adjustments have been significant and have helped to improve the macroeconomic conditions for growth. In contrast to some other CIS countries, where growth and exports remain concentrated in the extracting sectors with limited employment opportunities, the growth structure in Belarus has been much more beneficial for labour. Growth in labour-intensive sectors, backed by Government wage and income policies, has helped to ensure that the benefits from recent growth have been fairly broadly shared by the population. Poverty rates have declined substantially, while inequality has remained stable and moderate. The poverty headcount ratio (national definition) fell from 38.6% of the population in 1996 and 46.7% in 1999 to 17.8% in 2004, while inequality, which was moderate by regional standards during the entire period of economic growth, decreased further after 2001. This decline in poverty is, however, in line with a broader trend in poverty reduction that took place recently in the transition economies. This remarkable achievement is the result of a unique constellation of factors — rapid ‘catch-up’ growth in CIS accompanied by reductions in inequality in some countries.
Before 2001, in terms of economic growth, Belarus outperformed both the central eastern European and Baltic States (CEEBS) and the CIS but during the second period (2001–04), the CIS as a group had a stronger performance than Belarus and the difference in growth rates between Belarus and the CEEBS decreased. In addition, Belarus' relatively strong debt and trade indicators in the late 1990s should be treated with caution: the use of the official exchange rate at the time of the multiple exchange rate system distorted the data. The application of the alternative exchange rate revealed that during the first period of growth, Belarus had much more serious problems with its balance of payments than is usually recognized. In 1998, the current account deficit amounted to almost 16% of the GDP, while the official figures show only 7%. However, both measures show a strong post-1999 recovery in all main indicators of external vulnerability, indicating a strong external adjustment.
The macroeconomic performance during the years of economic growth has been rather mixed. Belarus has managed to maintain moderate budget deficits and debt levels. However, such indicators as inflation, foreign direct investment inflow and the current account balance were weak. Inflation in Belarus, which is being reduced substantially, remained significantly higher during both periods than in other transition economies, including neighbouring countries. The current account position is still precarious, given the low level of reserves, the inability to attract a sizable amount of direct foreign investment, and the limited access to international financing.
Overall, the Belarusian economy has a number of features that make it quite different from its neighbours in both the CIS and the CEEBS. These features include:

• The dominance of traditional firms (State-owned or partially privatized) in production and exports; *The high degree of Government intervention in state enterprise operations, including the preservation of some elements of central government planning of output, wages, and employment; *The high level of the tax burden and the major budget redistribution of funds aimed at supporting traditional firms and employment;
• Quite substantial dependence on trade with the Russian Federation along with the slow pace of geographic diversification of exports.

The pattern of changes in the structure of the nominal GDP by sector in Belarus is similar to that in other transition economies but the magnitude of these changes is somewhat different. As in other transition economies, especially those considered as over-industrialized, the share of services in GDP structure increased. The reduction in the share of agriculture has also been in line with the developments in other CEEBS. At the same time, the increase in the share of services is relatively moderate. Moreover, in 2000–2006 these trends were reversed — the share of industry actually increased while the share of services declined. However, changes in the nominal GDP structure are not the most informative in the environment of changing relative prices.

Primary energy supplies

In the past several years, Belarus has demonstrated considerable growth in its economy. The GDP of the country more than doubled from 2000 to 2010.
However, domestic fuel use during the same period was very moderate. Belarus remained highly dependent on its single foreign fuel supplier – the Russian Federation.
Belarus remained one of very few countries in the world which notably increased the share of natural gas in the national energy mix in the given period without having its own reserves of this energy resource. For example, the share of natural gas used for electricity generation is one of the highest in the world and equals 95–96%. At the same time, underground storage does not meet modern requirements for energy security (25% of total annual resource consumption).
All these facts jeopardize the efforts of the Belarusian government to sustain successes achieved lately and to create a strong economic basis for further national development.
To address these challenges, reduce energy dependence and lessen the national economy’s vulnerability to energy price shocks in the future a comprehensive energy policy is required.

Primary energy sourse

Imported crude oil and natural gas are the main sources of primary energy for Belarus. The history of these kinds of primary energy is given in Table 3.

Table 3. Imported crude oil and natural gas

	2000	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Crude oil, mill. tonnes	11.9	19.2	20.9	20.0	21.5	21.5
Natural gas, bill. M3	17.1	20.1	20.8	20.6	21.1	17.6

Domestic energy resources

To decrease the share of imported energy sources, it is planned to increase the use of domestic and renewable energy resources. In 2020 domestic resources and renewables will amount to 6.7 million tce.
Biomass
Wood and residues of wood processing are the most important source of domestic fuel in Belarus. At present, biomass reserves in forests of the country are estimated to be 1.43 billion m³. Territory of the country covered by forests is 9.3 million hectares.
Belarus has considerable potential to increase biomass use for energy purposes. It is supposed to increase the use of wood to 11 million m3 (3.1 million tce) per year by 2020.
Peat
Belarus has one of the largest reserves of peat in Europe. More than 9000 deposits of economically justifiable peat extraction have been found there. Their total area is 2.54 million hectares, and peat reserves there are estimated to be 5.65 billion t. Geological reserves of peat in Belarus amount to 4 billion t. Reserves of peat available for energy use are estimated at 100–130 million t.
At present, most of peat produced in Belarus is consumed by housing and utilities as fuel for small boilers, which is the main restriction for its wider use.
Further growth of peat use as a fuel will be possible if new small combined heat and power plants or centralized district heating plants designed especially for its use are built in Belarus.
For this purpose, it is expected to increase peat for energy production by 1.5 million tce by 2020. To achieve this goal, the development of new peat deposits will be necessary with due consideration given to environmental issues.
Lignite
In 2003, the available reserves of lignite in Belarus were estimated to be 151.6 million t. Lignite found in Belarus has the following characteristics:

• Humidity — 56–60%;
• Ash content — 17–23%;
• Sulphur content — 0.6%
• Calorific value — 1500–70 kcal/kg

Dried lignite can be used for briquettes, manufactured jointly with peat as a fuel for hot water boilers. Subject to thermochemical processes, lignite can be used as raw material for liquid fuel or other products.
The largest deposits of lignite in Belarus are located at Zhitkovichi. Its reserves allow to extract annually 2 million t of lignite (0.46 million tce). After completion of feasibility studies, it is planned to develop this deposit and its annual production will reach 0.2 million tce by 2020.
Oil shale
Forecast, reserves of oil shale in Belarus are estimated at 11 billion t. Reserves of the Luban and Turov deposits available for extraction are expected to be around 3 billion t. Oil shale in Belarus is characterized by low calorific value (1000–1510 kcal/kg), and high ash (61–82%) and sulphur content (2.6%) that makes its use for direct combustion impossible. The alternative way to involve oil shale in use in Belarus is to subject it to high-cost thermochemical processes; however, that is not economically feasible at present.

Renewable energy resources

Hydroelectricity
The theoretical potential of hydro resources for electricity generation in Belarus is estimated at 850 MW. However, only 529 MW is technically available. Economically feasible potential for hydroelectricity in Belarus is 250 MW.
Currently (2012), the total installed capacity of hydroelectric power plants is about 32 MW. The strategic goal of Belarus with regard to hydroelectricity is to construct new plants, and reconstruct and recover old hydroelectric power plants (HPPs). According to these plans, total installed capacity of HPPs will reach 120 MW in 2015.
For estimation of the economic feasibility of constructing hydro cascades on such rivers as the Sozh, Pripyat, and Dniepr, more detailed investigation is needed.
In the near future attention should be focused on the use of small hydro units with installed capacity from 50 to 5000 kW each. The use of small hydro generators of capsule design is more advantageous due to lower scheduled outages for maintenance.
Geothermal energy
The most favourable conditions for geothermal potential use in Belarus are in Pripyat and Podlyassk-Belostok cavities where extracted heat resource potential reaches 5–6 tce per m². To exploit this reserve, a complex of special geological studies is required in order to determine the exact sites for well drilling and development of special technologies for geothermal energy use taking into account high mineralization of this heat source.
Wind energy
According to the meteorological data available, approximately 1840 sites for wind turbine installation are to be found in Belarus. On 1 January 2005, the total installed capacity of wind turbines in Belarus was 0.85 MW, and their annual electricity generation made up 0.4 tce. Currently, in 2012, total installed capacity of wind turbines in Belarus is about 3 MW. The scale of wind electricity is subject to annual correction taking into account possible changes of fossil fuel costs.
Use of wind energy in remote rural areas, farms and greenhouses for electricity generation, heating and water pumping is considered to be the most feasible option for Belarus due to the low average wind speed in the country.
Biogas
Potential for biogas use in Belarus is estimated to be 160 000 tce per year. At present, three pilot biogas projects are completed in Belarus. However, an integrated approach with regard to biogas technologies is needed to make them competitive with traditional ones. Results achieved show that, for biogas projects, it is necessary to take not only costs of electricity and heat generated into account but also environmental effects.
Solar energy
According to meteorological surveys, average solar radiation in Belarus is 243 kcal/m² day, equal to 2.8 kWh/m² day. Providing the efficiency of energy transformation is 0.3, the average potential for solar energy production is 0.3 kWh/m2 day.
Possible ways to use solar energy in Belarus are agricultural and domestic applications, mainly for water heating purposes. Potential for use of solar energy in Belarus could amount to 5000 tce.
Solid waste
Total energy reserves possible from solid waste use are estimated to be around 470 000 tce. Providing that the efficiency of the process of transformation of waste into gas equals 30%, total available reserves of this source are 100–120 thousand tce. When considering use of solid waste as an option, it is necessary to take into account its large reserves in all the large cities in Belarus as well as possible environmental effects related to waste use.
Fast growing biomass and agricultural waste
Fast growing biomass of trees and bushes can be used as a fuel or a source of raw material for solid of liquid fuel production. Possible crops of fast growing biomass from one hectare in Belarus may exceed 10 t, i.e. equal to approximately 4 tce per year. If special growing technologies are used, productivity of such plantations can be 2–3 times higher. According to the data of special research, potential of this kind of energy resource in 2020 will reach 350 000 tce.
Agricultural waste also makes up a considerable reserve as energy resource. Total available potential of this alternative fuel in Belarus is estimated at 1.46 million tce per year. Agricultural waste is thought to be widely used as fuel for small heating plants and individual heating systems in rural areas.
By 2020, potential of this energy resource use is estimated at 140–200 thousand tce.
Biodiesel and bioethanol
Belarus has good prospects for the wide use of biodiesel and bioethanol as alternative automobile fuel. Rapeseed, soybean and sugar beet are considered to be the best crops for this liquid fuel production. Biodiesel and bioethanol can be used as additives to traditional fuel or in pure form as main fuel. Total available reserves of these fuel sources are about one million tce, taking into account existing and projected crop productivity and their main use for the food industry.
Should the necessary investment for the industry be available, the volume of biodiesel and bioethanol production could be 110 000 tce in 2020.
For launching bioethanol production in the country, large-scale modernization of existing sugar been processing industry is required. Biodiesel production will be organized at plants for the food industry operating at present.
Secondary energy resources
According to estimates made, the potential volume of secondary fuel energy resources available in Belarus is about 580 000 tce per year, including methane-hydrogen for ethylene production — 162 000 tce, X-oils — 14 500 tce, black liquor — 9200 tce, flax scotch — 36 900 tce, and fuel oil residues — 2400 tce. Efficiency of the secondary energy resources in technology and boilers varies from 70 to almost 100%.
At present, these reserves are partially in use. The most considerable project realized in this field is the utilization of lignin produced at Rechitsa hydrolysis factory for the generation of heat energy.
The use of secondary energy resources at refineries operated in Belarus is expected to increase notably. For example, the volume of oil coke produced at Novopolotsk refinery Naftan as a by-product will be up to 4 000 000 tce in 2015–2020. This energy resource can be used as fuel for heat and electricity generation and may be consumed by either Naftan or power plants and also the construction material manufacturing industry. It is expected to use appropriate technology at Naftan and Novopolotsk CHP.
Belarus also has great potential for use of waste heat resources. Their use in 2006 reached 4.9 million Gcal and the volume of their utilization in 2010 was about 5.9 million Gcal.
Enterprises of chemical and petrochemical industry have the largest reserves for waste heat use (about 96.5% of total reserves available).
Capital investments needed for that purpose will be about 70–80 million USD by 2015. Providing necessary investment is forthcoming, the volume of high-temperature waste heat use will increase by 200 000 tce and of medium- and low-temperature waste-heat by 60 000 tce.
The largest reserves for use of this energy resource are concentrated at the following factories:

• JSC Grodno Azot — production of ammonia fertilizers;
• JSC Gomel Chemical Plant — production of sulphuric acid;
• Naftan refinery — oil processing, including waste heat of hydrogen production;
• Mozyr refinery

The targeted volumes of waste heat utilization can be achieved only if scheduled volumes of oil processing and mineral fertilizer production are guaranteed.
The use of waste heat by factories owned by the Ministry of Industry of Belarus was about 5 925 000 tce in 2010.

Diversification of primary energy supplies to Belarus

At present, Belarus receives all oil and natural gas consumed from a single supplier — the Russian Federation. Such a structure of routes of primary energy transportation makes the economy of Belarus highly vulnerable to energy price changes and supply interruptions in case of damage to oil and gas transportation pipelines or political conflicts, for example.
However, the number of possible economically feasible alternatives of primary energy resource supplies to the country is very limited.
Taking into account the locations of existing and prospective gas and oil fields in the world and also the political relations between Belarus and other countries, it is worth examining the effectiveness of organization of energy resource supplies from Azerbaijan, Venezuela, Iran, and Kazakhstan.
Preliminary feasibility studies of energy supplies from these countries have already been conducted and detailed examination of economic effectiveness of these projects is necessary to make the final decision. The most important alternative routes of primary energy supply to Belarus are for:

• Natural gas — Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan;
• Oil — Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Iran, Iraq and Venezuela;
• Coal — Kazakhstan, Poland and Ukraine.

Energy sector

General data

The total installed capacity of all power plants in Belarus in 2010 was about 9.1 GW, of which 8266.5 MW of thermal capacity plants belong to the national utility Belenergo. The total length of the electricity grid was 238 800 km, and the total length of heat transmission pipelines was 5.100 km.
In 2010, the overall consumption of electricity in Belarus was 37.46 billion kWh. Electricity generation by the national power plants amounted to 34.5 billion kWh, of which 32.5 billion kWh were generated by Belenergo power plants. Electricity import in 2010 was 2.97 billion kWh. .
Heat generation by power plants and district heating plants belonging to Belenergo in 2010 totalled 36.72 million Gcal. Electricity in transmission and distribution grid and heat energy losses made up about 11% and 10%, respectively. .
Total fuel consumption of Belenergo generation facilities in 2006 was 1 3984 900 tce, of which 13 161 500 tce was natural gas (94.1% of overall fuel consumption), 799 900 tce — fuel oil (5.7%) and 23 500 tce. — other types of fuel (0.2%).

Main options for modernization

The current five-year power sector modernization programme takes the physical state of heat and electricity generation equipment, existing and prospective electricity and heat load profiles, and tendencies of fuel prices into account, and aims to achieve the least-cost regime of operation of energy objects in the country.
Installation of new, efficient combined-cycle generation equipment in power plants operated at present in Belarus is considered the strategic way to improve the efficiency of electricity and heat generation of Belenergo facilities. .
Other strategic ways aiming to increase the efficiency of operating generation equipment at thermal power plants are:

• Replacement of turbine blades;
• Dismantling of worn-out units and installation of new more efficient units on existing bases;
• Installation of modern generating unit automation control systems;
• Modernization of existing heating plants with installation of steam and gas turbines;
• Replacement of burners.

During 2012-2015 it is planned to continue modernization of the largest power plants in the country — Lukoml and Bereza condensing power plants. These power plants have been in service for more than 35 years, which considerably exceeds their assigned plant life (27 years) and makes their further operation inefficient.
In some cities in Belarus, construction of small combined heat and power (CHP) plants which use domestic fuel resources (primarily wood chips and peat) will be completed in 2012–2015. For instance, a new biomass-firing boiler is to be commissioned in Zhodino CHP plant (60 t/h), a small CHP facility with electrical capacity of 2.7 MW will be built in Pruzhany. .
Construction of hydroelectric power plants is considered one of the most important ways to reduce dependency of Belarus from the import of fossil fuels from the Russian Federation and to reduce greenhouse gases emissions. .
An additional possibility is to use domestic, renewable and secondary energy resources in the power generating facilities. The total volume of these energy resources used by Belenergo for electricity and heat generation was about 274 500 tce in 2010. .
Newly built units are expected to be provided with modern technologies for solid fuel combustion (e. g. fluidized bed technologies), highly efficient systems of ash removal and exhaust gases catalytic reduction.

Energy supply

Natural gas supply and distribution system

At present, all natural gas consumed in Belarus is supplied from the Russian Federation via a well-developed gas transmission pipeline network. The total length of large-size pipelines in Belarus exceeds 7000 km and of the distribution pipelines is about 28 000 km.
Nominal transit capacity of the main pipeline passing through the territory of Belarus Torzhok-Ivatsevichi is 51 billion m³ of gas per year, and the length of the Belarusian part of the Yamal-Europe pipeline is 575 km and its annual capacity equals 33 billion m³ of gas.
Distribution and delivery of natural gas to final consumers in Belarus is performed by Beltransgas which operates:

• More than 6.9 km of large-size pipelines;
• Eight compressor stations with installed electrical capacity of gas compressors equaled 729.7 MW;
• Two underground gas storage facilities, including Osipovichi gas storage with a nominal capacity of 0.36 billion m3 of gas and Pribugskoe gas storage with a capacity of 1.35 billion m³ of gas;
• 218 gas distribution stations with a nominal capacity of 93.4 billion m3 of gas (in 2002, supplies of gas were only 17.6 billion m³);
• 24 gas filling stations and other facilities.

The majority of gas distribution stations are located in Brest (46), Grodno (34) and Minsk (52) regions while other regions of the country receive a more moderate level of gasification due to the remote location from large-size gas transmission pipelines.
In general, the existing system of gas supply can be characterized by a rather low capacity utilization rate of about 20%. This is a legacy of the central planning and design policy of Soviet times when Belarus had low natural gas prices.
In spite of the fact that a considerable overcapacity in the transmission and distribution network exists, the organization of economically feasible gas supply of some regions of Belarus is a challenge because of the lack of necessary pipe-lines.
Development of gas transmission and distribution network is considered one of the key components of the national energy strategy.
Annually, 1350 km of gas transmission and distribution pipelines are built in Belarus. The forecast length of this gas supply network for 2015 is 38 000 km and for 2020 43 000 km.
The existing gas supply network well maintained. Pipelines that have been operating for 15- 25 years account for 15% of the total length, while those operating for 5-15 and less than 5 years account for 47% and 26% respectively. Existing pipeline system provides good basis for reliable gas supply of consumers in Belarus.
Until 2020, priority will be given to the construction of new distribution gas pipelines from existing gas distribution stations to large fuel consumers, primary energy intensive industrial enterprises and dwelling areas.
The gasification of 35 medium and small cities and is expected to be completed and a gas supply infrastructure put into operation for more than 200 000 households by 2020, which will require more than US $140 million.
Two possible scenarios are considered when analysing prospects of the gas supply system development in Belarus.
According to the pessimistic scenario, limited national and foreign financial capabilities may be the main restriction for the further development of the national gas supply network. In this case, the main priority will be given to the construction of new gas supply networks from existing gas distribution stations and reconstruction of gas distribution facilities operated more than 40 years. That will retain considerably switching to natural gas use of some territories, primarily small rural areas and also of dwelling areas.
The optimistic scenario, implies more active participation in the gas network development by both private and State institutions. For this, an active development of the gas supply system in Vitebsk, Gomel, Brest and Minsk regions is forecast. Enhancement of existing piping systems along with the implementation of intensive maintenance and repair programmes for operating facilities and improvement in industrial energy efficiency are expected.
However, comprehensive assessment of possible alternatives regarding more active domestic fuel use as an integral part of the planning and development process of the national gas supply system should be taken into consideration due to energy security concerns and continuously increasing natural gas prices.

Liquefied petroleum gas supply system

Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) consumption in Belarus has demonstrated a constant decline recently primarily because of its active substitution by natural gas in the housing and utility sector. About 60% of the existing demand for LPG is covered by domestic production, and rest of it is supplied by Russia.
In the forecast period, further decline of LPG consumption is expected.
The use of LPG is economically feasible to meet energy demands of sparsely populated rural areas where construction of natural gas distribution pipelines is not an effective option.
However, possibly LPG use by the transport sector will double. Should the necessary infrastructure be provided, it is possible to considerably increase the use of this energy resource due to its lower demand in housing and utility. The preliminary amount of investment needed would be about US $14.5 million for the construction of new filling stations and the acquisition of special transport and storage tanks.

Oil supply system

At present, Belarus receives all its oil from the Russian Federation via a system of pipelines: Unecha-Polotsk with a transit capacity of 29 million tons of crude per year, Unecha-Mozyr (80 million t per year) and Surgut-Polotsk (40 million t per year). The existing pipeline capacity in Belarus is sufficient to meet both the domestic oil demand and a large part of the oil demand of other European countries.

Electricity and heat

Electricity

Electricity production and consumption in Belarus during 1995–2008 are presented in Table 4 as electricity balance [2].

Table 4. Electricity balance of Belarus in 1995-2008, bln kW·H

	1995	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Electricity produced total	24.9	26.1	25.1	26.5	26.6	31.2	31.0	31.8	31.8	35.0
- by thermal PP	24.898	26.074	25.033	26.427	26.599	31.176	30.924	31.484	31.518	35.008
- by hydro PP	0.020	0.027	0.030	0.028	0.028	0.034	0.036	0.035	0.035	0.039
Electricity imported	10.1	10.0	11.0	10.0	10.8	8.0	9.1	10.1	9.4	7.1
Electricity consumed total	32.1	33.3	33.4	33.0	33.4	34.5	35.0	36.2	36.2	36.9
Losses of electricity in grid	3.6	3.4	3.5	3.4	3.4	3.6	3.6	3.8	3.7	3.7
Electricity exported	2.9	2.8	2.7	3.5	4.0	4.7	5.1	5.8	5.1	5.2

Electricity consumption in Belarus during 2000–2008 grew by 10.8% and in 2008 was 36.9 billion kWh. The most considerable contribution to this growth was made by industry (2.3 bln kWh, or 14% growth) and housing and utilities sector (1.6 bln kWh, or 20% growth). The most intensive growth of electricity consumption took place in 2006.
During 2006, a tendency of more active growth of electricity consumption was monitored. For instance, electricity consumption increased by 4.6% while for the previous year growth was only about 1.5%. Primary fuel consumption in 2006 rose by 6.4% compared to 3% growth in 2005. About 95% of electricity consumed in the country in 2008 was provided by domestic generation facilities, which was almost 17% higher than in 2000. Thus, electricity net import sank almost fourfold during this period.

Heat energy

Heat energy balance during 1995–2008 is presented in Table 5. A tendency of overall heat demand decrease is shown by the data in this table. There are tendencies of a decrease in heat production by boilers and an increase by exhaust heat utilization equipment. Heat consumption is characterized by a weak but stable tendency of a heat demand decrease by household and utility consumers. The tendency of heat loss increasing in pipelines reversed during the 2007–2008 period.

Table 5. Balanced of heat in Belarus in 1995-2008, million GCAL

	1995	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Heat generation total	72.7	69.1	73.7	71.3	72.7	72.7	73.5	74.4	69.7	67.5
Heat consumption total	72.7	69.1	73.7	71.3	72.7	72.7	73.5	74.4	69.7	67.5
Heat delivered to household and utilities	20.3	23.6	26.8	26.5	26.7	25.3	24.4	24.5	22.3	21.0
Heat losses	3.3	4.7	5.2	5.3	5.8	6.1	6.4	6.7	6.3	6.2

Electric power system expansion optimization

Optimization of the electric power system structure has to be an essential part of measures for sustainable development — not only of the energy sector but also the overall economy of a country. Results of research devoted to this problem and carried out at the JINPR-SOSNY of the National Academy of Science (NAS) of Belarus are briefly described below. The WASP IV code was used as an instrument for optimization.
The following are the results of recent studies on the optimum electricity source structure made in 2012 (forthcoming for publication). These studies are based mainly on the approach presented in. There are following improvements compared to:

• Recent data on the characteristics of candidate units on natural gas and coal are used for expansion of the power system;
• For nuclear units, real data on capital expenditure and cost of nuclear fuel are used from the contractual agreement for the construction of a nuclear power plant (NPP) in Belarus between the Russian Federation and Belarus;
• Starting from 2012, the growth rate of nuclear fuel prices is taken as the same as for natural gas.

It should be noted that the data used for the candidate of units on natural gas and coal are from 2009 and are likely to provide a more optimistic view of the traditional energy technologies, since they do not take into account the possible escalation of prices for these technologies by 2012.
Input data for the study included long time electricity demand and system peak power forecasts, prognoses for fuel prices and characteristics of existing and alternative power plants, and schedules for decommissioning and commissioning units regarding the programme of modernization of energy system. New cogeneration power plants were not considered as candidates for expansion of the system because of difficulties with their presentation in the framework of WASP methodology. However, some were estimated from WASP calculations.
The lower forecast of electricity consumption (extrapolated historical data) was used compared to the one previously used from. It is shown in Figure 1. According to the needs of the electricity system, peak power was also less than in and is shown in Figure 2.

FIG. 1. Electricity demand forecast.

FIG. 2. Peak power forecast.

FIG. 3. Fuel price prognosis.

The natural gas price prognoses used and shown in Figure 3 were performed using information from. The price of coal in 2012 was adopted on the information from. The price of coal growth rate was assumed to be 2% per year. For nuclear fuel, as mentioned above, the cost is taken from the contractual agreement between the Russian Federation and Belarus for the construction of an NPP in Belarus, and the growth rate taken as the same as for natural gas.

The deficit in the energy system capacity as a result of power source decommissioning and increasing peak power is shown in Figure 4. A 20% reserve of system capacity is taken into account.

FIG. 4. Deficit of energy system capacity.

Figure 4 shows a gradually retiring from service of energy sources of the existing power system, and newly introduced heat and power for coal and gas. Expansion and reconstruction of cogeneration power plants was estimated regarding of heat demand from WASP calculations. Taking these into account, it can be seen from Figure 4 that optimizing the deficit volume is about 1600 MW in 2015, 4000 MW in 2020, 4500 MW in 2025, 5000 MW in 2030 and 5600 MW in 2035. Characteristics of existing power plants in the Belarus energy system were derived from data provided by experts of BELNIPIENERGOPROM.

Table 6. Characteristics of candidates for expansion of electricity system

Utility	Instal. Capacity, MW	Heat rate, kkal/KW·h		Forced outages, %	Planned outages, d/a	O&M cost		Capital cost, $/kW	Constr. Period,a	Lifetime,a
		Min. load	Average increm. Load			Fixed, $/MWˑh
Condensed (steam-gas)	395	1859	1550	0.82	28	0.9	1.53	1100	3	30
Condensed (coal)	660	2335	1946	0.8	35	1.84	4.95	1844	4	30
Gas turbine	111	3000	2646	0.55	28	1.27	2.84	745	1	30
NPP	1170	2520	2100	4.5	57	4.81	6.59	3715	6	50

The technologies considered as ‘candidates’ for electricity system expansion to make up the electric power deficit shown in Figure 4 were:

• Condensed power plant using natural gas (steam-gas technology);
• Condensed power plant using coal fuel;
• Gas-turbine power plant;
• NPP 1170 MW capacity.

The characteristics of these candidates are presented in Table 6.
In this study, the base year for discounting of costs is 2012 and the discount rate values 10%. The calculations show that the gas-nuclear scenario is optimal for the development of power generation source structure in Belarus. In this scenario, the first and second NPPs of 1170 MW installed capacity each are introduced in 2018 and 2020. 2028 is optimal for the introduction of a third nuclear unit of the same capacity. Coal units do not fall in the best scenario because of the high capital costs. Although the cost of coal is less than the cost of natural gas, it is not low enough (due to high component of delivery) to compensate for the large capital investments.
The optimized electricity system structure for the gas-nuclear scenario is shown in Figure 5. Energy planning results has demonstrated the cost-effectiveness of few more nuclear units which could be introduction after 2025. However the decision on the introduction of these NPP has not been made yet and the assessment displayed in this report is focused on two NPP units.

FIG. 5. Structure of electricity system for nuclear scenario.

The advantage of nuclear scenario is seen also from the comparison of electricity production costs for the scenarios considered. In spite of higher cost in the construction period of nuclear units, the overall cost of electricity production for the nuclear scenario is lower than for the scenario with fossil fuel.
Accordingly, nuclear power generation is considered one of the most promising electricity generation technologies at present. In spite of the serious concerns that arose after the accident at Chernobyl NPP in 1986, the nuclear option proved its competitiveness in comparison with such traditional technologies as fossil fuel-based or hydro generation. More than 120 nuclear power units have been put into operation in the world since the Chernobyl catastrophe. Today nuclear technology accounts for 16% of the world’s electricity generation, being thus one of the most widespread sources of energy for society.
Such contemporary challenges as global climate change, high dependence on primary energy resources, notable growth in fossil fuels costs and their limited reserves are the main reasons nuclear power development.
Belarus considers implementation of its own nuclear programme one of the key elements of the national long-term energy strategy. High dependence on the import of primary energy, limited economically feasible alternatives for energy supply and high burdens imposed on the national economy by constantly growing fossil fuel costs were the main factors that were taken into consideration to make an appropriate decision.
According to the preliminary calculations, construction of the first 2000 MW Belarusian NPP by 2020 will allow a reduction of annual consumption of fossil fuel (primarily natural gas) for electricity generation by more than five million tce. Nuclear energy will notably change the structure of primary energy consumption in the country, making it more diversified. Nuclear fuel costs were considered another important advantage of a national nuclear programme. It is expected to cover the base load electricity generation and thus decrease the use of much more expensive natural gas for this purpose. The strategic goal is to achieve a share of nuclear power generation in Belarus of 27–29% by 2020.
Construction of the first NPP in Belarus can be considered an important project aimed to fulfil the Republic’s commitments under the Kyoto Protocol and will allow greenhouse emissions to be reduced by 7–10 million tons per year.
The criteria taken into consideration when determining the effectiveness of NPP construction and possible integration into the national power system were:

• High investment needs for NPP construction;
• Technical difficulties related to NPP operation during the night with low electricity demand;
• Limited load following capability of nuclear units;
• Long NPP life that requires long-term optimization (up to 2060) of the Belarusian utility if a nuclear energy programme is launched.

Nuclear energy system to be assessed

The scenario of introducing nuclear energy in Belarus to be assessed is illustrated in Table 7. Complementary to the schedule in the table, one should take into account the possibility of introducing a third nuclear unit after 2020, and units with the same capacity together with the start of decommissioning of units 1 and 2.
The scheme for the nuclear energy system (NES) to be assessed is shown in Figure 6.
Not shown in Figure 6 are the disposal facilities for final storage of operational radioactive waste from the NPP that will also be considered in the NESA.
The current NESA focuses on the domestic facilities and evaluates the non-domestic facilities depending on the availability of data. Also, the assessors intend to perform an assessment of nuclear facilities placed abroad in a comprehensive full-scope NESA, i.e. in the same depth and detail as for domestic facilities.

Table 7. Scenario: first two nuclear units and dry spent nuclear fuel storage facility

Year	Unit 1* 1170 MW(e) VVER AES-2006	Unit 2* 1170 MW(e) VVER AES-2006	Dry Storage of Spent Fuel (Transportable containers)
2012	Start of construction
2014		Start of construction
2018	Commissioning
2020		Commissioning
2022			Start of construction
2027			Commissioning
2078	Start of decommissioning
2080		Start of decommissioning
2088	End of decommissioning
2090		End of decommissioning
2125			Decommissioning

FIG. 6. Nuclear energy system of Belarus to be assessed (processes in green cells are to be located inside of Belarus territory, in red – outside).

This assessment started end of 2009 with a collection of necessary input data and was completed in the end of 2011 by production of a draft report. During this period Belarus made significant progress in the implementation of its national nuclear energy programme. Information comprised in this report was maintained "up-to-date" by the assessors during the whole assessment period to the extent possible.
However, several important actions were performed in the second half of 2012 which are not considered in this report:
In July 2012, Belarus signed a construction contract with the Russian Federation for two AES-2006 units covering fuel supply, take-back of spent fuel, training and other services. In October 2012, the IAEA delivered the final report from an IAEA Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR) mission to Belarus. This mission report made 16 general recommendations, and 22 specific recommendations. It concluded that Belarus has made important progress in its development of infrastructure for a nuclear power programme and that Belarus is on its way to being well-prepared with its infrastructure to support the construction of a NPP. To support the INIR mission the draft report on nuclear energy system assessment (current NESA report) was made available to the INIR mission participants in advance. In December 2012, Belarus has approved a draft intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in the area of nuclear safety with the Russian Federation.
Finally, a few national documents referred in this report were updated or replaced late in 2012 and early in 2013.
These important actions are to be taken into account while analyzing the results of the assessment of the nuclear energy system of Belarus mainly in the INPRO methodology areas of Infrastructure, Waste Management, Safety and Economics. For example, the assessor stated in several areas – mainly safety and waste management – that he had difficulties to gather necessary information for the assessment. This missing information will be available in the future based on the contractual agreements with the supplier.
At the moment of the report drafting lessons to be learned from Fukushima Daiichi accident in March 2011 were still under discussion. Many of the lessons relevant topics are covered in this report, e.g. regulatory body independence issues, reactor cooling systems including passive systems, seismic issues etc. However a detailed analysis of the implementation of the lessons learned from Fukushima could not be performed within a few months after the accident.

ECONOMICS

In this section, firstly, several important economic parameters are calculated and, secondly, these parameters are then used as input for an assessment of the economics of the Belarus nuclear power project according to the INPRO methodology (as documented in Volume 2 of IAEA-TECDOC-1575 Rev.1, the INPRO Manual) in the context of the planned NES in Belarus.

CALCULATION OF ECONOMIC PARAMETERS

Definition of input data

Input data for a calculation of the main economic parameters are shown in Table 8 for three selected types of power plants that are available in Belarus as future energy sources: two nuclear reactors of the type AES-2006 (VVER-1000) and, as alternative energy sources, four coal fired plants and five gas fired plants. All three power plant types have approximately the same power output. The main sources of these input data are for fossil fuel power plants and the Contract agreement between the Russian Federation and Belarus for the construction of NPP in Belarus as shown in the notes below Table 8. Unmarked data are suggestions by the authors.

Table 8. Input data for economic calculation

No	Parameters	Units	Power plant
			NPP	Coal	Natural gas
1	Net electric power output	kW(e)	2 × 1170	4 × 660	6 × 400
2	Construction time	a	6	4	3
3	Plant lifetime	a	50	30	30
4	Average load factor	-	0.9	0.85	0.85
5	Decommissioning cost	mills/kWˑh	1	-	-
6	Overnight cost	$/kW(e)	4700	1175	755
7	Normalized capital investment schedule (share per year)	-	0.020 0.146 0.220 0.244 0.217 0.153	0.15 0.3 0.3 0.25	0.3 0.5 0.2
8	Real discount rate	1/a	0.1	0.1	0.1
9	Price per unit of electricity sold	mills/kWˑh	125	125	125
10	Market income	M$/a	3600	3600	3600
11	Market share	-	1	1	1
12	Profit margin	-	0.12	0.12	0.12
13	Growth time	a	6	4	3
14	Adjusting coefficient	-	2.4	2.4	2.4
15	Fixed O&M cost $/kW(e)	57.7	22.0	10.8
16	Variable O&M cost	mills/kWˑh	6.6	5.0	1.53
17	Fuel price	$/GJ	-	6.14	8.97
18	Real fuel price annual escalation rate	-	-	0.02	0.02
19	Nuclear fuel backend cost	$/kg	500	-	-
20	Spent nuclear fuel average burnup	MWˑd/kg	55.5	-	-
21	Net thermal efficiency of plant	-	0.352	0.442	0.555
22	Reactor first core average power density	kW/kg	43.5	-	-
23	Natural U purchase cost	$/kg U	130	-	-
24	U conversion cost	$/kg U	10	-	-
25	U enrichment cost	$/kg U	163	-	-
26	Nuclear fuel fabrication cost	$/kg U	240	-	-
27	Number of stages at frontend of fuel cycle	-	4	-	-
28	Time from U purchase till fuel loading	a	-1.5	-	-
29	Time from U conversion till fuel loading	a	-1	-	-
30	Time from U enrichment till fuel loading	a	-0.75	-	-
31	Time from fuel fabrication till loading	a	-0.5	-	-
32	Losses at U purchase	-	0	-	-
33	Losses at U conversion	-	0.005	-	-
34	Losses at U enrichment	-	0	-	-
35	Losses at fuel fabrication	-	0.01	-	-
36	First core lowest 235U concentration	-	0.02	-	-
37	First core medium 235U concentration	-	0.028	-	-
38	Refuelling fuel 235U concentration	-	0.0479	-	-
39	Natural 235U concentration	-	0.00711	-	-
40	Enrichment tails 235U conc.	-	0.0025	-	-

As shown in section 1, a gas turbine power plant (GTPP) was also considered as a candidate for the extension of the power system. However, the financial performance of GTPPs is significantly lower than that of the other candidates and is not considered in this section.

Results of economic analysis

Calculations were carried out using the input data defined in Table 8 and a tool of the NESA support package called NEST (NESA economic support tool), which has been provided by IAEA/INPRO group to Belarus.
As proposed in Annex A of Volume 2 of IAEA-TECDOC-1575 (INPRO Manual for Economics), for the three types of plant to be compared in Belarus, the following economic parameters were calculated (Table 9): Levelized unit electricity costs, internal rate of return, return of investment, total investment volume and investment limit.

Table 9. Results of economic parameters calculations

Indications	Unit	Abbreviation	Value
Levelized unit electricity cost - NPP AES-2006 - Coal PP - Natural gas PP	cent/kWˑh cent/kWˑh cent/kWˑh	CN CA1 CA2	8.03 9.56 8.79
Internal rate of return - NPP AES-2006 - Coal PP - Natural gas PP	- - -	IRRN IRRA1 IRRA2	0.159 0.216 0.602
Return of investment - NPP AES-2006 - Coal PP - Natural gas PP	- - -	ROIN ROIA1 ROIA2	0.223 0.200 0.131
Investment volume/limit - NPP AES-2006 - Coal PP - Natural gas PP	109$ 109$ 109$	INVN INVA1 INVA2	11 610/2592 5724/2592 1979/2592

The levelized unit electricity cost LUEC consists of three factors, the capital costs, the operation and maintenance costs (O&M), and the fuel costs. LUEC is equivalent to the price of electricity that would have to be paid by consumers to repay exactly all costs for capital, O&M and for fuel supply with a proper discount rate (and without considering profits).
Internal rate of return (IRR) is equivalent to a discount rate that makes the net present value of all cash flows of a particular project equal to zero. The higher a project's IRR, the more attractive it is to undertake the project.
Return on investment (ROI) is frequently derived as the “return” (incremental gain) from an action divided by the cost of that action. Again the higher the ROI the more attractive is the project.
Investment volume is the total investment needed for a project up to the time of commissioning including contingency and owner’s costs. Investment limit is the maximum investment a private company can afford taking into account the (private) market conditions the company is working in.

According to Ref., in the Russian Federation the cost advantage of nuclear against fossil power is even more significant: electricity produced with coal and gas is almost twice as expensive as that generated by an NPP of AES-2006 design.

To confirm the robustness of the calculated levelized unit electricity costs of the selected NPP, robustness indexes were also calculated as specified by the INPRO methodology for economics by simultaneous variation of input parameters of the nuclear and gas power plant such as plant lifetime, average load factor, overnight capital cost, delay of construction, fuel

costs, and gas price escalation rate together with nuclear backend cost and fuel burnup (see Table 10).

Table 10. Robustness index of levelized nuclear electricity costs

Name of perturbed parameter	Perturbation of NPP data	Perturbation of gas PP data	Abbreviation	Robustness index
Plant lifetime	-5%	+5%	RIlifetime	1.095
Average load factor	-5%	+5%	RILf	1.051
Overnight cost	+5%	-5%	RICI	1.059
Construction schedule delay	1 year	-1 year	RIsch	1.092
Fuel cost	+5% (nat U cost)	-5% (gas price)	RIUcost	1.054
Nuclear backend cost	+10%	-10% (gas price escalation rate)	RIBEcost	1.056
Nuclear fuel burnup	-5%	+5% (Net PP thermal efficiency)	RIburnup	1.095

According to the INPRO methodology, a robustness index of greater than 1.0 indicates sufficient robustness of the economic analysis results, which means that all perturbations studied in Table 10 above show acceptable results.

ASSESSMENT OF ECONOMICS OF BELARUS NUCLEAR ENERGY SYSTEM

Using the results of the economic analyses above, the following economic assessment was performed applying the INPRO methodology as documented in Volume 2 of the report IAEA- TECDOC-1575 Rev.1 (Guidance for the Application of an Assessment Methodology for Innovative Nuclear Energy Systems; INPRO Manual, published November 2008).
The basic principle of the INPRO methodology area of economics reads: Energy and related products and services from innovative NESs shall be affordable and available.
Affordable means that the electricity costs produced by an NPP must be competitive against other available energy sources in the country, and available means that investment in nuclear power must be sufficiently attractive and the risk acceptable.
To check whether the goal of this basic principle is met by the selected NES, INPRO has defined four user requirements that are evaluated below.

User requirement UR1 — cost of energy.

User requirement UR1: The cost of energy from innovative NESs, taking all relevant costs and credits into account, CN, should be competitive with that of alternative energy sources, C_A, that are available for a given application in the same time frame and geographic region.
INPRO has defined one criterion CR1.1 (cost competitiveness) that simply repeats what user requirement UR1 asked for: It states that the costs of nuclear energy C_N(also called Indicator IN1.1) should be cheaper than the costs of an alternative energy source CA (called Indicator IN1.2) available in the country multiplied by a factor k: CN < kˑCA The factor k in criterion CR1.1 is usually taken as 1. A factor k greater than 1 can be used to justify higher costs of nuclear electricity (compared to alternative energy sources) on the basis

of strategic considerations such as an increase of security of supply by diversion of energy sources.
The INPRO methodology recommends using the common approach of the LUEC for determination of energy costs. This approach enables to compare very different energy sources such as nuclear and gas fired plants.
Calculated values of the LUEC for the three selected types of power plants in Belarus were presented in Table 9: the LUEC of nuclear power CN is equal to 8.03 cent/kWh for an NPP with AES-2006 reactors and the LUEC for alternative energy sources CA are 9.56 cent/kWh for a coal fired power plant and 8.79 cent/kWh for a power plant using natural gas as fuel.
Thus, electricity produced by nuclear power is cost competitive against gas and coal fired plant electricity in Belarus under the boundary conditions defined.
Final assessment of user requirement UR1 cost of energy
The advantage of nuclear energy against technology using gas fuel and coal provides the basis to confirm the satisfaction of criterion CR1.1 and, thus, the satisfaction of user requirement UR1 in relation to natural gas and coal, i.e. under the defined boundary conditions (input data in Table 8) nuclear power for electricity generation is cost competitive in Belarus against gas and coal. Criterion CR1.1 can be considered as satisfied.

User requirement UR2 — ability to finance

User requirement UR2: The total investment required to design, construct and commission innovative NESs, including interest during construction, should be such that the necessary investment funds can be raised.
INPRO has developed two criteria for user requirement UR2. Criterion CR2.1 (figures of merit) requires that the investment in an NPP be attractive to an investor compared to an investment in alternative energy sources. Criterion CR2.2 (total investment) defines the maximum investment — based on market conditions — that a private utility can make.

Criterion CR2.1 — financial figures of merit

Criterion CR2.1 states that financial figures of merit for an investment in nuclear power should be at least comparable to or more attractive than those for an investment in alternative energy projects.
INPRO recommends using the internal rate of return (IRR) and the return of investment (ROI) as financial figures of merit. Thus, criterion CR2.1 requires that the IRR and ROI of a nuclear project should be comparable or better than the figures of merit for alternative energy projects.
As shown in Table 9 above, the IRR for an investment in an NPP in Belarus is 0.158, i.e. it is smaller than for power plants with fossil fuel (0.216 for coal and 0.414 for gas). This value of IRR is caused by the significantly higher capital investment for an NPP. It means that energy projects related to fossil fuel are more attractive for private investor than an NPP. Nevertheless, the value of the IRR for an NPP is high enough for the Government to accept the nuclear project, taking into account again strategic considerations such as increased security of supply by diversification of energy sources.
The ROI for a nuclear project (0.223) shows an advantage over projects with coal fuel (0.200, see Table 9) and gas-fired PP (0.090) plants.
Assessment
Criterion 2.1 is partially fulfilled, i.e. investment in the planned nuclear project is better only by criteria ROI compared to investment in gas and coal energy sources. On other criteria, nuclear technology loses to both alternative technologies. However IRR 0.158 for nuclear technology is high enough to be attractive for introduction in Belarus.

Criterion CR2.2— availability of total investment

Criterion CR2.2 states that the total investment needed for a nuclear project should be available to a (private) investor in the country. The value of needed capital for the planned nuclear project in Belarus, as shown in Table 9, is higher than the calculated investment limit. This means that the national utility on its own would not be capable of raising the needed capital by itself, but would need a Government loan.
Assessment
The Belarusian Government is known to ensure the availability of capital through a line of credit from the Russian Federation. Criterion CR2.2, consequently, has been satisfied.

Final assessment of user requirement UR2 — ability to finance nuclear power programme

As not both criteria of UR2 are satisfied, it could be stated that user requirement UR2 is partially satisfied, i.e. the planned nuclear power project is not a sufficiently attractive investment for the government of Belarus from all points of view.

User requirement UR3 — investment risk

User requirement UR3: The risk of investment in innovative NESs should be acceptable to investors taking into account the risk of investment in other energy projects. Satisfaction of this user requirement UR3 is verified by evaluation of criteria CR3.1 (maturity of design), CR3.2 (construction schedule), CR3.3 (robustness) and CR3.4 (political environment).

Criterion CR3.1 — maturity of design

To limit the risk of investment in nuclear power, criterion CR3.1 requires an adequate status of the licensing process, depending on the experience of the country that intends to install an NPP. In the case that the first few NPPs are to be deployed in a country — as in Belarus, intending to install the latest VVER1000 design called AES-2006 as its first NPP — CR3.1 states that nuclear plants of the same basic design should have been constructed and operated in the country of the supplier. At the time the assessment was performed, AES-2006 was licensed in its country of origin and construction projects were ongoing with an AES-2006 type of reactor.
However, the absence of operational experience with NPPs of AES-2006 design in the supplier country (Russian Federation) leads to the conclusion that criterion CR3.1 is currently not yet completely satisfied. The assessor acknowledges that other novel pressurized water reactor (PWR) designs, e.g. EPR, APR-1400 and AP-1000, do not have operational experience in the supplier countries yet, either.

Criterion CR3.2 — construction schedule

To limit the investment risk, criterion CR3.2 requires evidence that the construction schedule (of the nuclear plant type to be installed) considered in the economic analysis has been met in previous construction projects for the same basic design.

As construction of AES-2006 reactors is currently not yet completed, CR3.2 is not fully satisfied (for the same reason as CR3.1), i.e. the absence of experience with construction schedules and operation of this plant type in the supplier country. The assessor acknowledges that also other available novel PWR reactors do not currently have enough experience with construction schedules and operation.

Criterion CR3.3 — robustness

Criterion CR3.3 (robustness) is satisfied if the economic robustness index RI (as defined in Annex A of Volume 2 of IAEA-TECDOC-1575 Rev.1) for selected major input parameters of the planned NES is greater than 1.0. As shown in Table 10, all calculated robustness indexes satisfy this condition within a rather high range of perturbed parameters.
Thus, criterion CR3.3 is fully satisfied.

Criterion CR3.4 — political environment

Criterion CR3.4 stipulates long-term commitment of the national political environment to nuclear power to reduce risk of investment. The Decree of the President of Belarus on the introduction of two nuclear energy units, first in 2016 and second in 2018, confirms the favourable political climate for installation of NPPs in Belarus.
Thus, criterion CR3.4 can be considered as satisfied.

Final assessment of user requirement UR3 — investment risk

This user requirement states that the investment risk into nuclear power should be acceptable in comparison to other available energy projects.
Two factors clearly reduce the risk of investment in nuclear power in Belarus: There is a strong commitment from the Government of Belarus to nuclear power and the economic evaluation demonstrated sufficient robustness of its positive results regarding cost competitiveness.
However, it was found that the overall risk for an investment in nuclear power is rather high because criteria related to the maturity (status of licensing, experience with construction schedule) of the chosen nuclear plant design, AES-2006, are currently not yet completely satisfied, as there is no operational experience of that plant type available (although it is licensed and being constructed in the country of origin). Taking the vast experience of the designer of AES-2006 into account, a very satisfactory operational behaviour of the plant is to be expected.
Taking all aspects into account, it is concluded that user requirement UR3 is currently partially satisfied (but expected to be fully met soon).
Note: User requirement UR4 (flexibility) is not considered in this study, because it is not concretized enough in the existing documentation (IAEA-TECDOC-1575 Rev.1, INPRO Manual) of the INPRO methodology.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION OF ASSESSMENT OF ECONOMICS

The LUEC of the planned NPP AES-2006 is lower than for gas and coal energy sources available in the country. Approximately 9% cost advantage of nuclear power confirms that nuclear power used for generating electricity is cost competitive against gas based energy in Belarus.
Taking strategic considerations into account — such as security of supply by diversification of energy sources — for the Government, sufficient attractiveness for an investment in the nuclear power project has been confirmed via the high enough internal rate of return.
Evaluation of the risk associated with an investment in nuclear power in Belarus produced the following mixed results: There is a strong commitment by the Government to nuclear power, which is an important prerequisite for a successful nuclear power programme. Sufficient robustness of economic results — especially for levelized unit electricity cost — for the planned nuclear technology of AES-2006 has been clearly demonstrated. Currently, only the level of maturity (licensing status, experience with construction schedule) of the planned NPP AES-2006 is responsible for a certain risk level. The assessment revealed a lack of operational experience for this reactor design, but the plant is licensed and currently under construction in the country of origin. Moreover, because of the long experience of the designer of AES-2006, very satisfying operational behaviour of this plant is expected.
Thus, it is concluded that the planned nuclear power programme in Belarus is in partial agreement with the economic requirements of the INPRO methodology.

INFRASTRUCTURE

INTRODUCTION

In the INPRO methodology area of infrastructure (Volume 3 of IAEA-TECDOC-1575 Rev.1) one basic principle is defined:
Infrastructure basic principle: Regional and international arrangements shall provide options that enable any country, that so wishes to adopt, maintain or enlarge an innovative NES for the supply of energy and related products, without making an excessive investment in national infrastructure.
This basic principle defines the goal that the effort for establishment (and maintenance) of a nuclear infrastructure should be reduced by development of regional or international arrangements. An example of such an arrangement could be an international fuel cycle centre, e.g. for enrichment of uranium or for disposal of high level waste.
To meet the goal of this basic principle, four user requirements have been developed in INPRO, UR1–UR4. Additionally, for each issue addressed by the user requirements, options are presented in the INPRO methodology that, if realized, would reduce the effort for establishment and maintenance of a nuclear infrastructure. The four user requirements are used to evaluate the nuclear infrastructure in Belarus as follows.

USER REQUIREMENT UR1 — LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE

User requirement UR1: Prior to deployment of an innovative NES installation, the legal framework should be established to cover the issues of nuclear liability, safety and radiation protection, environmental protection, control of operation, waste management and decommissioning, security and non-proliferation.
In the assessment of the legal infrastructure below it is assumed that the laws of Belarus and decrees of the President of the Republic have the same legal status.
Fulfilment of UR1 is checked by evaluation of two criteria, CR1.1 and CR1.2. Each criterion has one indicator and one acceptance limit.

Criterion CR1.1 — legal aspects

Indicator IN1.1: Status of legal (nuclear) framework.
Acceptance limit AL1.1: Legal framework has been established in accordance with international standards.
To enable the assessment of criterion CR1.1, INPRO has defined several evaluation parameters for IN1.1, namely: EP1.1.1, EP1.1.2, EP1.1.3, and EP1.1.4.

EP1.1.1 — scope of nuclear legislation

Acceptability of EP1.1.1: the scope of the national nuclear legislation is adequate if all areas (issues) listed below are covered:
1) Regulatory body and its functions, such as authorization, inspection and enforcement;
2) Radiation protection;
3) Protection of environment, if not covered by other State laws;
4) Safety of nuclear installations covering such areas as emergency preparedness and response, use of radiation sources and of radioactive material, transport of nuclear and

radioactive material, radioactive waste management and spent fuel management, and mining and milling (if there are such activities in the country);
5) Nuclear liability and coverage;
6) Export and import control of nuclear material;
7) Safeguards of nuclear material to ensure non-proliferation;
8) Security and physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities.
The Belarus nuclear legislation was evaluated with regard to all the issues listed above as follows.
Evaluation of regulatory body and its functions (issue No.1)
The evaluation of the first issue of the evaluation parameter EP1.1.1 came to the following conclusion:
The first paragraph of Article 7 of the nuclear law establishes a system of governmental bodies which regulate the use of nuclear energy:
"The Ministry for Emergency Situations of Belarus, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection of Belarus, the Ministry of Health of Belarus, Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus, Committee for State Security of Belarus (hereinafter - the public authorities on regulation of the safe use of nuclear energy) are authorized as National governmental bodies, engaged in State regulation of safe use of nuclear energy, unless otherwise is established by the President of Belarus".
In accordance with section 126 of the decree, licence activities for atomic energy are carried out by the Ministry for Emergency Situations of the Republic.
Thus, the first issue is covered by national nuclear legislation.
Evaluation of radiation protection (issue No.2)
Evaluation of the second issue of the evaluation parameter EP1.1.1 produced the following result:
The nuclear law “defines the framework of legal regulation in the field of radiation safety, and is aimed at creating conditions that ensure the protection of life and health from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation”.
Thus, the second issue is covered by national legislation.
Evaluation of environmental protection (issue No.3)
Environmental protection is defined by the law . Thus, the third issue is covered by national legislation.
Evaluation of safety of nuclear installations (issue No.4)
In accordance with Article 32 of the law "The operating organization shall develop and implement measures to maintain and enhance the safety of nuclear installations and (or) storage facility, create the appropriate services exercising control over security, provide information about the security status of these objects to the State authorities to regulate the safe use of nuclear energy that they have set terms.”
In accordance with Article 7 the Ministry for Emergency Situations of Belarus "carries out State supervision in the field of nuclear and radiation safety, as well as for the physical protection of nuclear facilities" within its competence.
Emergency preparedness and response are the responsibilities of the operating organization, defined by Chapter 7 of the Law.
Finding: The law does not fully present the issues to ensure the safe handling of radioactive waste and spent fuel.
Thus, the forth issue is partially covered by national legislation.
Evaluation of nuclear liability and coverage (issue No.5)
Liability and its limits for damage resulting from activities associated with the use of atomic energy are established by Chapter 9 of the law.
Thus, the fifth issue is covered by national legislation.
Evaluation of export and import control of nuclear material (issue No.6)
Export and import control of nuclear material is carried out in accordance with the following national legislation:

• Law on export control;
• Decree on the restrictions and limits on the transfer of goods across the border;
• Resolution of Council of Ministers on the issues of transfer of goods across the border.

Thus, the sixth issue is covered by national legislation.
Evaluation of safeguards of nuclear material (issue No.7)
Chapter 3, art.12 of the law states that nuclear material in Belarus is subject to accountancy and control by a corresponding State System. The State system of accountancy and control of nuclear material (SSAC) is to be organized by the government of Belarus.
Chapter 2, art.7 of the law states that the regulatory body is responsible for the performance of the SSAC in Belarus.
Evaluation of security and physical protection (issue No.8)
In accordance with Article 3 of the law :
“Protection of NPPs is carried out by the internal troops in accordance with the Law on the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs”.
The law further states:
“Physical protection of nuclear facilities is provided by operating organizations and State administration bodies within their competence”.
“State supervision of physical protection of nuclear facilities is carried out by authorized government agencies on the basis of regulation of the safe use of nuclear energy prescribed by the Government of Belarus”.
“Operation is forbidden of a nuclear facility and of storage of nuclear material, as well as carrying out of any work using nuclear materials or treatment of spent nuclear materials and (or) operational radioactive waste, in any form and in any stage, if necessary measures to fulfil requirements to ensure their physical protection are not taken".
Thus, issue No.8 is covered by national legislation.

Evaluation parameter EP1.1.2 — adequacy of nuclear law

Acceptability of EP1.1.2: the national nuclear law is deemed adequate if the following six questions (section 3.2.3.2 in Volume 3 of IAEA-TECDOC-1575 Rev.1) can be answered positively:
1)Does the current legislation make it clear that public health, safety, security and the environment are overriding considerations in the use of nuclear techniques and material?
2)Are there major gaps or overlaps in the legal structure regarding the treatment of nuclear related activities or material, both those currently being conducted or used and those that can reasonably be expected?
3)Have the most important terms used in the legislation been given clear and consistent definitions in the statutory documents? Does the use of different terms and definitions, or a failure to define certain terms, produce confusion about how nuclear related activities are to be regulated?
4)Are the institutional responsibilities for regulating nuclear related activities clear and consistent, permitting efficient regulation without delays and bureaucratic conflicts?
5)Does the present regulatory system involve unnecessary financial or administrative burdens on regulated entities or regulatory agencies that could be reduced in order to improve efficiency?
6)Does the present system fully comply with the State’s international legal obligations and reflect international best practice, as described in safety standards documents promulgated by the IAEA or other relevant multinational bodies?
These six questions were answered after evaluating the existing nuclear legislation of Belarus as follows
Evaluation of question No.1
The existence of the following laws of Belarus allows us to answer the first question affirmatively:

• Law on Environmental Protection;
• Law on the Sanitary-Epidemiological Welfare of the Population;
• Law on Radiation Safety.

Thus, current national legislation in Belarus makes it clear that public health, safety, security and the environment are overriding considerations in the use of nuclear techniques and material.
Evaluation of question No.2
The confirmed presence of the (mentioned-above) bodies of State administration and regulatory activities in atomic energy in Belarus allows us to answer the second question of the evaluation parameter EP1.1.2 affirmatively.
Regulatory body for nuclear and radiation safety (Promatomnadzor) was established in Belarus in the beginning of the 1990s.
By Decree on measures for the installation of an NPP, the Department of Nuclear and Radiation Safety (Gosatomnadzor) was established as the successor of Promatomnadzor and a structural unit of the Ministry for Emergency Situations of Belarus with special functions. By the same decree the Directorate for NPP Installation was created within the Ministry of Energy to perform the functions of the customer on the implementation of preparatory and survey work on the construction of nuclear power plant.
Decree created the Nuclear Energy Department of Ministry of Energy of the Republic; Decree on the Department was approved.
Authority of the last three bodies is established by regulations, annexed to the relevant Presidential Decree.
Finding: Ministry for Emergency Situations is a nuclear regulatory body of Belarus since it fulfills key regulatory functions, e.g. licensing, has necessary administrative and financial autonomy. However Ministry for Emergency Situations performs several other than regulatory functions in the area of nuclear energy.
Gosatomnadzor is а structural unit of the Ministry for Emergency Situations. While it has own legal status and extensive regulatory functions in the field of nuclear energy Gosatomnadzor administratively and financially reports to the Ministry for Emergency Situations. Perhaps the decision to grant full autonomy and a full set of regulatory functions to Gosatomnadzor could become an alternative approach, possibly more effective, than the existing system of government and regulation of the use of nuclear energy.
Evaluation of question No.3
There are several findings regarding this question:

• There is no definition in the law of ionizing radiation and ionizing radiation source, although, these terms are used in several articles of the law;
• Ionizing emission sources are not included in nuclear facilities, although, the text of the law says clear that they are such sources;
• The first paragraph of Art.6 of the law contradicts the last paragraph of Art. 7. The Ministry for Emergency Situations of Belarus is mentioned in these articles as an organ of State management and as an organ of State regulation on the safe use of nuclear energy. However, the last paragraph of Art.7 declares the independence of regulatory bodies from management bodies;
• Some safety specific terms in the law are not defined according to IAEA Safety Glossary, e.g. definition of the term nuclear safety.

Evaluation of question No.4
Article 4-8 of Chapter 2 of the law defines the sharing of power and functions in nuclear energy use between the:

• President of Belarus;
• Government of Belarus;
• Organs of State management;
• Organs of State management engaged in governmental regulation;
• Local regulatory and self-regulatory bodies.

In Article 6 the powers of organs of State management are divided between:

• The Ministry of Energy;
• The Ministry for Emergency Situations;
• Other national authorities and organizations authorized by the President. The State regulatory bodies are listed in Article 7:
• Ministry for Emergency Situations;
• Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment;
• Ministry of Health;
• Ministry of Internal Affairs;
• Committee for State Security.

Finding: Only the regulatory functions of the Ministry for Emergency Situations are clarified. Regulatory functions of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Committee for State Security have not identified and separated.
Evaluation of question No.5
Gosatomnadzor is a structural unit of the Ministry for Emergency Situations and financed from the state budget. Number of staff of Gosatomnadzor is determined by law. These give reason to believe that the present regulatory system does not involve unnecessary financial or administrative burdens on regulated entities or regulatory agencies and its activity is effective enough.
Evaluation of question No.6
On the basis of the analysis above, it can be concluded that the legislative framework and system of management and regulatory bodies of Belarus for atomic energy are generally satisfactory and conform with international practice.
Summary of findings regarding EP1.1.2 (adequacy of national nuclear legislation): The national law On the use of atomic energy needs further improvements in terms of completeness and correctness of definitions and a clear division of responsibilities between the relevant bodies of regulation in the area of nuclear energy.

EP1.1.3 — international legal arrangements

Acceptability of EP1.1.3: the national legal framework is adequate if relevant international arrangements are signed and ratified and incorporated into national nuclear legislation.
INPRO methodology recommends that a State sign and ratify at least the following international instruments:
1) Convention on Nuclear Safety;
2) International Nuclear Liability Convention;
3) Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident;
4) Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency; 5) Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management;
6) Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (and associated safeguards agreements);
7) Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities;
8) International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.
The status of the above mentioned international legal agreements was checked. Data for the entry into force of these agreements in Belarus are cited below in Table 11:

Table 11. International agreements.

Name of agreement	Came into
1. Convention on Nuclear Safety	27.01.1999
2.International Nuclear Liability Convention	09.05.1998
3.Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident	26.02.1987
4.Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency	26.02.1987
5.Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management	24.02.2003
6.Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	27.07.1993
7.Agreement between Belarus and the IAEA on the Admission of Safeguards according to the NPT	02.08.1995
8.Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities	14.06.1993
9.International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear TerrorismThe Law of Belarus On ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism	20.10.2006(the date of signing)

In addition to agreements listed above, recommended by INPRO, Belarus is party to the following international legal agreements:

• The Convention on the Trans-boundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, 23.09.2003.
• Agreement on the Ecological Security in the CIS Member States. Resolution of the Inter-parliamentary Assembly of CIS on 06.13.2000.
• Agreement between the Council of Ministers of Belarus and the Government of the Russian Federation on the mutual recognition of State licenses for construction activities issued by the licensing centers of Belarus and the Russian Federation, 08.12.1994.
• Agreement on interstate examination of construction projects of the CIS Member States’ mutual interest. It was signed by the Council of CIS Heads of Government on 01.13.1999.
• The Convention on Long-range Trans-boundary Air Pollution. Ratified 03.16.1983.

Thus, the completeness can be confirmed of international legal agreements signed by Belarus and incorporated into national nuclear legislation. Evaluation parameter EP1.1.3 is completely fulfilled.

EP1.1.4 — completeness and adequacy of regulations and guidelines

Acceptability of EP1.1.4: national nuclear regulations and guidelines are considered complete and adequate if they are consistent with and take into account all aspects of international standards.
As part of the legal framework, the third and fourth level of the legal requirements, consisting of regulations and guidelines, has to be established (the first two levels are constitution and statute).
To create these additional levels for nuclear safety documents, INPRO recommends the national regulatory body to take international safety standards into account (e.g.). Similar international standards are being prepared for the security regime.
Section 1.5.10 of Ref. discusses approaches to the application of standards and guidelines of international organizations or other States in national legal framework of Belarus.
The shortlist of recently introduced regulatory documents is given in Table 12. The shortlist of regulations to be developed currently is presented in Table 13. Full list of regulations to be introduced before NPP startup comprises 234 items.

Table 12. Rules and regulations of Belarus for nuclear energy

Title of document	Developed	Cleared	Approved	Registered
Safety rules for storage and transportation of nuclear fuel at nuclear power facilities	NAS Belarus	Ministry of Justice	Ministry for Emergency Situations	Decree No72, 30 Dec 2006
Siting of NPPs. Guidelines on development and content of justification of NPPs ecology safety	NAS Belarus	Ministry of Architecture And Construction	Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection; Ministry for Emergency Situations	TCP 099-2007 (02120/02300), dated December 25,2007
Siting of NPPs. Main demands to the structure and range of investigations while selecting the location and site for NPP	NAS Belarus	Ministry of Energy; Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection.	Ministry of Architecture and Construction; Ministry for Emergency Situations	TCP 098-2007 (02250/02300), dated December 25, 2007
Siting of NPPs. The main criteria and requirements for safety	NAS Belarus	Ministry of Energy; Ministry of Architecture and Construction	Ministry for Emergency Situations	TCP 097-2007 (02300), dated December 29, 2007
Siting of NPPs. Procedure for development of general quality assurance programme for NPP	NAS Belarus	Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection	Ministry of Energy; Ministry of Architecture and Construction; Ministry for Emergency Situations	TCP 101-2007 (02230/02250/02 300), dated December 25, 2007
Siting of NPPs. Procedure for development of quality assurance programme while selecting the site for NPP.	NAS Belarus	Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection	Ministry of Energy; Ministry of Architecture and Construction; Ministry for Emergency Situations	TCP 102-2007 (02230/02250/02 300), dated December 25, 2007
General provision for NPPs safety guaranteeing	NAS Belarus	Ministry of Energy	Ministry for Emergency Situations	TCP170-2009 (02300), dated May 1, 2009
Nuclear Safety Regulations for reactor facilities of NPPs	NAS Belarus	Ministry of Energy	Ministry for Emergency Situations	TCP171-2009 (02300), dated May 1, 2009
Requirements for the content of the safety analysis report for NPPs with VVER reactor		Department of Nuclear and Radiation Safety of Ministry for Emergency Situations; Ministry of Energy	Ministry for Emergency Situations	TCP294-2010 (02300), dated April 1, 2011

Table 13. Shortlist of regulations to be development in Belarus for nuclear energy

Title of document	Developed	Cleared	Approved
Requirements for the quality assurance programme during of construction of NPP	NAS Belarus	Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection, Ministry of Architecture and Construction	Ministry of Energy; Ministry for Emergency Situations
Requirements for the quality assurance programme for the design of NPPs	NAS Belarus	Ministry of energy, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection, Ministry for Emergency Situations	Ministry of Architecture and Construction
Requirements to write a report on environmental impact assessment for NPP environmental impact assessment (EIA)	NAS Belarus	Ministry of Architecture and Construction, Ministry of Health	Ministry of Energy, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection, Ministry for Emergency Situations
Acceptance of the completed construction of the reactors	NAS Belarus	Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection; Ministry of Architecture and Construction; Ministry for Emergency Situations; Ministry of Industry	Ministry of Energy
The account of natural and anthropogenic impacts on nuclear and radiation hazardous objects	NAS Belarus	Ministry for Emergency Situations	Ministry of Energy, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection
The main provisions for the selection, training, admission to work and control of the operation staff of NPPs	NAS Belarus	Ministry for Emergency Situations	Ministry of Energy
Design Guidelines for justification of investment in building a nuclear power station and the procedure for siting NPP	NAS Belarus	Ministry for Emergency Situations; Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection; Ministry of Architecture and Construction	Ministry of Energy
Regulations on the general requirements for physical protection of nuclear facilities	Ministry of energy; NAS Belarus	Ministry for Emergency Situations, Ministry of Internal Affairs; KGB; Ministry of Energy; Ministry of Architecture and Construction	Council of ministers of Belarus
Basic safety and security rules of nuclear material transportation	NAS Belarus	Department of Nuclear and Radiation Safety of Ministry for Emergency Situations; KGB; Ministry of Energy; Ministry of Justice; Ministry of Transport and Communications	Ministry for Emergency Situations
Basic rules of safety and physical protection of nuclear material in transit	NAS Belarus	Ministry of Energy; Ministry of Defense; State Border Committee; Ministry of Justice	Ministry for Emergency Situations; KGB; Ministry of Internal Affairs
Reporting requirements documentation for physical protection, control and accounting of nuclear material to the public authority	NAS Belarus	Ministry for Emergency Situations	NAS Belarus
The structure of the SSAC	NAS Belarus	Ministry for Emergency Situations; KGB; Ministry of Internal Affairs; Ministry of Finance; Ministry of Justice; Ministry of Energy	Council of Ministers of Belarus
The basic rules of accounting and control of nuclear material"	NAS Belarus	Department of Nuclear and Radiation Safety of Ministry for Emergency Situations; KGB; Ministry of Energy	Ministry for Emergency Situations
A typical instructions for registration and control of nuclear material at the research facility, critical and subcritical stands	NAS Belarus	Ministry for Emergency Situations; KGB	NAS Belarus
The procedure for determining the level of PP NF, NM, RW	NAS Belarus	KGB; Ministry of Internal Affairs; Ministry of Energy	Ministry for Emergency Situations
The organization of private security services NDO	NAS Belarus	KGB; Ministry of Energy	Ministry of Internal Affairs
System PP NM and NF. Instructions for organization of designee	NAS Belarus	Ministry of Energy	Ministry for Emergency Situations
Sanitary Rules for Radiation Safety personnel and the public for transportation of radioactive material (substances).	Ministry of health; NAS Belarus	Department of Nuclear and Radiation Safety of Ministry for Emergency Situations; Ministry of energy; NCRS; Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection.	Ministry of Health
Safety regulations for transportation of radioactive substances	NAS Belarus	Department of Nuclear and Radiation Safety of Ministry for Emergency Situations; Ministry of Energy; Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection.	Ministry for Emergency Situations
The collection, processing, storage and conditioning of liquid radioactive waste. Security requirements	NAS Belarus	Department of Nuclear and Radiation Safety of Ministry for Emergency Situations; Ministry of Energy; Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection.	Ministry for Emergency Situations
The collection, processing, storage and conditioning of solid radioactive waste. Security requirements	NAS Belarus	Department of Nuclear and Radiation Safety of Ministry for Emergency Situations; Ministry of Energy; Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection.	Ministry for Emergency Situations
Management of gaseous radioactive waste. Security requirements	NAS Belarus	Department of Nuclear and Radiation Safety of Ministry for Emergency Situations; Ministry of Energy, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection.	Ministry for Emergency Situations
Standards of design of fire protection facilities	Ministry for Emergency Situations	NAS Belarus; Ministry of Energy	Ministry for Emergency Situations
Warning systems and evacuation of people during fires in buildings	Ministry for Emergency Situations	NAS Belarus; Ministry of Energy	Ministry for Emergency Situations
Fire protection of nuclear plants. Standards of design	Ministry for Emergency Situations	NAS Belarus; Ministry of Energy	Ministry for Emergency Situations

The regulations developed and planned within the programme of scientific support of NPP construction by Belarus institutions cover:

• Siting;
• Design and operation;
• Safety;
• Safety of storage and transportation of nuclear fuel;
• Safety of research reactors and assemblies;
• Requirements to the report on justification of NPP safety with VVER-type reactor;
• Design and operation of actuating mechanisms for controlling the reactivity.
• Accounting and control of nuclear material and organization of nuclear material balance areas in particular (safeguards);
• Organization of the security tasks;
• Radioactive waste management;
• Analysis of the vulnerability of nuclear facilities;
• Terms of supply of imported equipment, products and components of nuclear facilities, radiation sources and storage;
• Licensing of nuclear and radiation safety;
• Certification of equipment, products and technologies for nuclear facilities, radiation sources and storage;
• Industry rules of nuclear safety for the use, processing, storage and transportation of nuclear (dangerous) fissile material;
• The order for testing of managers, engineers and technical workers regarding their knowledge of rules, norms and instructions on safety in nuclear power;
• Physical protection;
• Requirements for quality assurance programmes;
• Requirements for documents;
• Fuel management;
• Fire protection;
• Environmental protection.

Thus, in Belarus the legal framework for atomic energy is already partially developed and there is a concrete programme for developing the additional necessary regulations. This allows us to conclude that EP1.1.4 has been fulfilled.
Final evaluation of criterion CR1.1 (legal aspects)
The national legal framework necessary for a nuclear power programme is established in Belarus according to international standards.
Missing parts of nuclear regulation are clearly identified and are under development (with support from SOSNY) with the goal that they will be available before startup of the planned NPPs.
In particular it was found that the national nuclear law [1] needs some improvements in wording, such as correction and additional definition of terms, and a clear distinction of responsibilities of the relevant Government bodies involved in nuclear regulation (further discussed in the evaluation of CR1.2).
As a follow-up action it is recommended that the wording of the nuclear law be updated as defined.

Criterion CR1.2 — institutions

Indicator IN1.2: Status of State organizations with responsibilities for safety and radiation protection, protection of environment, control of operation, waste management and decommissioning, security (physical protection) and non-proliferation.
Acceptance limit AL1.2: the defined State organizations should be established, in accordance with international standards.
Criterion CR1.2 is checked using five evaluation parameters, EP1.2.1–EP1.2.5:

EP1.2.1 — independence of regulatory bodies

Acceptability of EP1.2.1: a regulatory body is deemed sufficient independent if its human resources and its competence and capability are adequate to make and maintain positions, independent of the owners/operators of nuclear facilities, and if it is free of undue pressure from interested parties — commercial or political.
An important attribute of a regulatory body is its independence from interference in its regulatory functions from operators of nuclear facilities or organizations that are promoting nuclear power. The basis for its independence should be set out in the nuclear legislation.
As discussed before (Subsection 3.2.1.2, EP1.1.2, adequacy of nuclear law), regulation of the activities on safety of nuclear energy use in Belarus is carried out by a governmental system. In Article 7 of the law, the independence of this system is defined:
"The public authorities to regulate the safe use of nuclear energy, in terms of exercising their powers related to government regulation of safety, holding control and State oversight of the use of atomic energy, are independent from national government bodies and other governmental organizations engaged in public management in (promotion of) the use of nuclear energy".
Finding: However, this declaration must be supported by the foundation of organizational and financial independence of regulatory activities. Under the current regulatory system the regulatory activities in the field of nuclear energy are only part of the activities of the Ministry for Emergency Situations.

A possible scheme for full financial independence of regulatory activities would be the separation of Gosatomnadzor into an independent organization, empowering it with all the powers and functions of a regulatory body and giving it financial independence by allocating to it a separate budget line.
The law and other legislation on the use of nuclear energy have no articles relating to other aspects of independence of regulatory activities: technical and managerial competence, the availability of adequate human resources, effective leadership, and reporting mechanisms.
Thus, the acceptability of EP1.2.1 (independence of the regulatory body) is considered not to be completely satisfied.

EP1.2.2 — general functions of regulatory body

Acceptability of EP1.2.2: A regulatory body is deemed adequate if it performs all the functions listed below:

• Establishment of regulatory standards, codes and criteria, and guidelines for the design, construction, operation and decommissioning of nuclear facilities, including the safe and secure management of radioactive waste generated;
• Review and evaluation of licensing documents, such as the physical protection plan, safety analysis and environmental reports of nuclear facilities;
• Authorization of construction, operation, and decommissioning of a nuclear facility and the conduct of activities by a licensee, by, e.g. issuing licences, registration;
• Performance of inspections, reviews, audits and enforcement activities to ensure compliance with established rules and regulations;
• Provision of information about safety and security aspects of facilities and activities to the to the public, the media, and interested parties;
• Coordination with other regulatory bodies.

Functions of the Ministry for Emergency Situations as a key regulatory body and other Government agencies (not specified), which regulate the use of nuclear energy, are set out in Article 7 of the law.
The main functions of Gosatomnadzor are listed in Chapter 3 of the Regulations for the Department of Nuclear and Radiation Safety of the Ministry for Emergency Situations of Belarus, introduced by.
In both documents, the regulatory functions could be set out more clearly, and basic functions that are absent include:

• Development, approval and dissemination of regulations and guidelines upon which regulatory actions based;
• Review and evaluation of safety documents both before the issuance of licenses and authorizations, and periodically during operation.

Additional evaluation of legal documents provided the following results: Article 10 of the law states that “licensing of the use of nuclear energy is to be carried out in conformity with the legislation on licensing”. Such a legislative act is the provision on licensing certain types of activities, approved by Decree. In accordance with section 126 of Chapter 13 of this provision, the licensing of activities for nuclear energy and ionizing radiation sources is carried out by the Ministry for Emergency Situations. In paragraph 5 of Annex 1 of this

provision, the services and activities subject to licensing in the use of nuclear energy and ionizing radiation are listed in full.
Thus, the acceptability of evaluation parameter EP1.2.2 has been met.

EP1.2.3 — review of safety regime

Acceptability of EP1.2.3: a review of the safety regime has been made by a competent authority with positive results.
In 2010, Gosatomnadzor in Belarus applied an updated IAEA tool SARCoN (Systematic Assessment of Regulatory Competence Needs). The SARCoN guidelines are intended to help analyse the training and development needs of regulatory bodies in Member States.
Finding: The authors of this study have no information about a review of the national safety regime by an independent authority. Results of the self-assessment using the SARCoN tool are not available to the assessor.
This evaluation parameter is not met due to a lack of information.

EP1.2.4 — review of emergency preparedness regime

Acceptability of EP1.2.4: A review of the emergency preparedness measures has been carried out either by a competent independent national authority or by government auditor or by a competent international institution, such as the IAEA, with positive results.
In 2008 two IAEA advisory missions on notification procedures and information exchange in case of radiation emergency and on further upgrading of emergency notification system were conducted in Belarus.
In 2010, upon request from Belarus Government, an EPREV (emergency preparedness and review) mission assessed the national system of emergency preparedness for nuclear and radiation accidents. The main conclusion of the IAEA expert group was that Belarus has a reliable system of emergency preparedness and response, but which needs to be reviewed in connection with the plans to build an NPP in Belarus. The mission also gave recommendations for further improvement of the existing system of preparedness and emergency response in accordance with international requirements and standards.
EP1.2.4 has been met if the IAEA recommendations have been followed.

EP1.2.5 — review of physical protection regime

Acceptability of EP1.2.5: a review of the physical protection regime has been carried out by a competent organization and the results of such review are positive.
From 31 August till 11 September 2009 an IAEA IPPAS mission was held in Belarus in order to examine the current status of the State system of physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, to compare it with internationally recognized practices and to assess compliance with international guidelines. Also a specific assessment was performed to ensure the physical protection of JIPNR-SOSNY NAS Belarus.
According to information available to the authors of this study, the IPPAS team concluded that the physical protection regime was in a satisfactory condition at both the State level and at JIPNR-SOSNY NAS.
Thus, acceptability of evaluation parameter EP1.2.5 has been confirmed.

Final assessment of criterion CR1.2 — institutions
A majority of the evaluation parameters of criterion CR1.2 were not completely met, i.e. EP1.1.1 (independence of regulator), EP1.2.2 (functions of regulator body), EP1.2.3 (review of safety regime), and EP1.2.4 (review of emergency preparedness regime).
Thus, criterion CR1.2 has not been completely met.

Final assessment of UR1 — legal and institutional infrastructure

Most the existing legal and institutional infrastructure of Belarus was found to be adequate.
To bring the nuclear legislation of Belarus completely in compliance with the requirements of user requirement UR1 of the INPRO methodology, the recommended follow-up actions are to:

• Provide legislatively for real financial independence of regulatory activities on the use of nuclear energy. A possible scheme would be the separation of Gosatomnadzor from the Ministry for Emergency Situations into an independent organization, to empower it with all the powers and functions of a regulatory body and to give it financial independence by allocating a separate budget line.
• Perform a review by competent authorities of the safety regime for atomic energy.
• Define the functions of the regulatory body or bodies more clearly in the law and, in particular, to introduce such functions into the law as:
  

(a)development, approval and distribution of regulations and guidelines upon which regulatory actions are based;
(b)review and assessment of safety documents before the issuance of licences and authorizations, and periodically during operation.

USER REQUIREMENT UR2 — INDUSTRIAL AND ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE

User requirement UR2: The industrial and economic infrastructure of a country planning to install a nuclear energy system (NES) installation should be adequate to support the project throughout the complete lifetime of the nuclear power programme, including planning, construction, operation, decommissioning, and related waste management activities.
To check the fulfilment of UR2, INPRO has developed five criteria, CR2.1–CR2.5. These criteria will be used to evaluate the industrial and economic infrastructure in Belarus as follows.

Criterion CR2.1 — financing

Indicator IN2.1: availability of credit lines.
Acceptance limit AL2.1: credit lines available in Belarus are sufficient for realization of planned nuclear power programme.
Criterion CR2.1 is checked using two evaluation parameters, EP2.1.1 and EP2.1.2.

EP2.1.1 — financing of industrial infrastructure

Acceptability of EP2.1.1: necessary financing for (planned) buildup of national industry — defined by a cost-benefit analysis or equivalent study — is available in the country.
There is no plan to build up an additional national industrial infrastructure in the foreseen future, and the financing of the present one will be secured by its own capital resources and, if needed, by external credit or special State programmes.
Thus, EP2.1.1 has been met.

EP2.1.2 — financing of governmental infrastructure

Acceptability of EP2.1.2: necessary governmental financing is confirmed by an analysis of budget resources.
The budget item ‘fuel and energy costs’ includes an item for financing activities related to the installation of an NPP.
Thus, EP2.1.2 has been met.
Final assessment of CR2.1 financing
The above evaluation shows that necessary credit lines are available, thus criterion CR2.1 has been completely fulfilled.

Criterion CR2.2 — energy market

Indicator IN2.2: Demand for and price of energy products.
Acceptance limit AL2.2: Adequate demand and price (of electricity) to enable a satisfactory financial return.
Ref. comprises a detailed analysis of the national energy market and a guarantee of satisfactory financial return confirmed by the calculations.
Thus, adequate demand for electricity and sufficient price is confirmed in Belarus, i.e. CR2.2 has been met.

Criterion CR2.3 — size of nuclear installations Indicator

                IN2.3: Size of installation. 

Acceptance limit AL2.3: size of nuclear facilities matches national needs.
The optimum size (power output) of an NPP in Belarus was defined by energy system planning (see section 1.5 of this report, ‘electric power system expansion optimization’, for details).
For criterion CR2.3, INPRO developed two additional evaluation parameters, EP2.3.1 and EP2.3.2.

EP2.3.1 — energy system expansion plan

Acceptability of EP2.3.1: results of an energy system expansion plan (defining the role of nuclear energy) have been performed with adequate means.
Ref. presented a plan to expand the energy system in Belarus, and also data on the development of neighboring countries in order to determine the possible volume of electricity imports. Additional information is presented in section 1.5 of this report.
Thus, evaluation parameter EP2.3.1 has been met.

EP2.3.2 — size of nuclear fuel cycle facilities (other than NPP)

Acceptability of EP2.3.2: size of nuclear fuel cycle facilities has been determined by means of adequate studies.

Currently, construction of only a temporary storage facility of spent fuel is foreseen in Belarus. It is possibly (depending on the conditions of the contract for the construction of NPPs) that a geological disposal for high level waste from reprocessing is to be built in the future.
Finding: sizes of these facilities are not defined yet.
Final assessment of criterion CR2.3
Size (power output) of the NPPs was defined on the basis of a comprehensive energy system planning study.
However, the size of planned nuclear fuel cycle facilities in the country is not yet defined. It is recommended as a follow-up action that the size of the planned nuclear fuel cycle facilities be defined.
Thus, CR2.3 has been partially met.

Criterion CR2.4 — national support structure

Indicator IN2.4: availability of infrastructure to support nuclear owner/operator.
Acceptance limit AL2.4: Availability of domestic or foreign support infrastructure needed by the operator.
For criterion CR2.4, INPRO developed two evaluation parameters, EP2.4.1 and EP2.4.2.

EP2.4.1 — review of existing capabilities of industry

Acceptability of EP2.4.1: a survey of the existing capabilities of national industry to support the owner/operator of nuclear installations has been performed.
As part of the State scientific-technical programme Nuclear-physics technology for the national economy of Belarus, section 17 contains an analysis of the availability and sufficiency of industrial capacities for construction, of raw material and of the scientific basis in Belarus for installation of NPPs.
Thus, evaluation parameter EP2.4.1 has been met.

EP2.4.2 — plan for national participation

Acceptability of EP2.4.2: plan for participation of national industry in nuclear power programme has been established.
A plan of participation of national industry in the NPP installation is currently being prepared and is based on the analysis of availability and sufficiency of the industrial capacity for construction, of raw material and of the scientific basis of Belarus in installing an NPP (see also evaluation of EP2.4.1).
Thus, evaluation parameter EP2.4.2 has been met.
Final assessment of criterion CR2.4 — national support structure
As both evaluation parameters have been met, it was confirmed that the necessary support infrastructure was available in the country, i.e. criterion CR2.4 had been met.

Criterion CR2.5 — added value

Indicator IN2.5: Full added value of proposed nuclear installation (AVNI).
Acceptance limit AL2.5: AVNI should be greater than national infrastructure investment necessary to support nuclear installation.

INPRO developed for criterion CR2.5 two evaluation parameters, EP2.5.1 and EP2.5.2.

EP2.5.1 — cost-benefit analysis for buildup of national industry

Acceptability of EP2.5.1: a cost-benefit analysis regarding necessary investments has been performed by national industry to be involved in the nuclear power programme with a positive result.
Introduction of nuclear power in Belarus does not foresee the creation of a full-scale national industrial base for the development of nuclear energy, but only selected participation of local industry. The main nuclear equipment will be supplied by one of the countries possessing (developing) nuclear power technologies, for example by Russia. Thus, no significant investment by national industry is foreseen in Belarus. Additionally, it is reasonable to assume that any investment in national industry related to NPP installation will be considerably lower than the investment in the planned NPP units.
Finding: No information about a cost benefit study for a buildup of national industry to be involved in a nuclear power programme was available to the authors of this study.
Assuming that the necessary investment in national industry build-up in Belarus is negligible, it can be concluded that EP2.1.2 is not relevant.

EP2.5.2 — study to define benefits of nuclear programme to society

Acceptability of EP2.5.2: a governmental study to define benefits of the planned nuclear power programme to society has been performed with a positive result.
Finding: The authors of this study have no information about governmental expertise regarding potential benefit to society of the planned nuclear programme.
However, it follows from the discussion above that the existing industrial infrastructure and its forecast fulfil all requirements for support of the owner and operator of the planned NPPs and that it does not require considerable financial investment.
Final assessment of criterion CR2.5 — added value
Criterion CR2.5 has not been met due to lack of available information on benefits of the nuclear power programme to society. It is recommended that such a study be initiated.

Final assessment of UR2 — economic and industrial infrastructure

This user requirement stipulates that economic conditions in the country should be adequate and that sufficient support should be provided by national industry to of nuclear facility operators.
Economic conditions have been confirmed via criterion CR2.1 (national capability to finance), and CR2.2 (national energy market). For assessment of CR2.3 (size of nuclear facilities) not sufficient data are available.
A sufficient national support structure has been confirmed via CR2.4 (support structure), but for assessment of CR2.5 (added value of nuclear power programme) sufficient data are not available. Thus, user requirement UR2 has not been completely fulfilled.
Recommended follow-up actions are to:

• Perform additional independent governmental research to demonstrate the benefits of the planned nuclear power programme to society.
• Define the size of the planned nuclear fuel cycle facilities.

USER REQUIREMENT UR3 — POLITICAL SUPPORT AND PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF NUCLEAR POWER

User requirement UR3: Adequate measures should be taken to achieve public acceptance of a planned NES installations to enable a government policy commitment to support the deployment of NES to be made and then sustained.
INPRO has developed four criteria, CR3.1–CR3.4, for this user requirement.

Criterion CR3.1 — information

Indicator IN3.1: Information on nuclear power programme provided to public.
Acceptance limit AL3.1: Scope and level of information is sufficient according to the best international practice.
Belarus is guided by the Aarhus Convention for carrying out public information and awareness-raising activities. A comprehensive report was prepared on the preconstruction environmental assessment of the planned NPP.
A summary of the environmental impact assessment regarding the planned NPP installation was prepared by the State enterprise BELNIPIENERGOPROM together with the Directorate for NPP Construction of the Ministry of Energy. This information was published on the official websites of the Ministry of Nature, the Ministry of Energy and the Directorate for Nuclear Power Plant Construction (minpriroda.by/en; www.dsae.by).
The following activities with regard to public information have been performed by Belarus in accordance with international practice:

• Stage No.1: Notification to the public on taking the decision on NPP construction, including a preliminary assessment and terms of reference for implementation of a comprehensive environmental impact assessment (EIA);
• Stage No.2: Performing research on environmental impact and preparation of preliminary version of EIA.
• Receipt of comments and notes from the public is in progress.
• Public consultations took place in Ostrovetskiy district on 9 November 2009.
• In compliance with the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe’s Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo, February 25 1991), which Belarus ratified on 10 November 2005, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection submitted brief information on the EIA for planned construction and NPP operation in Belarus to concerned countries — Austria, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland and Ukraine. In the framework of this process, a discussion of the preliminary report on environmental impact assessment took place in Vilnius, Riga and Kiev on 2, 23 and 31 March 2010 respectively.
• Official consultations and public consultations on the report on the EIA of the Belarusian NPP took place with Austria in Vienna on 10–11 May 2010 and with Poland in Warsaw on 25 May 2010.
• To prepare the general contract on Belarusian NPP construction between Belarus and Russia, the British company AMEC was chosen as an international consultant. The Director of the Directorate for the NPP construction reported on this activity to journalists on 10 March 2010.

Considering the activities presented above, it can be concluded that Belarus has taken significant effort to inform the public at home and abroad about the planned nuclear power programme.
INPRO has developed five evaluation parameters, EP3.1.1 to EP3.1.5, for criterion CR3.1.

EP3.1.1 — national energy policy

Acceptability of EP3.1.1: adequate national energy policy is available to the public.
Activities related to the possibility and feasibility of NPP installation in Belarus were begun in accordance with Directive. Item 1.3.1 of this Directive — Assignments of Head of the State on (draft) development of concept to achieve increased security and independence of energy supply in Belarus — considers:

• Intensification of activities related to NPP construction, thermal power stations based on coal, hydropower stations of small and medium capacity, mini thermal power stations and also production of biofuel, wind energy installations, complexes of biogas, and installations which supply energy using municipal waste.
• A concept of security of energy supply in Belarus approved by the Decree, which justifies nuclear power development to increase both national energy security and fuel diversity.
• A Decree on measures related to NPP construction, which considers:
  

(a)the establishment of a regulatory and oversight body for radiation safety — Department for Nuclear and Radiation Safety of the Ministry for Emergency Situations, which is responsible for organization and implementation of public administration for nuclear and radiation safety.
(b)the State Nuclear Plant Construction Directorate, established in accordance with the Decree of the President of the Republic to implement customer functions of NPP construction. The Directorate is subordinated to the Ministry of Energy.
(c)the State scientific research and design enterprise BELNIIENERGOPROM, which reports to the Ministry of Energy as the general designer for coordination for construction document development related to NPP construction in Belarus.
(d)the State Joint Institute for Power and Nuclear Research, SOSNY, NAS of Belarus, as the organization carrying out scientific support of NPP construction.
In November 2007, the Council of Ministers made a decision on financing of the preliminary activities regarding NPP installation. The decision to start an implementation of the nuclear programme was taken on 15 January 2008 at the meeting of the Security Council of Belarus.
The Decree of the President on the establishment of the Department of Nuclear Power in the Ministry of Energy and the Law on the Use of Atomic Energy were issued in July 2008.
A plan for activities of authorities on implementation of the law considering amendment of existing acts and development of new ones to adjust them in accordance with the adopted law was developed and approved by the First Deputy of Prime Minister on 22 September 2008.
A Belarusian delegation headed by the Deputy Minister of Health (Chief State Sanitary Officer of the Republic) took part in a meeting and negotiations with the Federal Agency for Protection of Consumers and Human Welfare of the Russian Federation (Rospotrebnadzor) in particular with the Head of the Federal Agency (Chief State Sanitary Officer of Russia). During the negotiations, an agreement was reached on practical assistance in establishing a system of State sanitary (health) inspections taking into account NPP construction, on information exchange and on new legislative and methodological documents of the Russian Federation and Belarus related to issues of sanitary (health) and epidemic welfare.
Technical codes of the established practice defining the requirements for site selection of NPP construction and basic provisions on NPP safety assurance were implemented. Thus, necessary conditions to carry out preliminary work to be done prior to NPP construction, were established in Belarus.
Preparation of NPP construction in Belarus is held in close cooperation with the IAEA, with which technical cooperation is successfully developing.
The strategy of energy supply in Belarus considers an improvement of the fuel and energy balance plan, taking into account the necessity of replacement of the currently used monopolistic fuel type — natural gas. Decrease of its portion in the fuel and energy balance plan is considered through the increased use of coal, nuclear power and other domestic energy resources. (25 April 2009 Interview of Minister of Energy for Journal FERST).
Thus, a national energy policy exists in Belarus and was communicated to the public, i.e. EP3.1.1 has been met.

EP3.1.2 — informing the public about benefits of nuclear energy

Acceptability of EP3.1.2: Results of public surveys show that the benefits of nuclear energy have been understood by the public.
Ministry of Energy coordinates and organizes information activities on NPP installation.
In Belarus much attention is paid to the public attitude towards nuclear power development. Outreach activities are aimed at fostering a positive public attitude towards nuclear power. A plan for the organization of informational and promotional activities was approved. In accordance with this plan, the opinion of population related to nuclear power development in the country is being studied on a regular basis.
Activities regarding public outreach and awareness-raising are carried out by the Department on Nuclear Power and Directorate for NPP construction in the Ministry of Energy, in the framework of Measure 9 Implementation of informational and analytical support of nuclear power development in Belarus of the State Programme on the nuclear power development scientific support.
An information centre was established for outreach and awareness-raising work with different population groups: students, workers, public organizations, mass-media and authorities on the topic of nuclear power and NPP construction. The main goal of this information centre is to inform the public about nuclear power and its facilities, about the nature of nuclear power, and principles of NPP operation. Group visits to the information centre are arranged by appointment. (Business hours – 08:30 17:00 Lunch break 13:00 – 13:30; Days off: Saturday, Sunday; address: Grodnensky district, Ostrovets, 3, Oktybrskaya str.; Phone: (01591) 23708)
A centre for nuclear power development, RATEN, has been established in the the Press House of the Ministry of Information. Public relations activities are carried out (briefings, roundtables, seminars) on different aspects of NPP construction: Bulletins on nuclear power are issued regularly; world news about nuclear power is reviewed; booklets for children are provided and a special activity for children is carried out.
Since 2005, the Institute of Social Science (BISS) of the NAS has been carrying out sociological monitoring regarding attitudes in Belarus regarding possible types of power development, including nuclear power. Research has confirmed that there is a clear trend in public opinion showing an increase of support for nuclear power development.
In 2005, on the question ‘Should Belarus have and develop nuclear energy?’, the following answers were received from the public: yes — 25.8%, no — 46.7%, have not thought about it — 25%. It is obvious that nuclear power is still associated with the threats and risks caused by the Chernobyl disaster.
A similar national survey conducted in December 2007–January 2008 demonstrated that the ‘Chernobyl syndrome’ has been gradually overcome. So at this time, 54.8% of respondents answered positively to the question ‘Should Belarus have and develop nuclear energy?’, and only 23% responded negatively.
The indirect support of nuclear power in Belarus is illustrated by answers to a number of other questions. For example, 41.6% of respondents believe that the Republic cannot ensure its energy security without nuclear power, and 58.6% consider the option of using nuclear fuel for energy development in Belarus as very promising. 48.2% agree that nuclear plant construction will increase the competitiveness of domestic products (because nuclear power is cheaper). 64.3% of respondents believe that constructing a nuclear power station will improve the situation in the energy sector of the country, a little or substantially.
The question: ‘Subject to which of these conditions you would have supported the idea of building an NPP in the country?’ was answered by 48%: ‘The most modern and safest reactors should be used’. This point of view is fully consistent with Government policy on nuclear energy development.
During 2009–2010, the Institute of Sociology of NAS of Belarus conducted regular surveys of public opinion on NPP construction in Belarus. 2000 respondents of different ages, social groups in different regions of Belarus were interviewed. The results were released in September 2010. Preliminary results show a positive trend.
In addition, questions on the construction of NPPs were raised in the BISS study jointly with the Novak laboratory: ‘The social consequences of the global financial crisis,’ conducted in spring 2010. The study was conducted with a representative sample of 1571 people in all regions of Belarus. Starting with the question “How respondents relate to the plans for the construction of NPP”, the Belarusian society is divided almost in half. Strong opponents of NPP construction are somewhat more numerous than strong supporters but, overall, supporters prevail over opponents with a difference of less than 3% (see Table 14).

Table 14. Spring 2010 survey results: how do you feel about the fact that in the nearest Belarus plans to build an NPP.

Answers	%
Completely positive	14.2
Rather positive	26.5
Rather negative	21.5
Completely negative	16.4
Know nothing about it	7.5
Difficult to answer	13.9

The supporters and opponents of nuclear power have a specific gender profile. Men are almost twice as likely than women to accept the idea of building an NPP with full enthusiasm and, taking into account those with a rather positive attitude towards nuclear power, the ratio is 50% male to 33% female.

The distribution of supporters and opponents of NPP construction, taking into account their residence, refutes the claim that the number of supporters increased due to mass media brainwashing of the population and supports the assumption that the Government has found rational arguments for its position. In particular, dominance of supporters over opponents is very impressive among the citizens of Minsk (53% to 37%), while at the rural population is dominated by opponents (34% to 37%). Belarus experts deem that the information gap in relation to nuclear power is most evident among the residents of small towns.
Nuclear power is mostly supported by executives, managers, workers, private entrepreneurs, law enforcement officials and the unemployed. Least likely to support nuclear power are retirees, students, civil servants and budget/finance workers.
The State-run media have been conducting an active educational campaign in the press and electronic media in order to convince the citizens of Belarus that there are no problems in connection with new technologies or security standards, and that there is a high level of international cooperation in the installation of nuclear power.
The supporters of a nuclear power are middle class people, and mostly from socially active groups. Some of the groups (workers, entrepreneurs) are convinced in the economic benefits of nuclear power. Intimidation of these groups by the risk of nuclear accident apparently expired.
As for the opponents of nuclear power, they are mainly part of a primarily socially passive or State-controlled group, and a mobilization of these groups is very unlikely to happen.
On the basis of the information presented above, it is concluded that a great effort is being undertaken by Belarus to inform the public about the benefits of nuclear power. Public opinion is surveyed regularly to confirm that the public has understood the benefits of nuclear power.
Thus, EP3.1.2 has been met.

EP3.1.3 — information on operation of nuclear facilities

Acceptability of EP3.1.3: a policy (by the owner/operator of nuclear facilities) on public communication is in place and its effectiveness has been demonstrated by surveys.
As there is no facility of the planned NES of Belarus currently in operation yet, this evaluation parameter cannot be assessed.
Finding: A policy on keeping the public informed on the operation of nuclear facilities should be developed before the startup of the NPP.

EP3.1.4 — addressing public concerns regarding nuclear installations

Acceptability of EP3.1.4: a communication programme exists that addresses issues of risk of nuclear power.
The following official statement by the government confirms that the issues of risk are fully taken into account in the Belarus nuclear power programme: “I guarantee that we will choose such the option of building NPPs where the risks are minimized and environmental protection is fully ensured,” said the President of Belarus in his annual address to the Belarusian people and the parliament on 29 April 2008.
The public information programme described in section 3.4.1.2 includes addressing concerns raised by the public regarding nuclear power.
Thus, EP3.1.4 has been met.

EP3.1.5 — use of communication experts for public information

Acceptability of EP3.1.5: communication experts are used in formulating and executing communication plans.
This evaluation parameter was not assessed directly in this study. However, it can be assumed that the Ministry of Energy — which is responsible for public information on nuclear power — is using communication experts.
Thus, EP3.1.5 has been met.
Final assessment of criterion CR3.1 — public information
All evaluation parameters of CR3.1 have been met completely with the exception of EP3.1.4, which recommends that a policy of the owner/operator of nuclear facilities be developed before the startup of the NPP.
Thus, criterion CR3.1 has been met, assuming the communication policy of the owner/operator will be available before the NPP starts up.

Criterion CR3.2 — participation of public

Indicator IN3.2: Participation of the public in the decision making process (to foster public acceptance).
Acceptance limit AL3.2: Public participation in decision process is sufficient according to national requirements.
For criterion CR3.2, INPRO has developed two evaluation parameters, EP3.2.1 and EP3.2.2.

EP3.2.1 — appropriateness

Acceptability of EP3.2.1: The participation process is deemed appropriate if four issues are covered: public access to information resources, identification of tasks in which the public is involved, structuring of decision-making process, and cost effectiveness of public participation.
This evaluation parameter was not assessed in the study.

EP3.2.2 — acceptability of participation

Acceptability of EP3.2.2: The participation process is deemed appropriate if the following four issues are dealt with: sample representative, independence of the participation process, early involvement, and influence of results on policy.
The evaluation parameter was not assessed in this study.
Final assessment of criterion CR3.2 — participation of public
Criterion CR3.2 was not assessed in this study.
====Criterion CR3.3 — public acceptance Indicator==== IN3.3: public acceptance of nuclear energy
Acceptance limit AL3.3: public acceptance is sufficient to ensure there is negligible political risk to policy support for nuclear power.
For criterion CR3.3, INPRO has developed three evaluation parameters, namely EP3.3.1 to EP3.3.3.

EP3.3.1 — regular surveys

Acceptability of EP3.3.1: public polling is performed on a regular basis, commensurate with the circumstances.
According to the results of reports submitted to the assessor it follows, that the survey of public opinion is carried out on an ongoing basis.

Table 15. Distribution of response to the question: ‘what is your attitude to the NPP building near the town you are living in?’ by region (in % of respondents)

Response	Total
	2005	2006	2008
1. Comfortable	8.6	7.3	12.2
2. Agree if it guarantees security of property and a State system of insurance for the people living near the NPP	34.3	35.4	41.1
3. Take part in the various protests against this construction	32.7	32.2	16.0
4. Try to leave this territory	17.0	18.9	23.9
5. Other	7.3	7.0	5.7

A survey of public opinion is also discussed in section 3.4.1.2 (EP3.1.2, information of public on benefits of nuclear power).
Thus, EP3.3.1 has been met.

EP3.3.2 — survey adequacy

Acceptability of EP3.3.2: surveys are adequate if they are performed by certified professionals with use of licensed instrument.
The surveys on public acceptance of nuclear power in Belarus are carried out by the Agency for Political Analysis (BISS) together with the survey laboratory NovAK. Results of these surveys are documented in reports called the social consequences of the global financial crisis, based on a survey conducted in spring 2010, and Nuclear power plants — and what do people think? in News of the Day, by BISS.
Thus, the surveys are performed by professionals, i.e. EP3.3.2 has been met.

EP3.3.3 — survey result acceptability

Acceptability of EP3.3.3: survey results are acceptable if they indicate that a majority of the public supports the nuclear power programme with a stable positive trend.
From Tables 14 and 15 it is clear that, at the moment, more than 50% (part 1 and part 2) agree with the installation of nuclear power and a positive trend is observed.
Thus, EP3.3.3 has been met.
Final assessment of criterion CR3.3 — public acceptance
CR3.3 has been met completely as have all assessed evaluation parameters.

Criterion CR3.4 — political environment

Indicator IN3.4: government policy
Acceptance limit AL3.4: policy is supportive of nuclear energy
In recent years, clear Government support of NPP construction in Belarus can be seen. For example, it is stated in the resolution that in order to develop nuclear power in Belarus, the Security Council of Belarus acts:
“to carry out the construction of an NPP in Belarus with a total electrical capacity of 2000 MW, with the commissioning of the first energy unit in 2016 and the second in 2018”.
Other examples of Government support are discussed in sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 above.
Thus, criterion CR3.4 has been met.

Final assessment of user requirement UR3 — political support and public acceptance

The evaluation above shows that development of nuclear power in Belarus has strong support from the Government.
Public acceptance was low at the initial stage of the programme but this was due to the lack of information about modern NPPs and the influence of the ‘Chernobyl syndrome’. Recently, public acceptance has been growing.
It is recommended that in time, a policy of public information on the operation of the NPP by the future owner/operator be developed.
Thus, user requirement UR3 has been met, assuming that a policy for public information of NPP operation will be available in time.

USER REQUIREMENT UR4 — HUMAN RESOURCES

User requirement UR4: The necessary human resources should be available to enable all responsible parties involved in a nuclear power programme to achieve safe, secure and economical operation of the NES installations during their lifetime. The owners/operators should have enough knowledge of the NES to be intelligent customers and should keep a stable worker of competent and trained staff.
INPRO has developed two criteria for this user requirement, CR4.1 and CR4.2. ====Criterion CR4.1 — availability of human resources==== Indicator IN4.1: availability of human resources
Acceptance limit AL4.1: human resources are sufficient according to international experience.
For criterion CR4.1, INPRO has developed three evaluation parameters, namely EP4.1.1, EP4.1.2, and EP4.1.3.

EP4.1.1 — educational and training system in nuclear power projects

Acceptability of EP4.1.1: a (qualitative) adequate educational system exists (is planned).
In Belarus, the National Training Programme, and the Programme of Scientific Support were developed and adopted. In February 2008, a mission by the IAEA was conducted in Belarus on staff training for future NPPs. The decision to create a national training system for nuclear power was taken.
Specialists for NPPs are currently trained in the leading universities of the country: the Belarusian National Technical University provides staff training for construction in the energy sector; the Belarusian State University Physics Department teaches specialists for NPPs; and the Belarusian State University of Informatics and Radioelectronics prepares personnel to work in the management system and security of nuclear power stations. In the long term, national educational establishments will provide new special courses to educate nuclear power specialists.

In order to meet the needs of the State for highly qualified nuclear personnel, the government set up a special State Committee. This organization should arrange and coordinate the development of legal and financial support for all types of training of personnel needed in a nuclear power programme. In addition, its major task is to coordinate the training programme for nuclear power with the concerned governmental bodies, universities, scientific institutes of the NAS, and with international and foreign organizations engaged in training specialists in the sphere of nuclear power.
Thus, an adequate educational system exists and is planned to be enlarged in the future, i.e. EP4.1.1 has been met.

EP4.1.2 — attractiveness of nuclear power sector

Acceptability of EP4.1.2: there are (are planned) attractive workplaces, comparable to those in other high-tech countries.
In the available data taken for the calculation of economic parameters, wages at the nuclear power station were found to be comparable with the average wages in Belarus for workers of the same qualifications. Also, a sensitivity analysis on wages was performed. With an increase in absolute value of wages up to 400% to 7.7 million rubles (US $2500), production cost will increase by 23.1%, while the share of wages in the production cost structure will increase from 7.7% to 25%. However, a competitive advantage (electricity production cost) of NPPs is still maintained compared to non-nuclear power stations. In the publications/,ref name<name=r44>INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERCY AGENCY, Developing Industrial Infrastructures to Support a Programme of Nuclear Power: A Guidebook. IAEA Technical Reports Series No.281. IAEA, Vienna (1988). </ref>, it was announced that the wages of workers with the same skills in Western Europe are about US $6000 and in the Russian Federation wages are also at this level.
Thus, wages in Belarus for nuclear power related jobs are not competitive with similar jobs outside the country, i.e. EP4.1.2 has not been met.

EP4.1.3 — capacity to accept additional load of nuclear power programme

Acceptability of EP4.1.3: human resources needed for the nuclear programme are available without adverse impact on other industrial activities of comparable value to the country.
Taking into account the specificity of an NPP, the issue of recruitment and training of personnel for NPPs needs to be addressed from the first day onwards after the decision to build the power plant is taken:

• In 2008, students started to take courses relevant to nuclear power in the four metropolitan universities;
• There are ongoing activities to invite nuclear specialists with experience in operating NPPs;
• There is a screening programme of Belarusian energy specialists to retrain them for the most important positions at the NPP.
• The number of workers at NPPs depends on the project and is expected to be about 2000 people. During peak demand, it is expected that approximately 10 000 employees will be used to build the power plant and associated infrastructure.

As discussed above, activities in Belarus started early enough to recruit and retrain nuclear power specialists so that no adverse impact on other industrial activities is expected.
Thus, EP4.1.3 has been met.
Final assessment of criterion CR4.1
Criterion CR4.1 has been only partially met. An adequate educational system is in place, but the structure of wages for nuclear facilities seems to be too low.
It is recommended that the structure of wages at nuclear facilities be reconsidered to ensure that human resources are not lost to competitive establishments outside the country.

Criterion CR4.2 — safety and security culture

Indicator IN4.2: Attitude to safety and security in nuclear organizations.
Acceptance limit AL4.2: a safety and security culture prevails in all nuclear organizations confirmed by periodic safety and security reviews.
Following an initiative of the State Belaya Rus association, a roundtable meeting was held on 21 April 2010 on the prospects of nuclear energy in Belarus. Several parties participated in the discussion: representatives from the Ministry of Energy, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment; Belnipienergoprom employees, developers of the Belarusian nuclear power station project, the Ministry of Education, and representatives from the leading universities of the country and the Ostrovetsky district community.
Delegates from the general office (directorate) DSAE to this round table drew the meeting’s attention to the need to develop a safety culture in organizations dealing with nuclear power: “Formation of a safety culture means training of each person, involved in nuclear energy to achieve such a mindset, that s/he — in the performance of duties — , will be simply unable to do any, even the smallest, step to the detriment of safety. Development and implementation of the concept of a safety culture needs efforts from ‘top down’, i.e. a visible impact by leadership, as well as from ‘bottom up’, i.e. from the staff. For the successful implementation of a safety culture, it is necessary to ensure both effective cooperation and awareness at all levels, which primarily depend on an atmosphere of trust in an organization. Technical specialists, human factor specialists, operational personnel and management should work together to develop common understanding, despite the differences in their functions. This is a characteristic of a strong safety culture itself".
Necessary support to build up the culture of nuclear (and radiation) safety in all nuclear power related organizations is provided by the Government. It is expected that — once the organizations for operating the NPP are established — periodic reviews of the safety culture will be performed by competent institutions such as the IAEA.
According to the information available to the assessor, no review of the safety and security culture has taken place until now.
Thus, criterion CR4.2 has not yet been met.

Final assessment of user requirement UR4 — human resources

The evaluation above shows that in Belarus all activities to achieve and maintain the necessary human resources for a nuclear power project are being implemented.
Nevertheless, a problem may be the currently planned salary level at nuclear power installations, which is too low and should be set at the same level as in neighboring countries to keep trained skilled professionals of Belarus from going abroad. Also no information was available to the assessor whether security and safety culture has been reviewed.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS OF ASSESSMENT OF BELARUS’ INFRASTRUCTURE

The evaluation – using the INPRO methodology – presented above allows us to make the following conclusions on infrastructure readiness for the development of nuclear power in Belarus.
The evaluation of the legal and institutional infrastructure in Belarus revealed that it was well established. Some minor corrections of the text of the nuclear law are recommended, such as adding definitions of terms used in the law and defining more precisely the functions of the regulatory body. It is also recommended that full financial independence of the licensing authority be considered.
The evaluation of the existing industrial and economic infrastructure and its planned development in Belarus confirmed, in general the readiness of this part of the national infrastructure. The existing national industry is found ready to support the installation of NPPs and no substantial financial investment is expected for upgrading national industries. An independent government investigation is recommended in order to demonstrate the economic benefits of the planned nuclear power programme to society and define the size of the planned nuclear fuel cycle facilities.
The evaluation of public acceptance and political support confirmed that adequate measures of public information are taken by the Government, which strongly supports the development of nuclear power. In time, a policy of public information should be developed on the operation of the NPP.
The evaluation of human resources needed for development of nuclear power revealed that practically all necessary activities are being implemented in Belarus. Nevertheless, a problem may be the planned salary level at nuclear installations, which should be the same as in neighbouring countries to avoid trained skilled professionals being enticed to better paid jobs abroad.

WASTE MANAGEMENT

In this section, an assessment of the selected NES of Belarus in the area of waste management is performed.

INTRODUCTION

Generally, radioactive waste is defined as material that contains radionuclides with a defined concentration or activity exceeding acceptance levels established by regulatory bodies, and for which no further use is considered.
Radioactive waste is generated at all stages of a complete nuclear fuel cycle, i.e. during:

• Mining and milling, raw material separation;
• Uranium conversion;
• Uranium isotope enrichment;
• Fuel fabrication;
• Reactor operation;
• Fuel reprocessing;
• Spent fuel management;8
• Waste processing;
• Decommissioning.

However, Belarus expects to perform only a few nuclear activities (see also section 1.6, NES of Belarus to be assessed) with a generation of radioactive waste within the country, namely:

• Reactor operation;
• Storage of spent fuel;
• Treatment and storage of radioactive waste produced during operation of nuclear facilities;
• Decommissioning of nuclear facilities.

Overview on existing waste management facilities in Belarus

The currently existing storage facilities for radioactive waste in Belarus are briefly described below, from Ref. [45].
Existing radioactive waste storage facilities in Belarus
A radioactive waste storage facility called EKORES is located two km outside Minsk. It is a typical near surface RADON-type facility1, and was commissioned in 1963 to accept waste from a research reactor of the Academy of Science of Belarus. It currently provides the storage of a wide range of radioactive waste produced in medicine, industry and research in Belarus.
At present, this site contains:

• Two closed old repositories (in operation 1963–1979)
• Two new generation near-surface repositories intended for solid waste and sealed radioactive sources;
• Storage for sealed radioactive sources;

• Special (contaminated) laundry (100 kg per shift).

The two old repositories are rectangular reservoirs with 225 m³ volume each, with walls and floor constructed as a concrete monolith and with a covering of precast concrete slabs. Their design dimensions are 5×15 m, and their depth is 3 m. During the final conservation process, the upper surface was covered with hot bitumen and, after that, with layers of asphalt (0.03 m) and soil (1.2 m).
The two new generation repositories (constructed in 1977) have an above-ground floor with a precast metal frame (design dimensions are 12×30 m) and an underground floor (830 m³) consisting of eight vaults (depth is more than 3 m and design dimensions are 6×6 m) made of a concrete monolith. The facilities are equipped with a suspension cat-crane with a lift capacity of 3.2 tons, which can remove one or two floor slabs and the waste packages can then be loaded into the vaults. The capacities of the new generation repositories are designed for loading solid waste with a specific activity and total annual activity not exceeding 3.7 MBq/kg and 7.4 TBq respectively. Currently, 6–10 tons of solid low and medium level waste annually comes to this EKORES facility. It is loaded into the vaults in the producer’s package or container. Until recently, incoming waste has not been segregated. The content of the filled vaults represents a conglomerate of different material (e.g. plastic, glass, rag), contaminated with both short-lived and long-lived radionuclides. The planned length of operation for the new generation repositories is 20 years.
There are wells for disposal of sealed spent radiation sources equipped with an S-type pipe of 108 mm diameter for source loading. The depth of these wells is 6 m. The designed well capacity does not exceed 20kg-equivalent of radium of total activity in a single well without any time limitation for loading. The planned length of operation of the wells is also 20 years.
For managing spent sealed sources, those:

• Delivered in transport containers with the capability of bottom unloading are loaded into the wells through an S-type pipe;
• Delivered in containers not providing a capability for bottom unloading and some radiation devices with built-in protection (for example, gamma-radiography units) are stored in special vaults under a concrete slab together with their shielding;
• Containing radioactive isotopes such as plutonium or americium are collected in a separate container, which is stored in a special concrete vault.

In 2003 at the EKORES site, the RADON company carried out activities for conditioning spent sealed radioactive sources to be stored in a metallic matrix inside a well type repository. In the course of reconstruction work at the EKORES site, a new storage for sealed radioactive sources was constructed and commissioned in 2003.
There are seven wells for spent gamma sources and four wells for alpha and beta sources. They are considered an intermediate (long-term) storage facility with a technical capability to take out the sealed sources if it necessary to store them in another place. For this, the upper part of a well is movable and weighs less than 2 tons.
Existing disposal facilities for decontamination waste of Chernobyl origin (DFDW)2
Depending on the specific activity or surface contamination of decontamination waste and formation history, solid decontamination waste is disposed in a special disposal facility named DFDW.

There are three different types of engineering structures used in DFDW facilities:
DFDW-I is a special engineering structure intended for disposal of decontamination waste with a specific activity more than 10⁵ Bq/kg caused by the nuclide ¹³⁷Cs. Isolation is ensured by use of special engineering barriers, hydrotechnical measures and a permanent system of radiation control. Currently, there is only one disposal facility of such a kind: KHATKI. It is located in the South of the Chernobyl zone several kilometers away from the border to Ukraine. It consists of nine trenches, equipped with concrete cells (3×3×3 m), where 3088 tons of radioactive material with a total activity of 74.5ˑ10¹⁰Bq (201488 Ci) were deposited in 1991.
DFDW-II is a near-surface engineering structure with a clay floor intended for disposal of decontamination waste with a specific ¹³⁷Cs activity from 103 Bq/kg to 10⁵ Bq/kg. There are eight DFDW-II facilities in Belarus: four in the Mogilev Region, three in the Gomel Region, and one in the Brest Region.
DFDW-III facilities are formed as temporary units during mass decontamination of inhabited areas carried out by civil defence forces in the Gomel Region (1986–1989). The total number of DFDW-IIIs is 82. Almost all of them were created under (extreme) emergency conditions and, in general, equipped spontaneously without much design consideration in former pits, ravines, lowlands, and sometimes in specially dug trenches or on flat sites. Only three of them have floor protection in the form of a clay layer or plastic foil, and 11 of them have test bore holes for control of contamination of ground water.
Collection, transportation and disposal of waste originating from decontamination of land after the Chernobyl accident and also construction, maintenance and radiation control of DFDW is executed in the three Belarus regions (mentioned already above) by the waste management organization:

• POLESIE in the Gomel Region;
• RADON in the Mogilev Region;
• BRESOBLSELSTROI in the Brest region.

Safety of existing waste management facilities in Belarus

The text of this section is based on the information from the national reports on the joint convention on the safety of spent fuel management and on the safety of radioactive waste management (Convention) Ref. [33, 45].
General safety considerations of radioactive waste management
General Safety requirements: According to Article 12 of the Law the operating organization must:

• Arrange and realize activities for ensuring radiation safety;
• Carry out systematic control of radiation at workplaces, rooms, sites, sanitary protection and surveillance zones, and radioactive discharge;
• Account for and control individual exposure doses of personnel;
• Conduct training and examination of managers and other workers;
• Organize medical examinations;
• Inform personnel about individual dose and dose rates at workplaces;
• Inform State authorities about emergences and breakdowns;
• Carry out of orders and decisions of State authorized authorities;
• Ensure human rights in radiation safety.

OSP-2002 states the necessity while managing radioactive material to ensure:

• The minimized irradiation of personnel;
• Highest automation and mechanization of operations;
• The lowest discharge of radioactive material into the environment;
• Safe operation of processing equipment.

These and other requirements followed from the Contracting Parties commitments according to Section 3 of the Convention are defined by the new national Sanitary Regulations of Radioactive Waste Management which came into force in 2005.
The obligations according to the Convention which are not reflected in prior legislation are assigned in the Law.
Safety of existing facilities
The major task is to ensure radiation safety of the existing facilities and radioactive waste storage facilities, originated from practices in the past.
A reconstruction project aimed at the improvement of safety of the EKORES facility was approved. Construction work has already been carried out. Commissioning is planned for 2013.Completion of reconstruction of the radioactive waste repository of EKORES and its radiation and environmental safety is one of the priority directions of the planned activity in the area of radioactive waste. In the reconstruction project, according to the legislation and regulations the principles of radioactive waste management realized are:

• Preliminary sorting of radioactive waste according to SPORO-2005;
• Separate management of different waste classes;
• Conditioning of radioactive waste, including a passport3 system;
• Separate storage of different waste classes;
• Architectural-building solution making to simplify decommissioning of installations.

It is planned that the methods indicated will be applied both for newly arriving waste and waste disposed in the closed old repositories. While implementing the third reconstruction phase, waste from old disposal facilities will be, where possible, retrieved, identified, processed and put into conditioned forms suitable for long-term storage and transportation.
Disposal facilities for decontamination waste of Chernobyl origin4
In order to prevent unauthorized access and to ensure safety and security of waste, the fence and radiation hazard signs were installed around the perimeter of the disposal facility. Around the disposal facilities, a 500 m-radius sanitary protection zone was established where all activities that are not related to facility operation are restricted.
After DFDW-II and DFDW-III have been filled, the facilities will be covered with clay and loose earth a meter thick. The service organizations carry out annual activities to prevent the consequences of spring flooding. In DFDWs equipped with wells, the ground water level is monitored. Water samples are taken to monitor radionuclide migration to ground water.
Radiation monitoring and surveillance of all operating and closed DFDWs are conducted according to a programme of radiation monitoring and surveillance. This programme defines objects, parameters & frequency of control, control points, equipment and responsible persons.
For DFDW-I and DFDW-II, the parameters of radiation control established are:

• Dose rate at control points;
• Specific activity of ¹³⁷Cs, ⁹⁰Sr in water samples from control wells at least twice a year;
• Ground water level in control wells.

At operating DFDWs, the control of dose rate is conducted:

• Every day, during activities in places with most probable decontamination waste carryover (roads, places of waste unloading);
• At five permanent control points outside the disposal area and within a fenced area, in accordance with the monitoring scheme, not less than once a month in the period of disposal work.

At DFDW-III, the dose rate is measured at the control points. The number of control points for DFDW-III supervision depending on square is given in table 16.

Table 16. Number of control points for DFDW-III supervision depending on square

DFDW-III,hectares	Number of control points
up to 0.01	1
0.01–0.10	4
0.11–0.50	8
0.51–1.00	15
1.01–2.00	25
2.01 and more	30

DFDW supervision includes control of technical state which is conducted at the same time as radiation control, and also after floods, heavy rain, and hurricane winds. The visual inspection of technical equipment is conducted to examine a fence, upper protective layer, radiation hazard signs and roads.
Assessment of safety of existing facilities
In accordance with Article 11 of the Law on Radiation Safety of the Public, safety assessment of the existing facilities is currently ongoing, using the parameters:

• Characteristic of radioactive contamination of the environment;
• Analysis of measures on radiation safety and compliance of norms, rules and sanitary guidelines;
• Probability of radiation emergencies and their estimated scale;
• Level of preparedness for efficient elimination of emergencies and their consequences;
• Analysis of radiation dose which certain groups of population were exposed to from all sources of ionizing radiation;
• Number of people exposed to beyond the defined level of dose.

Assessment results are annually registered in the radiation-sanitary certificate of the facility, which is the main document confirming its safety for personnel, population and the environment. On the basis of the radiation-sanitary certificate, regulatory bodies take the decision to issue, prolong, suspend operation or withdraw the license (permission) to carry out relevant operations while managing radioactive waste.

Planned activities to improve safety in existing facilities
As is obvious from the above sections, the implementation by Belarus of its commitments under the Convention has been carried out so far in conjunction with the development of a general legal and regulatory base for providing radiation safety. In the legislation important elements stipulated by the Convention have been established, such as:

• The licensing system;
• Prohibition to operate a facility without a license;
• A system of institutional and regulatory control;
• Documentation and accountability;
• A system of ensuring the execution of the regulatory provisions;
• Ensuring the preparation of emergency action plans.

Resolution of the Ministry for Emergency Situations [46] elaborates the points relevant to radiation safety and associated with articles 13-17, 23 and 26 of the Convention.
These measures are set forth in the Law [1] and also in changes and additions to the Law [17] and in developing the corresponding regulations.
The fulfillment of the obligations of Belarus under the Convention has been coordinated with the development of legislation, regulation and infrastructure for radiation safety. The following steps were implemented and are planned to be improved further:

• Licensing system;
• System of prevention of an unauthorized facility operation;
• System of regulatory supervision;
• System of documentation and reporting;
• System of maintenance of performance of existing regulating provisions and license conditions;
• Support of development of emergency plans, etc.

The priority directions of the planned activity in the area of radioactive waste management include:

• Further development of regulations in compliance with the requirements of the national law and international agreements and recommendations;
• Completion of reconstruction of the radioactive waste repository of EKORES and its radiation and environmental safety;
• Ensuring long-term safety of repositories of radioactive sources in the places of former location of the Soviet Union military troops.

At present activities to be realized for the design of a national radioactive waste storage facility include:

• Carrying out investigation for layout and arrangement;
• Feasibility study for construction of new storage;
• Siting new storage.

Part of this work is the redevelopment of the strategy of radioactive waste management taking into account the construction of a national radioactive waste storage facility for operational waste and also waste from industrial, scientific and medical institutions.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the system of ensuring radioactive waste safety and safety management of the spent fuel in Belarus is being improved. Substantial efforts will be required, financial and other support from the Government and regulatory bodies of Belarus to ensure its development in compliance with the Convention’s provisions. International cooperation would favor this activity, and shared goals — to maintain a high level of radioactive waste management and spent fuel safety in the whole world — will be best reached efficiently with such cooperation.
In accordance with the principles for safe disposal of radioactive waste, predicted radiation exposure of future generations caused by radioactive waste disposal is not allowed to be higher than the acceptable radiation exposure of the current population established by the effective national law and regulations. Future generations must be protected against the harmful impact by radioactive waste to no lesser extent than the current generation.
The INPRO methodology for waste management as described in Volume 4 of Ref. [47] will be used to assess the planned Belarus NES (see section 1.6).
Evaluations of waste generation and treatment processes are based on information of the AES-2006 reactor design from the Saint-Petersburg Research and Design Institute ATOMENERGOPROEKT (JSC SPAEP). As defined in section 1.6 of this report, two AES- 2006 reactors are considered to be installed as the first NPP in Belarus. Spent fuel storage facility and operational waste disposal facilities have been considered within this study since they potentially would be included into the nuclear energy system of Belarus.

FIRST BASIC PRINCIPLE BP1 — WASTE MINIMIZATION

The first INPRO basic principle BP1 of Waste Management reads: Generation of radioactive waste in an innovative NES shall be kept to the minimum practicable.
INPRO has developed one user requirement UR1.1 that simply repeats the goal of the corresponding BP1 in a more detailed fashion.

User requirement UR1.1 — reduction of waste at source

User requirement UR1.1: The innovative NES should be designed to minimize the generation of waste at all stages, with emphasis on waste containing long-lived toxic components that would be mobile in a repository environment.
This user requirement states that the designer of nuclear facilities should minimize the generation of waste with long-lived toxic substances that would be mobile in a final depository, i.e. in the end state of this waste. Mobile toxic components are the main contributors to detrimental health effects on humans (e.g. dose) or the environment.
INPRO has developed two criteria, CR1.1 and CR1.2, to check whether this user requirement has been met.

Criterion CR1.1 — waste characteristics

Indicator IN1.1.1: Technical indicators: alpha-emitters and other long-lived radionuclides per GWˑa; total activity per GWˑa; mass per GWˑa; volume per GWˑa; chemically toxic elements that would become part of the radioactive waste per GWˑa.
Acceptance limit AL1.1.1: Technical indicators should be as low as reasonable practical, social and economic factors taken into account (ALARP).
In the following, some background information on waste management of the AES-2006 reactor design is provided.
Two main types of waste are distinguished, namely:

• Spent (used) fuel;
• Operational waste.

Background information on spent fuel
According to the traditional approach inherited from the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation and Belarus assign spent fuel to a separate group of waste characterized by a high level of radioactivity, considerable heat generation and the long life-time of a whole range of its radionuclides.
Article 9 of the Intergovernmental agreement between Belarus and the Russian Federation on Cooperation in Construction of an NPP on the territory of Belarus signed on 15 March 2011 provides for supplies of fresh nuclear fuel by the Russian contractor throughout the whole NPP life cycle and spent fuel takeback. As the modalities for the return of spent fuel would be defined by a separate commercial contract, it is assumed that the parties would agree on whether high-level waste obtained after reprocessing spent nuclear fuel would be either returned to Belarus for the final disposal, or disposed of in the Russian Federation.
An important characteristic of radioactive waste is its radiotoxicity. Radiotoxicity of i-th nuclide in air or water is defined as the ratio of the specific activity Ai of the i-th nuclide to the allowable level of the specific activity of the i-th nuclide DAi in air or water, as described in the regulation of Belarus: RTi = Ai / DAi..
Table 17 shows the dynamics (decrease) of radiotoxicity of fission products and actinides in air and water during extended storage of one ton of spent nuclear fuel of VVER-1000 reactors.

Table 17. Dynamics of radiotoxicity of fission products and actinides in 1 ton of spent nuclear fuel of a VVER-1000 reactor with 4.4% enrichment of ²³⁵U

storage time, years	Radiotoxicity
	In air, m3(air)/t(FP or A)		In water, kg(H2O)/t(FP or A)
	fission products (FP)	actinides (A)	fission products (FP)	actinides(A)
1	1.17ˑ1016	1.24ˑ1017	3.35ˑ1015	5.3ˑ1014
3	3.72ˑ1015	1.17ˑ1017	1.79ˑ1015	5.1ˑ1014
10	1.35ˑ1015	1.14ˑ1017	9.85ˑ1014	5.0ˑ1014
30	7.61ˑ1015	1.07ˑ1017	5.86ˑ1014	4.7ˑ1014
100	1.37ˑ1014	8.73ˑ1016	1.10ˑ1014	3.7ˑ1014
300	1.13ˑ1012	5.92ˑ1016	9.64ˑ1011	2.5ˑ1014
1000	3.0ˑ1010	2.66ˑ1016	4.77ˑ109	1.2ˑ1014
3000	2.98ˑ1010	1.14ˑ1016	4.75ˑ109	5.0ˑ1013
10000	2.93ˑ1010	6.75ˑ1015	4.69ˑ109	3.0ˑ1013
30000	2.79ˑ1010	2.53ˑ1015	4.51ˑ109	1.0ˑ1013
100000	2.36ˑ1010	3.19ˑ1014	3.98ˑ109	1.4ˑ1012
300000	1.53ˑ1010	2.0ˑ1013	2.96ˑ109	8.74ˑ1010

It follows from Table 17 that the radiotoxicity of actinides in air exceeds by a factor of 10 to 80 the radiotoxicity of fission products at the beginning of storage and 1000-10 000 times after 100 years and more. During storage of less than 30 years, the radiotoxicity of fission products in water exceeds that of actinides but during further storage, the contribution of fission products quickly decreases and radiotoxicity of actinides becomes dominant as it decreases much more slowly.

The data demonstrated in Table 17 are related to the VVER-1000 design. However, this information gives a preliminary estimation of radiotoxicity of spent fuel to be produced in the Belarusian NPP with AES-2006 reactor. Later on these data may be adjusted upon a receipt of information relevant to the AES-2006 design.
Additionally, as a part of spent fuel management, radioactive waste management during transportation of spent fuel is necessary to be considered, first of all from the viewpoint of safety and the protection of human health and the environment and also from the viewpoint of necessary radiological control, decontamination of installations and vehicles, occurrence of emergency situations during transportation and the possible contingent generation of radioactive waste.
Transportation of spent fuel can also affect the environment. However, when all existing norms and regulations are observed, the expected impact will be negligible. The environment could be threatened during transportation only in accident or incident situations.
Background information on operational waste
Radioactive waste generated during reactor operation and storage of spent fuel in racks in the fuel pool and (secondary) radioactive waste produced during waste management constitute the second main waste stream called operational radioactive waste.
Operational radioactive waste is characterized by a wide variety of radioactive isotopes, such as:

• Global radionuclides consisting of fission products and nuclides generated by activation of some impurities in the coolant: ³H, ¹⁴C,⁸⁵Kr, and ¹²⁹I.
• Fission products (including those produced by ternary fission) of nuclear fuel, penetrating into primary coolant through defects in fuel cladding produced during manufacturing or developed during operation.
• Steel corrosion and corrosion of other material of primary circuit (e.g. iron, nickel, manganese, cobalt, zirconium, niobium)
• Iodine and oxygen short-lived isotopes and also a range of long-lived radionuclides, including isotopes of chlorine, carbon and tritium, generated during activation of coolant elements and attached foreign material.

⁷⁹Se (half-life (HL) is 65 000 years), ⁹³Zr (HL 1.53ˑ10⁶ years), ⁹⁹Tc (HL 2.12ˑ10⁵ years), 10⁷Pd (HL 6.5ˑ10⁶ years), ¹²⁶Sn (HL 1.0ˑ10⁵ years), ¹²⁹I (HL 1.57ˑ10⁷ years), ¹³⁵Cs (HL 2.3ˑ10⁶ years) and ¹⁵¹Sm (HL 87 years) are examples of ‘splinter’ radionuclides in operational radioactive waste, needing special management and disposal technology.
Long-lived fission products such as ⁶³Ni (HL is 91.6 years), ⁵⁹Ni (HL 7.5ˑ10⁴ years), ⁹⁴Nb (HL 2.03ˑ10⁴ years), ¹⁴C (HL 5730 years), but also ¹³⁷Cs (HL 30 years), ⁹⁰Sr (HL 29.12 years) are major isotopes to be considered during shallow land burial of operational radioactive waste. 93Zr is an isotope of both ‘splinter’ and corroding-activation origin. ⁶⁰Co, ⁵¹Cr, ⁵⁴Mn, ⁵⁹Fe are also important during processing operational radioactive waste.
Most radioactive gaseous fission products are short lived and decay almost completely during their migration process or are caught in special adsorption systems. Exceptions are: ¹³³Xe, decaying only partly, and ⁸⁵Kr, quite long-lived.
During NPP operation some global radionuclides can accumulate in coolant purification systems and in ventilation ducts and then enter into the biosphere. The documentation of Russian NPP projects with VVERs — studied by the authors of this report — did not include information regarding distribution of global radionuclides between different waste streams.

Due to peculiarities of design and operation of VVER reactors, a large amount of liquid radioactive waste — about 30 000 to 40 000 m³/GWa — is generated, most of which can cause problems during processing and disposal due to its complicated chemical and isotopic composition. This liquid radioactive waste contains long-lived radionuclides that require separation from the environment for a long time; therefore, one of the most important goals of waste processing and conditioning is their maximum reduction before further disposal.
Liquid radioactive waste generated at an NPP differs significantly in its radiochemical composition and, therefore, its processing technology needs to be different too. Besides radionuclides, this radioactive waste can contain different organic compounds, sodium salts, sulphates, or fluorides.
Depending on salinity, liquid radioactive waste is divided into three groups, namely:

• Demineralized (water of NPP loops, pools, condensate and others);
• Diluted saline (water after cleaning, loop leakage);
• Considerably saliferous (laboratory, regeneration, deactivation water).

Regular operation of special water purification systems can lead to a generation of ion- exchange material that cannot be processed; this material is classified as wet radioactive waste. This group also includes used selective adsorbents of radionuclides.
Solid radioactive waste is usually generated during maintenance and scheduled prevention activities. A detailed assortment of this type of radioactive waste is shown from experience in an existing type of NPP.
Specific activity of long-lived radionuclides in operational waste taken out from a pool after up to 300 years cooling is given in Table 18.

Table 18. Specific activity of long-lived radionuclides on operational waste

rowspan="2"	Radionuclide	rowspan="2"	Decay rate, 1/s	colspan="3"	Activity, Bq/kg
5 years cooling	100 year cooling	300 year cooling
79Se	3.38ˑ10-13	0.371	0.370	0.370
90Sr	7.55ˑ10-10	2.52ˑ106	2.63ˑ105	2.25ˑ103
93Zr	1.44ˑ10-14	74.3	74.3	74.3
99Tc	1.03ˑ10-13	57	57	57
125Sb	7.93ˑ10-9	1.094ˑ103	0	0
135Cs	9.56ˑ10-15	1.301	1.301	1.301
137Cs	7.28ˑ10-10	3.595ˑ106	4.05ˑ105	4.1ˑ103
144Ce	2.82ˑ10-8	1.413ˑ105	0	0
147Pm	8.97ˑ10-9	1.50ˑ105	0	0
Total		6.41ˑ106	6.69ˑ105	6.48ˑ103

Transfer of actinides to the primary coolant depends much on operational peculiarities of a nuclear reactor and on the physical properties of its nuclear fuel. Available design documents of the AES-2006 do not contain information about actinide content in the coolant and in radioactive waste. Rough estimation of actinide activity is 4.38ˑ103 Bq/kg.
Almost all long-lived radionuclides contained in operational radioactive waste are ‘soft’ beta- emitters (3H, 14C, 59Ni, 60Co, 63Ni, 90Sr, 94Nb, 137Cs, 99Tc, 129I). Uranium isotopes 235U, 238U, and transuranic radionuclides 238Pu, 239Pu, 240Pu, 242Pu and 242Cm are alpha-emitters.
In the following, the technical indicators of criterion CR1.1.1 — cited at the beginning of this section — are quantified. The two types of radioactive waste considered are:

• Spent fuel;
• Operational waste.

Total activity of radioactive waste
At the moment of assessment the data on isotopic composition of AES-2006 spent fuel were not available to the assessors. Average concentrations of major isotopes in a fuel of selected reactor type (i.e. of a pressurised reactor, assuming that fuel rods diameters and enrichments are similar) depend primarily on a fuel burnup, water-uranium ratio and to some extent on the integrated burnable poison used. The fuel burnup and water-uranium ratio in large VVER reactors including AES-2006 are linked to the economic efficiency of reactor performance and competitiveness. They are expected to be similar to the PWR reactors of the same capacity and age. A burnable poison used in VVER reactors may differ from poisons used in western PWR (e.g. AP-1000) but this effect is limited by the relatively low share of fuel pins containing admixture of this poison (normally this share in VVER amounts up to 2-4%). Assessors deem that for the purpose of this study the activity of AES-2006 spent fuel may be approximately evaluated through the activity of typical PWR spent fuel.
Table 19 lists the main radionuclides and their activity in TBq in a spent fuel assembly (FA) from an AP1000 after 90 years cooling time.

Table 19. Radionuclide activities for one spent fuel assembly from AP1000, typical PWR

Nuclide	AP-1000 SF, TBq per FA
14C	0.83ˑ10-1
36Cl	0.91ˑ10-3
59Ni	0.39ˑ10-1
79Se	0.27ˑ10-2
90Sr	0.29ˑ103
99Tc	0.48
126Sn	2.19ˑ10-2
129I	1.08ˑ10-3
135Cs	2.02ˑ10-2
137Cs	0.50ˑ103
233U	1.29ˑ10-5
234U	0.43ˑ10-1
235U	1.84ˑ10-4
236U	0.81ˑ10-2
238U	0.61ˑ10-2
237Np	1.63ˑ10-2
238Pu	1.04ˑ102
239Pu	0.76ˑ101
240Pu	1.60ˑ101
241Pu	0.51ˑ102
242Pu	1.09ˑ10-1
241Am	1.23ˑ102
242mAm	0.47
243mAm	1.81

• Total activity of spent fuel to be discharged annually from AES-2006 unit operating in equilibrium reloading regime is about 10²⁰ Bq, i.e. 0.95ˑ10²⁰ Bq/GW·a.

Total activity of operational radioactive waste is about 2ˑ10¹⁴ Bq/GW·a according to.